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Abstract  
  
Nietzsche, Sin and Redemption  
  
In this thesis, I use the work of Friedrich Nietzsche to offer a detailed account of existential 
sin. I show that existential sin as a form of self-understanding is deeply embedded in the 
Christian theological tradition, and that Nietzsche’s account of existential sin should be 
understood as part of this same tradition.  In my reading of On the Genealogy of Morality I 
show that we need to place sin in close relation to bad conscience, guilt and the genealogical 
method itself. However, despite being grounded in Christian thought and dependent upon the 
figure of the Christian God in its origin and emergence, I follow Nietzsche in positing 
that existential sin continues to exist after the death of God. It is by considering sin as not 
only a form of self-understanding, but also as a cultural memory, that we can make sense of 
this claim.   
  
For Nietzsche existential sin is at its root a mistaken understanding of human nature that has 
taken hold of us through Christianity. However, I argue that we need to consider existential 
sin as a socio-historical answer to the ontological problem of meaningless 
suffering. Existential sin responds to a fundamental experience of the human condition. With 
this in mind, in the final chapter of the thesis I examine possible avenues of redemption from 
post-Christian sin. What options are open to the person suffering from post-Christian sin-
consciousness if she cannot turn to religious narratives? I argue that Nietzsche’s redemptive 
method of genealogy is not sufficient, and that life-affirmation is too demanding. However, a 
weaker version of life-affirmation in which meaningless suffering is affirmed as necessary, 
but not desired, does provide a promising alternative answer to the problem of meaningless 
suffering.  
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Introduction 
 
After Buddha was dead, they still showed his shadow in a cave for centuries 
– a tremendous, gruesome shadow. God is dead; but given the way people 
are, there may still for millennia be caves in which they show his shadow. – 
And we –we must still defeat his shadow as well! (GS: 108) 
 
 
We live in a world that is inundated with messages about the importance of self-improvement. 
When we walk into a bookstore or open a magazine, we read reviews of the latest popular 
self-help book, interviews with so-called ‘self-made’ individuals, we read about the 
importance of self-improvement, how mindfulness and meditation can make us more efficient 
human beings, and many similar stories. Books with techniques for living better and more 
efficient lives such as The Secret, The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People, The Subtle Art of 
Not Giving a F*ck, 12 Rules for Life and The Power of Habit frequently top best-seller lists. 
In these books we learn that we are responsible for our own success and failures. After all, the 
message is that if we work hard enough on every aspect of our lives, we will succeed. In 
many ways, this is the message that we are happy to hear; “[t]he figure of the self-made 
man—and more recently that of the self-made woman—comforts and consoles us, suggesting 
that vast material, social, and personal success are available to anyone who is willing to work 
long and hard enough.” (McGee 2005: 13). 
However, when we take a closer look, it becomes clear why there is a downside to this culture 
of self-help. Take, for example, language we often hear used in relation to cancer diagnoses 
and treatment. Cancer can be “beaten”, by a “positive attitude”, patients are considered to be 
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“fighters”, who can win the “battle” (see for example Jardin 2017). Cancer is thought of as an 
opponent that can be defeated, as long as the patient is dedicated enough. By using this kind 
of language, we suggest that it is an individual’s spirit and fight that decides, or at the very 
least influences, the outcome of the illness. This, of course, is at the very least simplistic, and 
at worst offensive. There are many aspects of physical and mental illnesses that we cannot 
influence, and to attribute this to the failing of the patient is highly problematic. 
So why is this still a common way to talk about illnesses such as cancer? The answer to this 
question can be found in the comfort that McGee described above. We do not wish to think of 
ourselves as helpless to the world, the victims of (bad) luck and fate. The fact that any of us 
can become terminally ill at any point, without any regard for who we are and how hard we 
work – this is, for many, unbearable. The world is unpredictable and in many ways “morally 
inhospitable” (Dews 2008: 118) but in order to make it easier for us to exist in this world we 
choose to ignore this. We need to understand why one person suffers more than another, and 
we need to be able to feel like we can control our own happiness and suffering. In a response 
to a critic, Russian author Lydia Chukovskaya identifies this desire: "[t]he human mind, 
unwilling to reconcile itself to the senseless, looks for reasons to explain every case" and  
claims that this desire can lead to uninformed attempts to explain suffering (1990: 5th 
paragraph).1 
All of the above examples are nothing more than contemporary expressions of an experience 
as old as humanity, and indeed an essential part of what it means to be human. This 
experience can best be described as an inability to accept meaningless suffering. One of its 
most profound expressions can be found in the Book of Job. Job is described as the most 																																																								
1 It could be argued that Chukovskaya falls prey to this same desire that she attributes to John Russell. In her 
letter, she clearly gives an explanation for the death of her husband by the Russian authorities: quotas. However, 
I would argue that her point is that the explanation of 'quotas' is often considered to be an insufficient 
explanation: we want to think that there must be a reason why particular individuals were targeted during the 
Great Purge, and that it cannot all have been a case of bad luck. 	
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upstanding person on earth; “a blameless and upright man who fears God and turns away 
from evil” (Job 1:8). However, in response to a challenge from Satan2, God takes away 
everything from Job: his children, livestock and property, and his health. When they see Job 
suffer so terribly, his friends argue that he must have sinned; he must have done something to 
upset God as otherwise the suffering simply makes no sense. Eliphaz tells us that “as I have 
seen, those who plow iniquity and sow trouble reap the same.” (Job 4:8). Bildad argues that 
Job must repent as “If you will seek God, and make supplication to the Almighty, if you are 
pure and upright, surely then he will rouse himself for you and restore to you your rightful 
place”, explicitly saying that “God will not reject a blameless person” (Job 8:5-6, 20). Zophar 
even argues that “God exacts of you less than your guilt deserves” (Job 11:6), stating that Job 
deserves his punishment. Despite Job’s insistence that he is innocent, his friends cannot 
accept this as true, because there must be a good reason for Job’s suffering. It cannot be the 
case that he is suffering unjustly, as this goes against their understanding of God, against their 
entire world-view. 
Job points out that their account of the world is rather simplistic, as plenty of ‘wicked’ people 
live until old age, and there is much suffering of innocent people in the world that God does 
not in fact respond to; “from the city the dying groan, and the throat of the wounded cries for 
help; yet God pays no attention to their prayer.” (Job 24:12). The fact that the world is like 
this is ground for despair and anger in Job (“when I think of it I am dismayed, and shuddering 
seizes my flesh” (Job 21:6). Job wishes that there was something he could do to appease his 
suffering, he wishes there were sins he could atone for, and above all he wishes he could 
speak to God. Why is God making him suffer so much? The fact that Job’s wife tells him he 
should “curse God and die” (Job 2:9) seems quite reasonable: how can one make sense of 
God allowing for this suffering to continue? 																																																								
2 ‘Satan’ meaning ‘Accuser’, from the Hebrew ha-satan (.(ןָטָשַׂה) 
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God’s response to Job does very little to explain why he is suffering. His response from out of 
the whirlwind emphasizes the lack of knowledge and understanding in Job, and much of the 
passage is God reminding Job of all the things that he, as God, can do, but Job, as human, 
cannot. No part of the response explains why Job was suffering. God does not explain nor 
apologise, but he does say to Eliphaz, Bildad and Zophar “you have not spoken of me what is 
right, as my servant Job has” (Job 42:7).  
We must therefore read the Book of Job as a meditation on meaningless and undeserved 
suffering. The explicitly religious message that we are given is that it is not on us to question 
God (see also Ecclesiastes 8), and that God’s actions cannot be explained by a narrow 
framework such as that proposed by Job’s friends. Although this religious message may not 
resonate as much with us now, when we remove the concept of ‘God’ and replace it with 
something such as ‘the world’, it becomes clear how little our concerns have changed. Indeed, 
we are still attracted to views such as those of Job’s friends, where illnesses can be fought by 
the person suffering from them (whether it be through repentance or positive thinking). Most 
importantly, the question of ‘why?’ is one I am sure we have all asked in relation to our own, 
or someone else’s, suffering. ‘Why do good people suffer?’ is a question that we demand an 
answer for, despite the reality that it often cannot be answered by anything other than because 
of ‘sheer dumb luck’.   
It is important not to confuse these questions with an inability to accept suffering as such, it is 
rather suffering that we cannot explain that bothers us. We know, as do Job and his friends, 
that suffering exists. For Job and his friends, the problem appears because they understand 
suffering as divine punishment.  If suffering is divine punishment, then there must be a reason 
why Job is being punished. In other words, we feel the need to explain and understand the 
suffering we see in the world.  
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In addition to the above, another example is the increased interest in the pathology of criminal 
offenders, in particular violent offenders and psychopaths. An impressive amount of books 
written, TV shows and documentaries on this topic are continuously made. What drives this 
interest is the need to understand why these crimes were committed. The why requires an 
answer – we will not be satisfied by any claim that someone simply happened to become a 
criminal. Instead, what we want to hear are underlying psychological, physiological, social, or 
environmental reasons for why a violent act was committed. Similarly, when natural disasters 
strike, we can find a wide array of explanations in the media. Conservative and evangelical 
preachers claim that natural disasters are a sign of divine retribution, in particular that these 
disasters are God’s response to the acceptance of homosexuality.3 Though controversial and 
morally objectionable, there is a reason why these preachers are given a much larger platform 
after such events. We seek answers to the question of why tragedies occur – even when the 
answer itself is problematic.  
It is the consequences of this need to explain meaningless suffering that I am primarily 
interested in. One of the historically prevalent ways in which the problem of meaningless 
suffering has been responded to, is the concept of sin. In this thesis I will argue that sin, 
although also offering us relief, has brought with it additional suffering. This suffering relates 
to the self-understanding that sin presupposes – namely that human beings are innately 
deserving of suffering.  
Sin can explain suffering in two ways; firstly it designates some acts as sinful and therefore 
deserving of punishment, and secondly it depicts human nature as essentially guilty before 
God and therefore deserving of suffering. These two different sides of sin roughly correspond 
with the theological concepts of ‘acts of sin’ and ‘original sin’ respectively. The Book of Job 																																																								
3 We can think here of figures such as Rabbi Yehuda Levin, Pastor John McTernan, Rt Rev Graham Dow, and 
preacher Cindy Jacobs. 
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illustrates both types of sin very well; firstly, Job’s friends are convinced that Job must have 
committed a specific act for which he is being punished. They endeavour to convince him of 
this – that there must be something he has done that has angered God. However, Bildad also 
asks: “How then can a mortal be righteous before God? How can one born of woman be 
pure?  If even the moon is not bright and the stars are not pure in his sight, how much less a 
mortal, who is a maggot, and a human being, who is a worm!” (Job 25: 4-6). Here, he is not 
speaking of particular acts, but rather human nature as a whole.  
In order to offer a philosophically robust account of sin as responding to the ontological 
problem of meaningless suffering, I will turn to the work of Friedrich Nietzsche. In On the 
Genealogy of Morality, he explicitly frames sin as following:  
‘Sin’ – for that is the name for the priestly reinterpretation of the animal ‘bad 
conscience’ (cruelty turned back on itself) – has been the greatest event in the history 
of the sick soul up till now: with sin, we have the most dangerous and disastrous trick 
of religious interpretation. Man, suffering from himself in some way, at all events 
physiologically, rather like an animal imprisoned in a cage, unclear as to why? what 
for? And yearning for reasons – reasons bring relief –, yearning for cures and narcotics 
as well, finally consults someone who knows hidden things too – and lo and behold! 
from this magician, the ascetic priest, he receives the first tip as to the ‘cause’ of his 
suffering: he should look for it within himself, in guilt, in a piece of the past, he should 
understand his suffering itself as a condition of punishment . .” (GM III:20) 
Nietzsche here describes precisely the issue we are concerned with: people need to understand 
why they are suffering. The figure of the ‘ascetic priest’ responds to this need by positing the 
concept of sin as providing an answer, namely that people themselves are to blame for their 
suffering. This answer, Nietzsche tells us, is problematic in its own ways. Indeed, we will see 
later in this introduction and throughout the thesis that although sin may explain meaningless 
suffering, it itself also causes suffering.  
The claims that we are concerned with should be placed in two different spheres; the 
ontological and the socio-historical. The problem of meaningless suffering is an ontological 
problem that is a part of what it means to be human. However, when we talk about sin as 
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responding to meaningless suffering, we have to look at sin as a socio-historical, contingent, 
response to the ontological problem. And this is indeed precisely what Nietzsche does. This 
thesis is primarily concerned with the concept and experience of sin, and therefore with the 
particular socio-historical response to the ontological problem of meaningless suffering. The 
suffering that is caused by sin should be interpreted similarly. When I talk about meaningless 
suffering in this thesis, I am referring to the ontological problem of meaningless suffering, yet 
when I speak about the suffering caused by sin, it is a contingent socio-historical suffering.  
In attempting to understand the concept of sin, it is important to understand its history. Sin has 
historically been understood in a number of different ways. When a specific act is considered 
to be sinful, this means that it is a transgression against God and religious laws. In some 
sense, designating an act as sinful appears to be synonymous with judging it to be morally 
wrong. This form of sin is localized and act-specific, thereby it need not affect any 
understanding of the person who commits an act. There is a further way of understanding sin 
that focuses primarily on the person, however. This is sin as a burden or a weight, as a 
blemish or punishment. Often spoken of in relation to original sin, we are speaking here of a 
concept with an existential dimension. To be sinful means not merely to have committed a 
transgressive act, but rather that one’s nature is somehow corrupted.  
What we therefore might call “sin-consciousness” is different from locally-reactive guilt. We 
are not talking about feeling guilty in response to certain actions or events. Instead, sin-
consciousness refers to an overarching, existential sense of wrongness. This can take several 
different shapes. We might say that this sin-consciousness is a reflection of our fragility, that 
what it means is that we are aware of just how weak we are in the face of the world. We could 
also interpret it as being a reflection of human nature as a plague upon this earth, that human 
beings as such are abominable. Or perhaps we can think of a more individualistic 
interpretation, where individual agents will feel themselves as bad and corrupted to the core, 
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as a ‘mistake’. For now, I would like to allow these different interpretations to remain 
possibilities, and focus on what they have in common: a sense of global wrongness.  
There has been a decline in belief in the Christian God, or in Nietzschean terms, God has 
died. We might be tempted to assume that, given this decline, ‘sin’ as an existential 
experience has also declined. If we accept that there are now more people who would identify 
as non-religious than as Christian, and there are thereby more people who do not accept the 
theological story of sin, then there is no reason to think that they would still experience 
themselves as sinful. When Nietzsche talks about shadows that remain after the death of God 
in The Gay Science 108, he perhaps refers to Christmas songs, to Christian holidays, to 
Christian schools. They do not refer to anything quite as internal as forms of self-
understanding – on this line of thought we have moved beyond sin as a way of relating to 
ourselves. The Christian concept of sin is now only meaningful for those who still believe in 
God, and their number has been dwindling steadily since the early twentieth century. If we 
think about the world from a secular perspective, this concept of sin no longer has value to us.  
It is precisely this attitude, but with regards to evil, that Peter Dews describes in The Idea of 
Evil:  
From the secular, naturalistic perspective prevalent amongst citizens in many Western 
societies it is tempting to regard the question of theodicy – and more generally, the 
philosophical problems of evil – as the product of an antiquated conception of the 
world. It is only if we assume the existence of a benevolent and omnipotent creator, it 
seems, that we encounter acute difficulties in explaining the existence of suffering and 
moral evil. (2008: 118) 
The problem of evil, and the concept of sin, belong to “antiquated conception[s] of the 
world”, and depend upon belief in God. If we reject God, however, the problem of evil will 
not appear as an acute problem, and similarly, the concept of sin will not appear as a form of 
self-understanding that acutely calls upon us.  If we accept this viewpoint, we must focus our 
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inquiries on sin or evil within the field of theology, or redirect our philosophical efforts 
altogether. It might be interesting for the history of philosophy to discuss sin, but it certainly 
will not help us understand our contemporary lives. I believe that the perspective just outlined 
is misguided: the perspective, that is, in which the concept of sin and experiences of 
sinfulness are no longer relevant to us.  
Secularization 
Our starting point is contemporary Western European culture, which is a culture that is often 
thought of as secularized. Certainly when we think about the importance of Christianity in 
Western Europe, the overarching view is that it is much less important to us than it was, say, 
200 years ago. This is the process of secularization. In sociological and historical literature, 
many other changes are linked to secularization, such as modernity, the advent of modern 
science, new religious movements, and moral nihilism.4 The overall picture is one wherein we 
now understand the world and ourselves better, through scientific endeavours such as physics, 
neuroscience and the biomedical fields. We no longer rely on the concept of a God in order to 
explain the world or to make sense of ourselves: we are able to more rationally reflect upon 
the reality of existence.5  
Some of these claims regarding secularization are no doubt contentious. We find debates, for 
example, about whether or not secularization is necessarily related to the onset of modernity 
and science, and whether it is thereby a necessary consequence of our time: they also consider 
whether Western Europe is actually an exception, or if this process will also occur in other 
parts of the world. For now these discussions are not relevant. I shall not rely in this thesis on 
any particular sociological account of the process of secularization, nor is there any need to 																																																								
4 For more detailed explorations of this thought, see Eagleton, T., 2014, Culture and the Death of God (Yale 
University Press) and Taylor, C., 2007, A Secular Age (Harvard University Press) 
5 Nietzsche, and he is not alone in this, argues that this development of modernity is the product of Christianity 
itself. 	
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make global claims about the importance of religion. Within sociological literature on 
secularization, however, one claim appears uncontested: that there are less people who 
identify as Christian in Western European societies now than there were 100 years ago. 
In Steve Bruce’s God is Dead we can find, for example, that in the UK between 1851 and 
1998 church attendance was reduced from 40-60% to 7.5% (2002: 63-64). Bruce himself 
points out the limitation of this kind of data; there are more people who do profess to believe 
in God than people who attend church. Therefore, if we want to be able to say anything 
salient about the importance of Christianity, we must somehow also track belief. To this end, 
Bruce turns to data on people who believe in a personal creator God. Here there is a decline 
noticeable from the 1950s to 2000, namely from 43% to 26% (ibid. 71). Furthermore, we can 
find evidence that in the UK that there is a significant downward trend in people identifying 
themselves as religious. Clive Field shows three important findings for this current project: in 
2011, only 35% of individuals in the UK identified as religious (2015: 311). A 2014 MORI 
poll showed that only 10% of those questioned considered religion an important part of their 
identity (ibid. 319). Finally, between the 1970s and 2015 the self-assessed importance of 
religion to adults in the UK went from 51% to 30% (ibid. 320). Again we see here a 
downward trend, as well as the sense that the number of people who identify themselves as 
religious in the UK are, generally speaking, a significant minority.6 
The data compiled and analysed by Bruce and Field are not exceptional: these trends have by 
now been described in a large body of empirical research. In fact, when we look at 
sociological literature on religion or secularization in Western Europe, it becomes clear that 
even though the particular definition of secularization or the analysis of it might differ, there 																																																								
6 Field further states that “the range of objective quantitative evidence for overall religious decline is relatively 
narrow and often discontinuous. It therefore requires supplementation by more subjective sources, reflecting 
claimed patterns of religious belonging, behaving, and believing.” (2015: 309). The methodological concerns 
Field raises here are important to consider, as they reflect the difficulty in really measuring the importance of 
religion for individuals. 
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is no doubt about the decline of the importance of Christianity in Western Europe. In On 
Secularization, David Martin employs a hermeneutics of suspicion towards different versions 
of the secularization thesis, but does not question the secularization of Western Europe. Peter 
Berger’s seminal The Social Reality of Religion similarly concerns itself with the 
interpretation of the processes of secularization, but states that they are “empirically available 
processes of great importance in modern Western history (1973: 112) and that “the modern 
West has produced an increasing number of individuals who look upon the world and their 
own lives without the benefit of religious interpretations.” (ibid. 113). Grace Davie even 
states in her The Sociology of Religion that “the notion of secularization as an identifiable 
social process is inextricably bound up with the discipline of sociology as such” (2007: 47). 
My philosophical project is grounded upon this broad sociological consensus.  
Sin as socio-historical 
The focus of this thesis is primarily on sin as a socio-historical concept. In this thesis I will 
argue that the concept of sin as developed by Christianity has become a part of how people in 
Western European societies are given to understand themselves. This is not the same as 
supporting a theological account of sin, in which its reality is underpinned by our relationship 
to the real, existing God. This belief in God is not necessary for the experience of sinfulness. 
Not only is it not necessary, but someone can actually understand themselves as a sinner 
whilst openly rejecting the existence of God. We can therefore have a person who consciously 
rejects any theological underpinnings to her sense of self but who nonetheless continues to 
experience herself in ways that seem to force the concept of sin on her.   
This claim seems paradoxical: how could it make sense for a person to reject the theological 
underpinnings of the concept of sin and yet, on the other hand, continue to experience herself 
as sinful or a sinner? At the heart of this antinomy is a question about the ontological status of 
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a concept such as sin. What is it dependent on in order for it to be of meaning to us? Can we 
still use the concept of sin without referring to a god, or will this render it too opaque? Is 
belief in existence of God only required for the origin and perhaps emergence of sin, and can 
this concept then take on a life of its own as a form of self-understanding?  
In order to answer these questions, I suggest that we need to look at a second way in which 
‘secularized’ Western European culture relates to religion. This is a tendency to conceive of 
Western European cultures as Judeo-Christian (often used in contrast to Islamic cultures). 
Indeed, many people express the idea that this heritage ought to be cherished and in some way 
held onto. There is a tendency to believe that we should still be looking at the historical 
presence of Christianity for moral and behavioural guidance. After all, the line goes, if we 
want to be well-integrated participants in this culture we need to be sensitive towards its 
cultural history. This argument is often used with regards to immigrants and asylum seekers, 
for example, who are asked to adapt to Western European culture by respecting historical 
customs and beliefs.7  
These two different movements – the move away from religion together with a continuing 
emphasis upon its historical importance - are clearly not necessarily contradictory. On one 
approach, we need to enforce a sharp distinction between them, and say that in the case of 
morality, referring to our Christian heritage is necessary in order to retain order and an 
ethically robust society - but that, in the case of knowledge and critical thinking, we want to 
trust in science instead. We cannot rely on the foundations of Christianity anymore, but we 
can rely on sciences to help us explain the world around us. In this picture, science has simply 																																																								
7 For example, in The Netherlands there exists a custom in which people dress up as in black face in order to 
represent Black Pete, the ‘helper’ of Sinterklaas (loosely based on St. Nicholas of Myra). Although 
contemporary political theory and race theory are clear in the negative effects of customs such as black face, the 
public debate will often see people defend the custom based on its historical significance in the culture 
(Sinterklaas being the most important holiday of the year for many). This is often fleshed out in terms of 
‘outsiders’ coming in to criticize Dutch culture, and in particular we can find a rhetoric that blames people of 
other religions wanting to change ‘Judeo-Christian’ culture.  
		 18	
usurped some of Christianity’s functions. Christian heritage lives alongside science: they 
simply belong to different spheres of society. 
However, some problems arise here. Besides the fact that morality and scientific knowledge 
cannot be entirely separated from one another, there are also problems with the particular 
roles that science and religion actually do play in our society. Morality influences the 
scientific endeavours that are undertaken and the value we attach to them, and scientific 
findings can influence our moral judgements (we can think here of neuroscientific research 
into psychopathy). Furthermore, we cannot simply posit that the overarching cultural 
narrative concerning morality is that Christianity ought to play a role. Not only are there those 
who would deny Christianity any reason to play a role, but we also often hear about people 
being concerned about the status of moral judgments now that Christianity is no longer 
important. This latter concern would not have appeared if there was a consensus that morality 
is still the sphere of religion now. We see this concern expressed in, for example, Larry 
Siedentop’s Inventing the Individual, where he writes on the very first page: “[p]eople who 
live in nations once described as part of Christendom – what many would now call the post-
Christian world – seem to have lost their moral bearings. We no longer have a persuasive 
story to tell ourselves about our origins and development.” (2015: 1)  
Here Siedentop suggests that it is actually a significant aspect of life in a ‘post-Christian’ 
world that we no longer have a foundation for our morality, by contrast with the era in which 
Christianity was a prominent part of life and culture in Western Europe. The Christian 
narratives and doctrines offered us a way of understanding the world and human beings as 
well as how we ought to act in this world. But the power of these narratives has faded away. 
Siedentop here demonstrates that we cannot simply assign Christianity to one sphere of our 
lives. With the process of secularization, Christianity’s influence in Western European society 
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lessened as a whole, and this impacted upon the field of morality as well as other areas of 
people’s lives. 
‘Post-Christian’ 
There is one phrase Siedentop uses that requires some elucidation, as I will also be employing 
it in my thesis. This is the concept of ‘post-Christian’. In some sense it simply means that we 
live somewhere that has historically been Christian, but is not anymore. Or at the very least, it 
is no longer as Christian as it once was, but the historical impact of Christianity should be 
acknowledged. Rowan Williams uses the concept to explain precisely that view: “[i]f I say 
that this is a post-Christian nation, that doesn’t mean necessarily non-Christian. It means the 
cultural memory is still quite strongly Christian. And in some ways, the cultural presence is 
still quite strongly Christian.” (Moreton 2014). Note that Williams says that our cultural 
memory is still Christian, and that this has its effect upon our culture now. This makes it clear 
why we would want to talk about post-Christian, rather than ‘secular’ or ‘atheist’ – the 
reference to Christianity is essential. ‘Secular’ and ‘atheist’ can be understood in reference to 
any religion (and perhaps any culture), whereas post-Christian declares itself more precisely. 
We can think here that ‘post-Christian’ is a helpful term for differentiating Western European 
culture from cultures that might also be somewhat secularized but do not have the background 
of Christianity. 
Similarly, Daphne Hampson writes:  
I am post-Christian. Post-Christian because Christianity (and not Islam) is the 
historical context within which my religious sensibilities were formed. But definitely 
post-Christian because I do not believe […] that God could be related in a particular 
way to a particular age or to one particular person Jesus Christ. (1990: 42).  
Hampson here tells us that she does not identify as Christian, but she does acknowledge that 
the ways in which she understands the world, in this case her ‘religious sensibilities’, are 
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inextricably linked to Christianity. She is explicit about rejecting Christian doctrines, 
however, and particularly the doctrine of the incarnation. Now if we generalize Hampson’s 
view, we might phrase it as something like the following: I am post-Christian because I live 
in (and was brought up in) a historically Christian culture that still carries this heritage with it. 
This means that I learned how to understand the world and religion in the context of this 
history. But, I am post-Christian, because I reject the Christian theological doctrines 
themselves.  
When I write about the post-Christian in this thesis, this is in accordance with both Williams’ 
and Hampson’s use of the phrase. However, there is an added element to the experience of the 
post-Christian that is signalled by neither of these thinkers, but is essential to my use of the 
term. Living in a post-Christian culture means not only living in a culture with a Christian 
heritage, but also living in a culture that has the heritage of modernity: a culture that has a 
move away from Christianity embedded within it. Our culture offers us two different 
messages. Firstly, we are to respect and acknowledge the importance of Christianity for our 
culture historically; secondly we are to accept that with the advent of science and modernity 
we no longer need God or Christian doctrines in order to explain and understand that world. 
Both of these messages make up the ‘post-Christian’. In other words, living in a post-
Christian culture means living not only in a culture with Christian heritage, but also in a 
culture that has the heritage of modernity and a move away from Christianity embedded in it. 
Our culture offers us two different messages. Unsurprisingly, these two messages are often 
conflicting.  
Sin as pre-reflective  
We have observed that our post-Christian culture inscribes two different messages: on the one 
hand, the on-going importance and value of our Christian heritage and, on the other hand, our 
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having moved decisively away from Christianity and calls for ever more thoroughgoing 
secularisation. I posit that these two messages are often-times conflicting. Although there are 
undoubtedly many different ways in which this conflict will show up, I will be focusing on 
one. This is the way in which this double heritage affects us in our self-understanding. Post-
Christians understand themselves as no longer requiring religion, and some are explicitly 
atheist. At the same time however, the culture in which they find themselves still carries 
within it elements of Christianity. And this impacts upon post-Christians, even on those who 
would consider themselves atheists and consciously deny the existence of God and the 
validity of Christian doctrines.    
In this thesis I will argue that we can think of sin-consciousness as one of these Christian 
remnants. Sin-consciousness is a mode of self-relation that tends to go underneath the radar of 
explicit beliefs and judgments.8  I will argue that post-Christians can continue pre-reflectively 
to relate to themselves as sinners even while they reflectively disavow belief in God. This 
claim is fraught with difficulties however, and so the goal for this introduction is to render the 
hypothesis intelligible, and to argue that post-Christian sin-consciousness is a genuine 
possibility.  
We have to ask if this sin-consciousness can, paradoxically, be pre-reflective. Can we have a 
form of self-understanding that flies under the radar of reflective judgment? Reflective beliefs 
are what allow the post-Christian to identify herself as an atheist. Here a reflective disavowal 
of God can, and often is, part of the way in which the post-Christian consciously understands 
herself.9 Now, if we take sin-consciousness to be a pre-reflective self-relation, this means that 																																																								
8 With self-relation I am referring to, simply put, the way in which we relate to ourselves. Kierkegaard famously 
uses the term in The Sickness Unto Death when he writes that “the self is a relation which relates to itself, or that 
in the relation which is its relating to itself. The self is not the relation but the relation’s relating to itself” (2004: 
43). I am not committed to this interpretation of self-relation, my use of it is closer to “self-understanding”, but 
does not have the same allusion to conscious reflection that ‘understanding’ has. 
9 I am deliberately avoiding a discussion on identity here. Whether or not reflective judgments and pre-reflective 
modes of self-relation are constitutive of a person’s identity is an interesting question, but not relevant to this 
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sin-consciousness will be a part of the way in which the post-Christian understands herself, 
but not consciously so, and this complicates matters. The relevant reflective judgment of an 
atheist can be phrased as "I reject God, and I know that I reject God". It is transparent to her 
that she holds the belief ‘I reject God’, so she is able to also affirm the second-order belief 
that she knows she rejects God. Sin-consciousness as a pre-reflective self-relation would 
involve relating to oneself as a sinner, at some primitive level, but not doing so reflectively 
and thematically. It would be as if one were looking at the world through a pair of coloured 
lenses, without knowing that this is the case. The lenses impact how she perceives the world, 
but unless she knew they were there, she would have no reason to believe that there is any 
such thing in place that would colour the world differently. Of course the implication of this 
analogy that there is an innocent, ‘natural’ way to look at the world may well be unhelpful. 
After all, the post-Christian’s atheism is also like a lens through which she experiences the 
world. The difference, however, relates to transparency; the post-Christian is aware the she 
sees the world as an atheist, but she is not conscious of experiencing the world and herself 
through sin-consciousness.  
This preliminary account of post-Christian sin leaves unanswered a number of questions. 
How is possible for sin-consciousness to fly under the radar of reflective thought? How is this 
post-Christian sin-consciousness related to the concept of sin that we find throughout that 
Christian tradition? And how can the post-Christian ‘sinner’ become aware of the presence of 
her sin-consciousness? In order to answer these questions I will turn to Nietzsche’s 
philosophy. My aim in the body of this thesis is to illuminate Nietzsche’s thought about these 
matters and thereby provide convincing answers to all these questions.  
																																																																																																																																																																													
current project. Works that do discuss this topic are, among others, Judith Butler’s Giving an Account of Oneself, 
Dan Zahavi’s Subjectivity and Selfhood and Paul Ricoeur’s Oneself as Another.  
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This thesis contains four chapters. In the first chapter, I will offer a historical overview of sin 
in Christian thought. I will argue that in order to understand the category of existential sin, we 
have to become familiar with other concepts such as transgressive sin, sin as guilt, acts of sin 
and original sin. By focusing on Biblical writings, as well as thinkers such as Paul, Augustine, 
Aquinas and Tillich, I establish existential sin as a socio-historical form of self-understanding 
that is an essential part of the Christian belief system. The first chapter will provide a 
structured way of thinking about sin that will be mirrored in the second chapter. The second 
chapter will be dedicated to three different, but related, ways in which Nietzsche understands 
sin: sin as transgression, sin as debt, and sin as an existential sense of self. The latter of these 
will contain an in-depth analysis of the passage quoted above that contains Nietzsche’s most 
powerful description of the experience of sin, which he argues is made possible by the 
Christian church. Before turning to this, however, I first explore earlier works in which 
Nietzsche understands sin primarily as a transgression against God and religious law. In The 
Birth of Tragedy, Daybreak, Human, All-Too-Human, and The Gay Science we find such 
accounts, and I will argue that already there we find a distinction Nietzsche makes between 
Jewish and Christian forms of sin. For Nietzsche, there is a specifically Christian way to 
relate to the Law, which he traces back to St. Paul. The law here functions as a tool not to 
enable people to act as ethically as they can, but rather to feel as sinful as possible. Here, 
therefore, is some kind of existential dimension to the experience of sin: a transgression of the 
law is not taken as an isolated incident. The second half of the chapter is dedicated to On the 
Genealogy of Morality, and the specific accounts of sin as debt and existential sin that it 
offers. I argue that, for Nietzsche, indebtedness towards the Christian God becomes 
transformed into existential sin.  
Furthermore, the second chapter serves to argue against certain interpretations of Nietzsche 
that hold his moral psychology to be entirely secular. I argue that the notion of moralized 
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guilt, in the form of existential sin, is a religious concept for Nietzsche. I will show that 
Nietzsche’s understanding of sin is rooted in the Christian tradition. The way in which 
Nietzsche understands sin, in any of the shapes he discusses, is congruent with much of 
Christian thought. The experience of existential sin that he describes in the Genealogy 
belongs in a long-established tradition that began with Paul, and continued with thinkers such 
as Calvin and Kierkegaard.  
The second chapter raises a question about the nature of Nietzsche’s account of sin. I show 
that his understanding of sin is very similar to important accounts in the history of Christian 
thought, but Nietzsche himself was, famously, not a Christian thinker. This may lead us to ask 
why sin is such an important problem for Nietzsche. After all, did he not declare that God is 
dead? In the third chapter I will argue that, for Nietzsche, existential sin has continued to exist 
after the ‘death of God’. In order to show this, I first offer a detailed analysis of the death of 
God, focusing in particular on the status of the ‘shadows’ that Nietzsche tells us remain after 
God’s demise. Although Nietzsche’s work clearly contains the hypothesis of sin after the 
death of God, it remains unclear throughout his work exactly how we can conceptualize this 
possibility. I will therefore turn to Paul Ricoeur and Hans Blumenberg in an attempt to answer 
the question of how post-Christian sin is possible. I argue that we can think of existential sin 
as a cultural memory that is deeply embedded in Western European culture.  
One question that remains unanswered is why existential sin has remained as a cultural 
memory. Why does existential sin endure, when other aspects of Christianity no longer play 
an important role for post-Christians? I suggest that the answer to these questions lies in the 
correspondence between existential sin and the human condition. Here, I will explicitly move 
away from Nietzsche, as for him, the concept of sin tells us nothing true about human nature. 
His account of sin relies on a particular judgment of its truth-value: Nietzsche considers the 
concept of sin to misrepresent human nature. However, I will offer a phenomenological 
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account of existential sin that allows us to understand the self-understanding of the sinner as 
an accurate understanding of human nature.  
The fourth and final chapter seeks to answer the question of what is next for the post-
Christian sinner. Assuming that the account I established in the first three chapters is 
plausible, we have to turn to the question of redemption. In the tradition of theology, we 
always find accounts of redemption that correspond to accounts of sin. However, Nietzsche 
convincingly argues why these Christian avenues of redemption are no longer accessible for 
the post-Christian. I consider two Nietzschean redemptive concepts instead: the genealogical 
method and life-affirmation. I will argue that the affirmation of suffering can be considered an 
alternative to existential sin: it responds to the problem of meaningless suffering by offering 
us a framework with which to understand it.  
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Chapter 1  The Concept of Sin in Christian 
Thought 
 
They called God what contradicted and hurt them, and truly, there was much 
heroics in their adoration! And they knew no other way to love their God 
than to nail the human being to a cross! (TZ, ‘On Priests’) 
 
 
The concept of sin has provided an answer to the problem of meaningless suffering that, given 
its prominence in the Christian tradition, has been very persuasive. Before we can begin to 
understand the nature of its appeal, we have to understand exactly what sin is. The first thing 
to point out is that ‘sin’ is a multifaceted concept. There are the conceptual categories of 
‘actual sin’, ‘original sin’ and ‘existential sin’, and furthermore each of these forms of sin can 
be conceived of in various different ways. In this chapter I will focus on sin as transgression, 
sin as debt, and sin as a feeling of guilt. This chapter offers a historical approach to the 
concept of sin in order to explain these different shapes that it can take. However, it is 
impossible to offer a single, definitive account of sin in the Christian tradition. There are 
countless books that offer comprehensive overviews of sin in, for example, the biblical period 
and early Christianity, later Christian thought or more recent theology.10 If we want to 
understand in what way sin, and in particular existential sin, responds to the need for 																																																								
10 See: Anderson, G. A., 2009. Sin: A History. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), Lyonnet, S., 1970, Sin, 
Redemption and Sacrifice: A Biblical and Patristic Study, trans. Sabourin, L. (Rome: Biblical Institute Press), 
Frederikson, P., 2014, Sin: The Early History of an Idea (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), Newhauser 
R.G. & Ridyard, S.J. (eds.), 2012, Sin in Medieval and Early Modern Culture, (York: York Medieval Press), 
Delumeau, J., 1990, Sin and Fear: The Emergence of the Western Guilt Culture, 13th-18th Centuries, trans. 
Nicholson, E. (New York: St. Martin’s Press), Sievernich, M., 1983, Schuld und Sünde in der Theologie der 
Gegenwart (Frankfurt: Verlag Josef Knegt), Häring, B., 1974, Sin in a Secular Age (New York: Doubleday). 
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meaningless suffering, it has to be clear to us exactly what we mean by ' sin'. This chapter 
therefore aims to use historical accounts to elucidate the concept of sin, and in particular 
existential sin.  
1.1 Sin in Christian thought 
A few general remarks about sin will give us a helpful starting point. Firstly, the concept of 
sin has generally been understood in relation to both morality and human nature. This is to 
say that to talk about a sin or a sinner is mainly done with relation to the condemnation of 
certain acts,11 or with a certain analysis of what it means to be human. In the realm of 
morality, we can say the following: when an act is considered sinful, it is simultaneously 
judged as morally wrong. Furthermore, the sinner who commits this act has not only done 
something wrong, but is in fact in some way wrong. The category is existential, not merely 
deontological. It is this notion of existential sin that I, following Nietzsche, argue has been 
taken up as an answer to meaningless suffering. It can be fleshed out in several different 
ways, which I will show throughout this chapter.  
It is important to understand that when we talk about a sinner or a sin, the judgment that it 
implies is severe. A bad act can be considered a thoughtless mistake, or perhaps an oversight. 
When a sinful act is committed out of oversight, Augustine, for example, takes this to mean 
that the person who committed the act is inherently ignorant of what the good is. To designate 
an act as sinful is therefore a reflection upon the moral standing of the act, but to designate a 
person as sinful is not merely to state that she has committed one act of transgression, but 
rather that there is something wrong with her nature.    
 																																																								
11 Following Augustine, Luther and Aquinas, we can understand ‘acts’ to include thoughts. Luther, for example, 
tells us: “[s]in, in the Scripture, means not only the outward works of the body but also all the activities that 
move men to do these works, namely, the inmost heart, with all its powers.” (2012: 278-279).  
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1.1.1 Actual, original and hereditary sin 
In the Christian tradition a distinction has often been made between original and actual sin. 
Actual sin refers to specifics acts of sin that a person does, specific acts that go against God’s 
will. Original sin can be understood in two different ways. Firstly, it can refer to the first sin 
of Adam and Eve, their eating of the fruit in the garden of Eden. Secondly, original sin can 
refer to the concept of hereditary, inherited, sin.  
The first interpretation is based upon Genesis 3. This passage reads:  
The woman said to the serpent, “We may eat of the fruit of the trees in the garden; but 
God said, ‘You shall not eat of the fruit of the tree that is in the middle of the garden, 
nor shall you touch it, or you shall die.’” But the serpent said to the woman, “You will 
not die; for God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will 
be like God, knowing good and evil.” So when the woman saw that the tree was good 
for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to 
make one wise, she took of its fruit and ate; and she also gave some to her husband, 
who was with her, and he ate. (Gen. 3: 2-6) 
Against God’s command, Adam and Eve ate the fruit from the tree in the middle of the 
garden, the tree of good and evil. And this is the original sin, a singular event that was the first 
transgression of God. There are many different interpretations of this particular section of 
Genesis. For example, Lyonnet argues that the sin in Adam and Eve’s eating of the fruit is not 
the fact of their transgression, but rather the internal sin of pride lead to a desire to become 
more like God and therefore preceded the eating of the fruit. However, in Kierkegaard we 
read that Adam and Eve could not have known what God’s prohibition meant without already 
being aware of what good and what evil was: “how could [Adam] understand the difference 
between good and evil when this distinction would follow as a consequence of the enjoyment 
of the fruit?” (1980a: 44). Tillich similarly focuses on the nature of the prohibition. He argues 
that in order to make sense of Genesis, there must have already been present in Adam and Eve 
a “sin that is not yet sin”, which he understands as “the desire to sin” (Tillich 1957: 35). For 
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Nietzsche, the fall is a passive story of transgression, where temptation is the primary 
motivation for the act. He frames the fall narrative as entirely passive, as Eve merely 
succumbs to temptation of the snake, but does not act in a desire to do good. In all of these 
accounts, however, we find that the act of eating the fruit is a transgression against God, 
whether deliberate or not.  
Although Adam’s eating of the fruit can be understood as the first sin and is in that sense 
original, the more common understanding of original sin holds it to be inherited sin. This 
understanding of original sin is seen as a consequence of the Fall.12 It is therefore still related 
to the first sin, as it is because of the eating of the fruit from the tree of good and evil that 
human nature suffers from hereditary sin. This account we find for example in Augustine: 
“God […] justly decreed that from the first pair we should inherit ignorance, difficulty, and 
death, because they, as a result of their sin, fell into error, tribulation and death” (1955: 
3.20.56). Similarly, in Bonaventure original sin is considered a debt to God that we incurred 
due to the Fall, and in Aquinas original sin is “an inordinate disposition of nature” that has 
been transmitted to all from Adam (2016: II.I 82.1). In the article on ‘Original Sin’ in the 
Augsburg Confession we can read that “since the fall of Adam, all men begotten in the natural 
way are born with sin” (1921: Article II), which again emphasizes the hereditary nature of this 
kind of sin. Calvin further emphasizes the impact of Adam’s sin on human nature when he 
writes “[f]or when it is said, that the sin of Adam has made us obnoxious to the justice of 
God, the meaning is not, that we, who are in ourselves innocent and blameless, are bearing his 
guilt, but that since by his transgression, we are all placed under the curse [maledictione],” 
(2006: II.1.8). These theologians all posit that although Adam indeed committed the first sin, 
original sin refers instead to the state of human nature after the fall: since Adam all humans 
have inherited a corrupt nature. 																																																								
12 The German and Dutch words for original sin, Erbsünde and erfzonde are translated literally as ‘inherited sin’.  
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There are important exceptions to the above understanding of original sin as hereditary sin, 
which can for example be found in Kant and Tillich. Both of these thinkers reinterpret the 
meaning of the Fall, and suggest that we should understand the story as symbolic for each 
individual’s experience. Kant interprets the Fall in terms of an “innate propensity to 
transgression”, which can be traced back to a beginning in time in our life “when the use of 
reason had not yet developed” (1998: 6:42). We all have this propensity to transgression, but 
not through any inheritance; “[w]hatever the nature […] of the origin of moral evil in the 
human being, of all the ways of representing its spread and propagation through the members 
of our species and in all generations, the most inappropriate is surely to imagine it as having 
come to us by way of inheritance from our first parents.” (ibid. 6:40). Tillich’s account of 
original sin seeks to emphasize the reality of our existential condition. As such, he considers 
the story of the Fall and notion of original sin to be crucial; “[t]he story of Genesis, chapters 
1-3, if taken as a myth, can guide our description of the transition from essential to existential 
being. It is the profoundest and richest expression of man’s awareness of his existential 
estrangement […]” (Tillich 1957: 31). Tillich differs from Kant in arguing that the Fall does 
not concern a particular point in time, but rather that it designates “the universal destiny of 
estrangement which concerns every man” (ibid. 56). In other words, to exist as a human being 
means to be fallen. 
In all of these accounts, however, hereditary sin is concerned not with particular acts that a 
person commits, but rather their existence or being as a whole. If we were only looking at acts 
of sin we could say that a person commits a sin, but that might not mean she is herself sinful – 
at least, the definition of actual sin does not necessitate it. In the case of original sin, we 
cannot point to an act that has been committed by the person in question that enables the 
diagnosis of sinfulness, but only to her nature as such. It is of course possible within Christian 
thought for a sinful person to commit an act of sin, and I will show later in this chapter that 
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committing acts of sin does reflect upon one’s nature: committing a sinful act leaves a stain 
on oneself. But this stain is not inherently a part of acts of sin, and similarly we can conceive 
of a person with a sinful nature due to hereditary sin who does not commit acts of sin.13 As 
Aquinas puts it; “original sin is passed down from the sin of the first parent to his posterity 
[and] actual sin is passed down from the soul’s will, by way of its moving the members” 
(2016: II.I.81.3). What we therefore see is that hereditary sin is a way of understanding 
human nature, whereas actual sin is a way of understanding actions. 
The distinction between actual and hereditary sin will be important throughout this thesis. In 
the next chapter I will show that Nietzsche’s understanding of sin as transgression focuses on 
acts of sin, whereas his more existential descriptions of sin relate to notions of hereditary sin. 
Therefore, the type of sin that serves as an explanation for meaningless suffering, namely 
existential sin, appears more closely related to notions of hereditary and original sin than acts 
of sin. In section 1.3 I will show that the relation between acts of sin and existential sin can be 
understood by looking at sin as debt and the notion of the body. First, however, I will turn to 
sin as a form of transgression.  
1.2 Sin as transgression 
When we speak of acts of sin as being transgressive, generally what is meant is that they 
transgress divine laws. We can here think of, for example, the commandments given to Moses 
by God in Exodus 19 as divinely given and representing God’s will. These laws have a 
different status from immanent laws, as the person transgressing does this not only against a 
law, but also against God.    
																																																								
13 We are here dependent upon certain interpretations of original sin. In contrast, Calvin’s notion of double 
predestination tells us that although a person is born either good or evil, their actions reflect this nature – if you 
are acting evilly, committing acts of sin, then this means that you are a sinful person an sich.  
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In scripture, we see that Adam disobeys God’s commands (Gen. 3), which in Isaiah 43 is 
explicitly called a sin (“your first ancestor sinned” (Is. 43:27)). In John we can read 
“[e]veryone who commits sin is guilty of lawlessness; sin is lawlessness” (1 Jn. 3:4) and in 
Romans 2 and 8 we can clearly see that it is sinful to go against the Law, precisely because it 
reflects God’s will. Furthermore, in Contra Faustum Augustine defines sin as 
“any transgression in deed, or word, or desire, of the eternal law” (1887b: 22.27); similarly 
Aquinas argues that sin is acting against the eternal laws (2016: II:I.71.6). In his Homily on 
Romans John Chrysostom understands sin purely in terms of the Law (1887: 12,13). Barth 
follows Paul in understanding righteous people in terms of “doers of the law”, and sin as 
transgression of and rebellion against the law (1968: 63), and in Kierkegaard we find an 
account of sin as “disobedience that defies [God’s] commandments” (1985: 81). We can 
therefore, at the very least, state that there are many authoritative authors within Christian 
thought who have discussed and proposed an account of transgressive sin. In all of these 
accounts, furthermore, transgression is understood in the narrow sense of transgressing 
against God or God’s laws.  
Is sin here simply synonymous with law-breaking? Perhaps this particular type of 
transgression can be called sin because the law that is broken is a divine law, and so the 
transgression is law-breaking of a more extreme type. It is structurally the same; a person 
breaks a law, but because of the nature of the law, the transgression is simply more severe. 
This way of understanding sin as transgression is oversimplified, however. A comparison 
with secular law is useful to some extent, but it does not adequately capture the nature of a 
divine transgression precisely because it does not account for the relation to the divine. In 
other words, in secular law we transgress an immanent law that has been posited by other 
human beings. A transgression of God’s law is not sinful because it transgresses a law, but 
because it goes against God. The consequence of having this type of God in the picture is that 
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the transgression itself is never merely a transgression of a law. It is always a transgression 
against God, “by sinning a man offends God” (Aquinas 2006: II:I, 113.2), “sin is an offense 
against God” (Catholic Catechism: 8.2). A transgression is considered to be sinful only in 
case it is an offence to God, the immanent aspect of this act, i.e. the breaking of a given law, 
is not the most important aspect. We therefore need to shift our focus from understanding the 
role of the law to understanding the role of God.  
1.2.1 Transgression against God? 
It is important to establish what kind of God is required for this account of transgression to be 
intelligible. Presupposed is a God, not as one who merely posited Laws and then disappeared; 
He is, rather, an active God. Furthermore, it appears that God is not understood as a more 
powerful, more perfect version of human beings, but instead as wholly other.  
There are many different ways of understanding God. For example, we can think of God as 
(simply) creator or ‘clock maker’, a God who is present in natural processes, God as King, 
before whom we must live our lives in humility, a judging God who observes, keeps score 
and deals out punishment, a God who intervenes occasionally, a personal God who acts in the 
world and responds to individuals, or the still, small voice (1 Kings 19:12), where God can be 
found in the quiet conscience.14  This list, though not exhaustive, illustrates why it is 
worthwhile trying to understand precisely what kind of God transgressive sin requires. After 
all, sin as transgression of God’s law does not need to involve a relation between the sinner 
and God, as we could consider the laws as having been posited by God, but no longer 
involving Him in any active way. Lev Shestov suggests precisely this:   																																																								
14 One of the most prominent accounts of God as simply Creator, also called deism, is Paley’s description of the 
Divine Watchmaker in his Natural Theology. A God that is present in natural processes can be found in 
pantheistic accounts, including Spinoza’s Ethics. God as Judge can be found for example in Karl Barth’s Epistle 
to the Romans, chapter two. Maimonides suggests an occasionally intervening God, who only looks after species 
and not individuals in Guide for the Perplexed. Note that these different understandings of God can co-exist in 
one account. Tillich, in ‘The Witness of the Spirit to the Spirit’ argues for God as judge and a fatherly, loving 
God.  
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God commanded only once and, thereafter, He and all men after Him no longer 
command but obey. He commanded a long time ago, an infinitely long time ago, so 
that He Himself has forgotten when and under what circumstances there occurred this 
absurd, unique of its kind, and consequently unnatural, event. Perhaps, having taken 
on this habit of passive and submissive existence, God has even forgotten how to 
command; perhaps, like us ordinary mortals, He can only obey. (Shestov 1968: 85) 
Theoretically this possibility is entirely compatible with transgressive sin. We could perhaps 
even explain the offence against God as being an offence grounded in the fact that God laid 
down these laws, and so going against them would be act of disrespect towards (the memory 
of) Him. Similarly, we often think about what someone we lost may have thought about a 
particular action of ours – and if we commit an act we know they would have disapproved of 
it can feel immensely disrespectful. However, this feeling coincides with some sense of 
distance, as it is the historical significance of a person’s memory that makes the disrespect 
possible for us. If we were to take this analogy seriously we would have to state that a 
transgression of God’s laws is sinful in the light of what God once posited, but not in the light 
of our active relationship with God now – this relationship is seen to be inaccessible, as it 
would be with a person who has passed.  
This picture of God is not sufficient for understanding the severity of transgressive sin, 
however. I suggest that we need to posit a living God in order to understand the Christian 
accounts of transgressive sin. In fact, all of the accounts of sin discussed in his chapter 
presuppose a living God. As Kierkegaard tells us, “[W]hat really makes human guilt into sin 
is that the guilty one has the consciousness of existing before God” (1980b: XI 192).  
So what does this before God mean? It designates the added dimension of transgressive sin: 
because we are positioned before God a transgression of His laws is never merely a 
transgression. For the ‘before God’ to be meaningful, God must be living, and for the ‘before 
God’ to be significant it requires the God before whom we stand to have a particular nature. 
This, we will see, is particularly important to Nietzsche. Nietzsche posits a perfect God who 
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we can never live up to as God is conceived of in terms that are impossible for human beings 
to achieve. Nietzsche fleshes this out in terms of egoism, but we can find other accounts in 
which the radical difference between God and human beings is understood in different terms. 
Kierkegaard focuses on God as infinite and eternal, and human beings as particular 
existences, finite and mutable. In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript we read: “[T]he 
absolute difference between God and the human being consists precisely in this, that the 
human is a particular existing being (which holds as much for the cleverest as for the most 
stupid), [...] while God is the infinite, who is eternal” (Kierkegaard 2009: 182-3). 
Furthermore, for Kierkegaard this absolute difference must be acknowledged, as we can only 
take up an adequate attitude towards ourselves and God if we acknowledge it. In other words, 
to feel oneself as sinful, or to acknowledge one’s own sinfulness means to be aware of the 
lowliness of human nature and the magnitude of God’s. And so, it seems that even though in 
cases of transgressive sin we may be able to point at a particular act and designate it as wrong, 
we cannot designate it as sinful without the added dimension of the ‘before God’. Such acts 
are sinful because they go against laws that were not only posited by God, but are 
representative of God now.   
In addition, it is the relation with God that actually makes the experience of sin possible. Paul 
Ricoeur writes “it is […] the personal relation to a god that determines the spiritual space 
where sin is distinguished from defilement” (1969: 48). Sin is therefore made possible only 
when a certain kind of God-relation comes into play. This relation involves the possibility of 
transgression, as well as allowing the ‘sinner’ to think of herself in relation to God. For 
Ricoeur, this means that the sinner must see herself as opposed to the good God, such that the 
reality of sinfulness becomes an essential part of her self-understanding; “the penitent 
becomes conscious of his sin as a dimension of his existence, and no longer only as a reality 
that haunts him” (ibid.). In other words, sinfulness becomes internalised through the 
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relationship with God. Ricoeur thereby acknowledges the importance of the ‘before God’, and 
furthermore situates it in the context of the Decalogue.  He rejects the notion of what he calls 
the Hegelian wholly Other image of God, as he argues that the Covenant could only have 
arisen with a God who is “essentially turned toward man” (ibid. 51). 
However, in trying understand sin as a transgression of the covenant between God and 
humans, Ricoeur argues that we have to acknowledge two different aspects; firstly an 
understanding of human nature that places evil and sin in their “hearts”, we are “unclean in 
lips and hearts”; and secondly, there is an immanent imperative in place in the form of the 
Decalogue; “on one side [there is] an unconditional but formless command that finds the root 
of evil in the “heart”; on the other, a finite law that determines, makes explicit, and breaks up 
sinfulness into enumerable ‘transgressions’ […]” (ibid. 62).  
Ricoeur thereby explicitly speaks about the two dimensions that are a part of transgressive 
sin. We have to look at the immanent covenant, these laws that have been set up between God 
and the people of Israel in dialogue. However, in addition to these laws that offer a “limited 
imperative”, there is the dimension of the “unlimited demand” that God as the holy God, the 
“God of sovereignty and majesty” places on people (ibid. 57-58). It is in fact the height of 
God that allows us to truly understand the depth of sin; “it is the holiness of God that reveals 
the abyss of sin in man” (ibid. 242), or in Kierkegaard’s words “because sin is against God it 
is infinitely magnified.” (1980b: 80). 
Contra Kierkegaard, I argue that it is not necessary to accept a notion of God as wholly other 
in order to understand sin as transgression. Instead, what it requires is a living or active God 
who is also considered holy. Sin as transgression requires the ‘before God’ in order to be 
understood as more than merely law-breaking. In order for the ‘before God’ to be significant, 
we have to take seriously the notion that in committing an act of transgression against the 
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Law, a person is really transgressing against the holy, magnified, God. In as much as we 
understand transgressive sin as concerning not merely a breaking of the law, but as doing so 
before God, the Christian position as expounded in this section understands sin as being 
against God.  
1.3 Sin as a debt to God 
Now that we have a firm grasp on what it means for sin to be understood as a transgression, 
we can turn to the second understanding of sin: sin as a form of debt. This can be understood 
in two different ways. Firstly, sin can in this context refer to a debt that humankind incurred 
through the sin of the first man. Secondly, sin can represent a debt we owe God because we 
personally have sinned. Hereditary or original sin can therefore itself be thought of as a debt, 
whereas acts of sin are acts that incur debts. The type of debt here is very different, hence the 
solutions to these debts are very different. In the case of original sin, theologians such as 
Augustine, Bonaventure, Luther, and Aquinas have all spoken about the rite of baptism as 
redeeming the debt of sin.  
As with transgressive sin, we can find the basis for sin as debt in scripture.15 In Colossians 2 
we read: “And when you were dead in trespasses and the uncircumcision of your flesh, God 
made you alive together with him, when he forgave us all our trespasses, erasing the record 
that stood against us with its legal demands. He set this aside, nailing it to the cross.” (Col. 
2:13,14). In Matthew 6 Jesus mentions sins as debts to God, similar to debts to our neighbour 
that we ought to forgive. The notion of original sin as a debt we find particularly in 
theological discussions on baptism, as for example Aquinas describes “ the stain and debt of 
sin” (1920: III 68.4). However, it is significant that Aquinas speaks of “the debt of sin”, and 
similarly Augustine writes about the “debt of sins” (1887c: III.17). In contrast, accounts of 																																																								
15 Lyonnet considers the conception of sin as debt to be particularly important for Judaism, and not so much for 
Christian thought (Lyonnet 1970: 26). In contrast, Anderson argues that sin as debt is the primary conception of 
sin in both Judaism and Christianity after the Old Testament (Anderson 2009: 27).  
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transgressive sin suggest that to sin is to transgress, but in the case of debt, to sin is not to 
become indebted. Instead, the indebtedness is a consequence of the sin.   
Accordingly, in Julia Kristeva’s Powers of Horror we read that by conceiving of sin as debt, 
sin is placed within a particular human’s own responsibility. At the same time, Kristeva 
speaks of this debt requiring “infinite fulfilment”, and being “constitutive of man” (1982: 
121). What we see here is precisely the two different forms that sin as debt can take: 
particular debts and an inherited debt. In both of these accounts we can see that sin is not 
synonymous with debt, but instead a debt follows from sin – if you have sinned, you incur a 
debt with God as a consequence of your sin. And in the case of hereditary sin, the sin of 
Adam has as its consequence a hereditary debt that needs to be redeemed. It appears therefore 
that sin leaves something behind: it leaves a mark in the form of a debt.  
The mark left by sin has been referred to throughout the literature as a stain, the stain of sin, 
and is not exclusively thought of as relation to debt. In the Summa Aquinas discusses the debt 
of sin alongside the stain. In the works of Kristeva and Ricoeur we find detailed analyses of 
how stain as defilement is related to the concept of sin. But what exactly does this stain refer 
to? Gary Anderson explains it in terms of a ‘thing-ness’: “sin is not just a guilty conscience; it 
presumes, rather, that some-“thing” is manufactured on the spot and imposed on the sinner” 
(Anderson 2009: x). This lays bare the most important element of the stain of sin: that there is 
a physical reality to the consequence of sin.  
1.3.1. Sin as a stain 
The notion of sin as a stain or impurity has received particular attention from scholars of the 
Hebrew Bible. Their interest comes from a number of key passages in the text, which 
establish a relation between purity and sin: 
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 Rather, your iniquities have been barriers between you and your God, and your sins 
have hidden his face from you so that he does not hear. For your hands are defiled with 
blood, and your fingers with iniquity; your lips have spoken lies, your tongue mutters 
wickedness. (Isa. 59: 2-3) 
Though you wash yourself with lye and use much soap, the stain of your guilt is still 
before me, says the Lord God. (Jer. 2:22) 
I will cleanse them from all the guilt of their sin against me, and I will forgive all the 
guilt of their sin and rebellion against me. (Jer. 33:8) 
Have we not had enough of the sin at Peor from which even yet we have not cleansed 
ourselves, and for which a plague came upon the congregation of the Lord. (Josh. 
22:17) 
What we find here is the idea that sin is a stain or impurity that can be washed clean. It is a 
blemish upon us but in some sense not fundamental to our nature, as there are cleaning rituals 
we may undertake in order to cleanse ourselves. This means that in some sense we can 
consider the stain of sin to be external to us, as Joseph Lam states: “[t]he idea of a stain 
presumes a thing that is outside of us, an intrusion that doesn’t belong.”  (2016: 180). For 
example, say I lean against a wall that has a sign saying “do not touch” on it. As a 
consequence of my action, I now have a large stain on my back. This stain is there due to my 
action, and in some sense, I certainly deserve to have it. However, this stain on my back will 
not become a part of me, not even if it is there for a couple of days or longer. It will continue 
to be felt, by myself, as external, as a part of the outside world that encroached upon me 
(through my own fault). My intention is not to suggest that the blemish of sin is like a blemish 
of paint, but nonetheless there are parallels here. If sin is considered a blemish upon oneself, it 
need not necessarily be thought of as a part of oneself.16  
																																																								
16 Jonathan Klawans argues that we need to make a sharp distinction between moral and ritual impurities in order 
to deal with precisely this problem. He argues that ritual impurities are contagious impurities that are temporary 
but will forbid a person from participating in public life or ritual life for this period of time. Women with periods 
are paradigmatic examples of ritual impurities; they cannot enter the temple for seven days and anyone and 
anything they touch during this period is impure (Lev. 15). It is essential to this kind of impurity that it is of a 
temporary nature. Moral impurities are neither temporary nor contagious, and they are the result of acts that are 
considered to be immoral. The result of these immoral acts is a permanent “degradation of status” (Klawans 
2000: 34). 
		 40	
The imagery of stain or defilement is a powerful one. It incites a reaction in the reader that 
“transgression” does not. Whether this reaction is one of disgust, as Kristeva argues, one of 
dread, as Ricoeur tells us, or a general “instinctual, visceral reaction” (Lam 2016: 180), these 
all fit in the same category. There is a strong physical response to impurity and defilement, 
which is to turn away and to designate the defiled as somehow untouchable. Unsurprisingly, it 
is essential to think about the specific role of the body if we want to understand the notion of 
sin as stain.   
1.3.2 The body 
The body, the flesh, is in many accounts considered as the place in which sin resides. In the 
story of the Fall, one of the consequences that Adam and Eve face is feeling shameful of their 
bodies. They want to hide parts of their bodies when faced with God, because they feel that 
these parts are somehow inappropriate to be shown in public. Furthermore, in many 
traditional accounts of sin the concept of concupiscence has played a role. For example, 
Bonaventure, and with this issue he should be considered representative of the Catholic 
tradition, defines original sin not only as a privation of justice, but also as excessive 
concupiscence. Here, concupiscence is an overwhelming physical desiring of things are 
contrary to reason; “the carnal desire takes precedence over the spirit” (Bonaventure 2006: 
2.32.7-8). In Reformation thought there is similarly a link between concupiscence and 
original sin; for Luther concupiscence is the human disposition since the Fall, and the 
Augsburg Confession reads that after the fall, all humans are born “with sin, that is, without 
the fear of God, without trust in God, and with concupiscence” (1921: II).17 Concupiscence is 
excessive desire, yet it is also typically understood in terms of sexual desire. In Christian 																																																								
17 Tillich defines concupiscence as the “unlimited desire to draw the whole of reality into one’s self” (Tillich 
1957: 52), which he argues concerns every single aspect of a human being’s relation to the world. The insistence 
of traditional accounts of concupiscence (he singles out Augustine and Luther) to focus on sexual desire is for 
Tillich representative of the church’s general difficulty in dealing with the “central ethical and religious 
problem” of sex (ibid.).   
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thought, both excessive and sexual desires are associated with the body. It is in and through 
the body that concupiscence takes its form. The body is thereby, in some sense, seen as a 
place of sin, and further as a place of defilement. 
Consider the following passage from Romans 7: 
For we know that the law is spiritual; but I am of the flesh, sold into slavery under 
sin. I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very 
thing I hate. Now if I do what I do not want, I agree that the law is good. But in fact it 
is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwells within me. For I know that nothing good 
dwells within me, that is, in my flesh. I can will what is right, but I cannot do it. For I 
do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do. Now if I do what I 
do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwells within me. So I find it to be 
a law that when I want to do what is good, evil lies close at hand. For I delight in the 
law of God in my inmost self, but I see in my members another law at war with the 
law of my mind, making me captive to the law of sin that dwells in my 
members. Wretched man that I am! Who will rescue me from this body of death? 
We find here a battle between one’s body and mind. Paul acknowledges that he knows what is 
right, yet because he is “of the flesh” he does not continuously act in accordance with what 
the good is. Additionally he writes, “nothing good dwells within […] my flesh”, even though 
he delights in God’s laws in his mind. We therefore find a very clear distinction between the 
body and mind, and moreover a very clear sense of the body as the place in which sin resides. 
We can interpret this claim in different ways. Most simply, we might consider Romans 7 to be 
condemning the body and its drives; after all, Paul states that the body is where sin dwells, 
and the body battles with the mind that knows the right thing do. However, as Hans Hübner 
tells us, we can also interpret the flesh, the body, theologically. This means that when talking 
of the flesh or the body, we are not speaking of the physical site of humans, but rather the 
“individual place of the universal power of sin” (2000: 81, my translation). If we take this 
interpretation, we can avoid a condemnation of the body by suggesting that, even though the 
flesh is designated by Paul as the place of sin, the significance lies entirely within sin and not 
within the flesh. In other words, instead of arguing that Paul condemns the body, and that by 
suggesting that the body is the place in which sin resides we condemn the body, there is no 
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condemnation of the body, but only of sin, which merely happens to reside in the body. A 
third interpretation is found in Tillich, who argues that we need to distinguish between the 
human body and the concept of ‘the flesh’. The human body is not condemned, but the ‘flesh’ 
is “hostile to God” (Tillich 1953: 133). In Tillich’s account the body as such cannot be 
condemned because it is able to “become a temple of the spirit”, but the ‘flesh’, as a 
“distortion of human nature”, with its “unlimited desire” is separated from God (ibid.). 
Therefore, not all natural drives are rejected as sinful, and neither is the body as a whole.  
Despite writing “if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwells 
within me”, Paul does not relinquish responsibility for his sinful acts. Indeed, it is clear 
throughout the Christian literature that we are held fully accountable for any sinful acts. 
However, Paul's statement does tell us something very important. His lament is powerful 
precisely because he thereby tells us that sin alienates us from ourselves. As Ricoeur puts it, 
“the flesh is myself alienated from itself, opposed to itself and projected outward” (1967: 
142). It is through sinfulness that we become more alienated from our bodily selves, as we 
become alienated from God. And so, it is not a matter of our spiritual selves being ‘true’, and 
our bodily selves as being somehow external to our true nature. The relation Paul takes up to 
his body, one of despair and alienation, is a symbol and consequence of sin. To borrow 
Tillich's words, the body itself is not condemned as sinful, but it is rather a specific 
incarnation of bodily existence that is called the ‘flesh’ that distorts and houses sin.  
However, at this stage it is still unclear exactly how the notion of sin as a stain is related to a 
Paulinian account of a sinful body or sinful flesh, nor how these forms of sin relate to the 
explanation of meaningless suffering. In response to the first problem, I suggest that there are 
two different avenues of interpretation open for us. The first is fairly straight-forward, as it is 
to understand the stain that original sin has left as synonymous with the sinful body of 
Romans 7. There is some plausibility to this claim. The stain is a consequence of actual and 
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hereditary sin that makes the sinner less able to act rightly in the future. Similarly, Paul 
describes the sinful body as impacting his ability to act in accordance with the law; it is 
because of the drives of his body that he finds himself sinning. However, there is an important 
difficulty with this account, which is brought out in the Defence of the Augsburg Confession. 
There, sin is described as a disease in order to make it clear that sin refers not merely to “a 
part of man, but the entire person with its entire nature is born in sin as with a hereditary 
disease” (Melanchton: II.5). Here, Melanchton reacts to certain conceptions of original sin 
that hold it to be a burden or a blemish instead of a corruption of the entire nature of 
humankind. He seems to want to guard against the risk of diminishing the impact and 
presence of sin by describing the consequence of sin as a stain or blemish. A reading of 
Romans 7 with this in mind could focus on the fact that Paul’s suffering and sinfulness is not 
depicted as a small part of himself, but rather concerns his body as a whole. 
Ricoeur and Kristeva can offer us a second robust understanding of the stain of sin. In their 
accounts of sin, they pay considerable attention to the notion of defilement. The stain that sin 
leaves is considered a blemish, an imperfection: whatever it marks is now impure. In order 
words, the stain of sin is a form of defilement. Ricoeur argues that defilement is the 
understanding of one’s body as a source of impurity, and that this understanding lingers in 
religious traditions, and specifically the concept of sin (1967: 15,48). The significance of the 
impurity lies in its transgressive nature; by being impure or defiled, the body is already 
transgressing. This understanding of the defiled body need not mean that it is sinful, and 
Ricoeur argues that we find it in the Greek tradition as well. However, it shows how closely 
linked the notions of defilement and the stain are, and precisely what kind of role the body 
can play here. The body is the place of the stain and defilement, and it is also the place in 
which transgression can continue to take place.  
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Kristeva fleshes this out further. She argues that there are certain bodily functions that we find 
repulsive, mainly those related to our various bodily fluids. For Kristeva, this repulsion comes 
from the threat that these moments pose to the symbolic order. We see this clearly in sin; 
“those various descriptions of sin converge on the flesh or rather on what might be called, by 
anticipation, an overwhelming release of drives, unrestrained by the symbolic.” (Kristeva 
1982: 124). Kristeva helps us understand that the body and its drives are considered to be 
transgressive (hence “unrestrained by the symbolic”), and possibly even threatening. By 
designating the flesh as a place of threat to the symbolic order, we are taught to become 
suspicious of our body and to consider it as disobedient and transgressive.  
This does not mean, however, that the body is only relevant to accounts of transgressive sin. 
Paul is again crucial here. He designates the body as the place where sin as such resides, yet 
also understands the body as that part of us which acts upon these sinful desires. This means 
that the sinful body is sinful and acts sinfully. As Ricoeur puts it, the sinful being is both “act 
and state” (1967: 154). She not merely acts sinfully but is sinful. We have therefore here 
returned to the notion of an existential type of sin. I will turn to this concept in detail in the 
next section, but there is a further dimension of the role the body plays with regards to 
understandings of sin that requires a closer look.   
Further insight into the relation between sin and the body can be gained by looking at 
descriptions of sin that describe it as a disease. If we think about sin as disease, then we might 
have to think of it as in some sense outside of people’s control. With a number of diseases we 
can make the utmost effort not to contract them, but generally speaking we become ill through 
no fault of our own. Ricoeur argues that the sinful body is a contagious source of impurity. It 
is difficult to know how to make sense of this aspect of sickness. We can, of course, point to 
hereditary sin as a kind of contagious sickness; it is passed down from one generation to the 
next. It is in fact in discussions of hereditary sin that we most often find a comparison with 
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sickness. Aquinas talks about original sin in terms of an infection: “[o]riginal sin infects the 
different parts of the soul, in so far as they are the parts of one whole; even as original justice 
held all the soul's parts together in one. Consequently there is but one original sin: just as 
there is but one fever in one man, although the various parts of the body are affected.” (2016: 
I.II 82.2). In the Augsburg Confession, sin is referred to as a disease, and furthermore that 
“this disease, or vice of origin, is truly sin, even now condemning and bringing eternal death 
upon those not born again through Baptism and the Holy Ghost” (1921: II).  
In these accounts it is unclear whether we ought to understand the disease of sin as 
contagious, but what is clear is that it represents the ill-health of a person suffering from sin. 
As with Paul’s descriptions of the body in Romans 7, something is wrong with the sinner. It is 
this element of sin that is most essential to the current project, and that again brings us to the 
notion of existential sin.  
1.4 Existential sin: Nietzsche, Paul, and Calvin 
A fruitful way of understanding existential sin is by looking at the difference between a 
particular act of transgression and a general feeling of indebtedness. In Human, All-Too-
Human I:141, Nietzsche describes that the saints experience an increased feeling of sinfulness 
because through the outlawing of sexual acts their desires increased, yet these desires and 
thoughts are considered transgressions. This increased sinfulness is related to a particular act 
of sin. There is a clear prohibition or commandment against a specific act, and doing, thinking 
or desiring it leads to a feeling of indebtedness. But when Nietzsche writes further in the same 
section that “Christianity had indeed said: every man is conceived and born in sin; and in the 
insupportable superlative Christianity of Calderón this idea was again knotted and wound 
together, so that he ventured on the most perverse paradox there is in the well-known lines: 
the greatest guilt of man is that he was born” (HH I:141) an entirely different form of 
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indebtedness is implied. This does not concern a particular act that is prohibited: it is being 
alive in the first place that is seen as the cause of a feeling of indebtedness. 
Existential sin is the notion that there is something wrong with me, as an individual, by virtue 
of being alive, being human. This does not concern one specific part of me, nor is it in 
relation to one particular action on my part; the sinfulness is felt to be all-encompassing. 
Romans contains myriad descriptions of existential sin, both experientially and conceptually. 
As we saw earlier in this chapter, Romans 7 displays a man struggling with himself to the 
core of his being. The cry,  “[o]h wretched man that I am!” (Rom. 7:24), that is echoed 
throughout Paul’s writings evidently expresses an intense suffering on the author’s part. 
However, Paul does not think his suffering is unjustified – he is not struggling with 
meaninglessness of suffering. He knows why he suffers, and believes it to be just. Here we 
can therefore see why the notion of existential sin can provide us with an answer for 
meaningless suffering: Paul knows that he deserves to suffer because he is sinful.  
Furthermore, this suffering is not without relief – Paul clearly believes in God’s grace as 
redemptive. This possibility of redemption nonetheless does not diminish the kinds of claims 
Paul makes about human beings; in Romans 3 he writes that “[t]here is none righteous, no, 
not one” (Rom. 3:10), and that “all have sinned” (Rom. 3:23). Jacob Taubes analyses the 
salient parts of Paul’s account as follows; 
Paul really does believe that humanity and the cosmos are guilty [Rom. 7:7-25]. A 
guilt that can be redeemed by means of sacrifice and atonement. Justified. But what a 
terrible price is paid in this entanglement! What terrible cruelty, from which there is 
no escape! Everything else in the critique of Christianity is not worth talking about, is 
so to speak negotiable, as we say about contracts, but not that. This is a fundamental 
experience. (Taubes 2004: 87-88) 
Taubes here understands sin to be related to a guilt that has been handed down since Adam, or 
in other words hereditary sin. What defines human nature (as well as nature as a whole) is this 
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guilt, a price that has been paid for the transgression of the first man. Taubes furthermore 
argues that the experience of sinfulness, the experience of this guilt, is a fundamental 
experience in Christianity. For Paul, the fundamental human experience is one in which a 
person feels themselves to be a sinner; and in this experience they feel “sick, miserable, filled 
with ill-will towards [them]sel[ves]” (TI VI:2). In other words, existential sin is an ineluctable 
part of the Christian experience.  
A reading of Calvin further supports this analysis. In the Institutes of the Christian Religion, 
Calvin offers an account of sin that similarly can be described as existential. He argues that 
sin is a “hereditary corruption and depravity of our nature extending to all the parts of the 
soul.” (II.1.8). He describes, furthermore, the way to redemption as a difficult one: “[we] shall 
not prove that we have thoroughly shaken off our stupor [soporem] until, groaning under the 
burden, and lamenting our sad condition, we seek relief from God.” (III.3.18).18 Note the 
formulations that echo the intensity of sin described by Paul; “depravity of our nature”, 
“groaning under the burden”, “our sad condition”. For Calvin human nature was changed 
radically after the Fall, to the point where post-lapserian humanity is wicked: we cannot do 
good without help from God. Furthermore, there is an awareness of this state, and humans 
feel themselves carrying the weight of their condition and their sinfulness.  
We can therefore begin to understand how sin can offer an answer to the problem of 
meaningless suffering. There are intricate narratives surrounding different ideas of sin that 
help us understand why we are sinful and why we deserve to suffer. With actual transgressive 
sin, the explanation for suffering is quite straight-forward: a person has committed an act that 
is designated as sinful, and therefore deserves to be punished in some way. This parallels how 
we think about transgressions of the law in secular society, where to break the law is usually 																																																								
18 Malaque nostra, here translated as “our sad condition” could also be interpreted as a “bad condition”. In the 
context of sin, this is potentially significant.  
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followed by a punishment that we consider to be justified. We can think of this in terms of 
debt as well; by committing an act of sin, we are incurring a debt towards God.  
However, these explanations are not what I am interested in here. As I explained in the 
introduction's discussion of the Book of Job, there are certain explanatory narratives that are 
more easily available to us than others. Job's friends are quick to point to his actions as 
deserving punishment, as this is an explanatory framework that human beings often turn to. 
However, the crux of Job's story is that his actions are in fact not deserving of punishment, 
and that we cannot point to a particular aspect of his life as having caused his suffering. When 
we are unable to point to one particular act or part of a person in order to explain suffering, 
that we begin to struggle with explanatory narratives. And this is precisely why the notion of 
existential sin is compelling.  
By positing hereditary sin and grounding this concept in a narrative telling us of a prior state 
(the Garden of Eden), we are offered an explanation for the meaningless suffering of those 
who seem not to deserve it. After all, even if they have not acted sinfully, they still have a 
sinful nature, which can be traced backed to wrongdoing by someone else. Here, we are 
therefore still able to understand suffering as punishment for an act, but it is no longer our 
own act that causes the sin. Rather, our very nature must be understood as deserving of 
punishment because of the first, original, act of sin. We have seen that this sinful nature can 
be conceptualized in many different ways: as a stain left behind by the original act of sin, as a 
debt towards God, or as the fact of our bodily nature. Importantly, existential sin designates a 
person as sinful as a whole, rather than pointing to certain acts as sinful.     
There are consequences to this conception of human nature. Indeed, when we read in this 
chapter the descriptions by Paul, Calvin, Kierkegaard and others, the image we get is not a 
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joyful one. Sin may explain why there is meaningless suffering, but it itself causes suffering 
of a different kind. It is here that a turn to Nietzsche is extremely fruitful.  
In Third Essay of On Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche offers one of the most powerful 
descriptions of the experience of sin we can find: 
The unhappy man has heard, has understood; he is like a hen around which a line has 
been drawn. He cannot get out of this drawn circle: the sick man has been made into 
‘the sinner’ . . . And now we shall not be rid of the sight of this new sick person, ‘the 
sinner’, for a few thousand years, – shall we ever be rid of him? – wherever we look, 
everywhere the hypnotic glance of the sinner always moving in the one direction (in 
the direction of ‘guilt’ as the sole cause of suffering); everywhere, bad conscience, that 
‘abominable beast’, as Luther called it; everywhere, the past regurgitated, the deed 
distorted, the green eye on every action; everywhere, the will to misunderstand 
suffering made into the content of life, suffering reinterpreted as feelings of guilt, fear, 
punishment; everywhere, the scourge, the hair shirt, the starving body, contrition; 
everywhere, the sinner breaking himself on the cruel wheel of a restless and morbidly 
lustful conscience; everywhere, dumb torment, the most extreme fear, the agony of the 
tortured heart, the paroxysms of unknown happiness, the cry for ‘redemption’. In fact, 
the old depression, heaviness and fatigue were thoroughly overcome by this system of 
procedures, life became very interesting again: awake, eternally awake, sleepless, 
glowing, burned out, exhausted and yet not tired, – this is how man, the ‘sinner’, 
looked when initiated into these mysteries. (GM III:20) 
We see here that Nietzsche uses metaphors of illness, torture, self-mutilation, and insomnia, 
and emotive descriptions referring to fear, agony, and depression. The sinner cries, cannot 
sleep, tortures herself, and interprets everything through the lens of sinfulness. Here, 
therefore, we are not given a detailed definition of sin, but rather a depiction of the experience 
that speaks to us emotionally as well as logically. Nietzsche tells us that the sight of the sinner 
is not rare, the sinner is everywhere, and Nietzsche even wonders if we will ever be rid of the 
concept of the sinner.  
Furthermore, we see towards the end of the paragraph that Nietzsche talks about how the "old 
depression, heaviness and fatigue" were beaten by the notion of sinfulness. Positing sin as an 
answer to meaningless suffering does to away with some form of suffering, here called the 
"old depression" by Nietzsche. It serves its purpose very well, and Nietzsche even argues that 
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it made life interesting again. The concept of sin therefore has a complicated relation to 
suffering: it lessens the suffering caused by an inability to understand meaningless suffering, 
yet it brings with it another type of suffering, a suffering from oneself. This is key. The 
ontological category of meaningless suffering is related to our existence in the world. By 
virtue of finding ourselves as human beings in this world we see and experience meaningless 
suffering. The desire to have it explained is similarly ontological; it is essential to the human 
experience. 
The suffering that is caused by sin is socio-historical in nature, and not ontological. In other 
words, it is contingent upon the specific explanation of meaningless suffering that was offered 
by Christianity. The particular shape that this suffering takes, namely to suffer from oneself as 
sinful, is not an essential part of the human experience. In order to further elucidate the 
relation between sin and suffering, I will in the next chapter turn to Nietzsche's account of sin. 
By offering a detailed account of his thought on the concept and experience of sin, I will show 
that the price paid by accepting sin as an explanation for meaningless suffering may indeed be 
too high.  
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Chapter 2   Nietzsche on Sin: Transgression, 
Indebtedness, Guilt, and God 
 
Churches they call their sweet smelling caves. Oh how repulsive is this 
falsified light, this stale air! Here, where the soul to its height – is denied 
flight! Instead their faith commands: ‘Up the stairs on your knees, you 
sinners!’ (TZ, ‘On Priests’) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter I presented the first part of an account of existential sin by focusing on 
its history within Christian thought. I argued that existential sin concerns a person's nature as 
a whole, rather than a specific act that they may have done. By contrasting actual sin with 
hereditary sin, we can understand this difference in more detail. Acts of sin are specific 
violations of God, usually conceived of as transgressions of God's Law. Hereditary sin, 
however, is the concept that sinfulness is inherent to human nature since the Fall, and that it is 
therefore not primarily related to specific acts a person may do. It is, rather, an ontological 
state: to be human means to be sinful. As such, hereditary sin has functioned as an effective 
explanation for meaningless suffering: this suffering that we perceive as meaningless exists 
because we are all, at heart, sinful beings who deserve to suffer. This account of hereditary sin 
is the basis for our understanding of existential sin. However, existential sin is not 
synonymous with hereditary sin, which I will show in this chapter. 
This chapter furthermore argues for a specific method of reading Nietzsche. I will show that 
we cannot merely explain Nietzsche’s account of sin in terms of moral wrong-doing; it is, 
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rather, a religious concept. If we want to understand Nietzsche’s project in the Genealogy, we 
need to frame the central concept of sin in religious terms. If we were to instead focus on 
moral psychology, as a significant number of secondary texts do, we will misunderstand the 
phenomenon that Nietzsche is discussing in the Second and Third Essay that I defined as 
existential sin in the previous chapter. It is in fact the Christian background that makes this 
phenomenon of moralized guilt what it is: existential sin.  
I will thereby be arguing against Nietzsche commentators such as Christopher Janaway and 
Aaron Ridley. I will show that Ridley and Janaway suggest that even though Nietzsche 
introduces the Christian God in the Second Essay as the reason why we feel reprehensible or 
that we deserve punishment, we can take the Christian God out of the picture and still make 
sense of the phenomenon of moralized guilt. This is a mistake. We can only understand why 
moralized guilt becomes existential sin if we look at the role of the Christian God in 
particular.  
Furthermore, in order to understand Nietzsche’s accounts of sin, and in particular his account 
of sin as a sickness, it is essential to understand the religious literature that grounds his 
account and that I presented in the previous chapter. The cultural phenomenon of sin that 
Nietzsche diagnoses in the Third Essay of the Genealogy is one that can be found in Luther, 
in Calvin, in Paul. It is therefore not new, but what makes Nietzsche’s account distinctive is 
the value he attaches to this phenomenon; he describes it as a sickness that is grounded in a 
false narrative Christianity has taught us. For Nietzsche, sin is not ontological, but it is a 
historical fact, and a crucial part of the constitution of the European soul. As Valadier tells us, 
“we cannot underestimate the importance of Christianity in the shaping of the European man” 
(1974: 293, my translation).  
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In order to bring out the salient points of Nietzsche's account of sin, I will offer a thorough 
discussion of this account. The structure of this chapter mirrors chapter one and contains 
discussions of four different models of sin that Nietzsche offers us; sin as transgression, sin as 
debt, sin as a feeling of guilt, and existential sin. I will show that Nietzsche's account of sin is 
very much rooted in the Christian framework that I presented in the previous chapter. For 
example, Nietzsche’s understanding of sin as transgression focuses on acts of sin, whereas his 
more existential descriptions of sin clearly relate more to notions of hereditary sin. However, 
although echoing the sentiments described by Paul and Calvin on the experience of sin, 
Nietzsche moves away from them in presented existential sin as a cultural problem.  The 
explanation for meaningless suffering that existential sin consists of can be understood 
outside of the Christian paradigm: it has, in a way, taken on a life of its own. For Nietzsche, 
existential sin is a problem that has led to much suffering.  
2.1 Sin as transgression 
Section 9 in The Birth of Tragedy is the first mention of transgressive sin in Nietzsche’s 
works. He offers a comparative analysis of Oedipus, Prometheus and Eve that focuses on their 
particular kinds of transgressions as well as their relation to nature. He describes Oedipus and 
Prometheus as radically different from Eve: their transgressions are self-aware, whereas Eve 
transgresses out of passivity. The different orientations towards the world of these three 
figures are also very important. Both Oedipus and Prometheus find themselves in a world that 
is already bad, and their transgressions can only be explained if we acknowledge that aspect 
of life. In Oedipus we see the badness of the world reflected, and Prometheus finds himself in 
a world that he wants to improve by his particular act of transgression. In the myth of the Fall, 
Adam and Eve find themselves in a good world but through the act of sinning badness is 
brought into the world.  
		 54	
Nietzsche writes that the myth of the Fall is a myth in which “curiosity, deception, weakness 
in the face of temptation, wantonness, - in short, a whole series of pre-eminently feminine 
passions, - were regarded as the origin of evil” (BT: 9). The story of Christian sin is not one 
of a person actively going against a rule because “the best and highest” that someone can 
attain is through breaking this rule. It is a passive story of transgression, where seduction and 
temptation are the primary motivations for the act. Nietzsche hereby suggests that sin is weak 
and does not aim towards any good, nor does it reflect the world the transgression takes place 
in. 
Eve’s transgression is passive due to the way in which she transgresses, rather than the nature 
of her transgression. In contrast to Prometheus, Eve does not transgress because she feels that 
it is necessary or even important. Nor is there in place a prophecy that will dictate her action, 
unlike Oedipus. Eve acts not because her transgressive action would lead to something 
worthwhile, she decides on the action out of curiosity and temptation. And indeed, the 
contrast between Oedipus saying “no one but I brought down these piling curses on myself!” 
(Sophocles 1984: 206) and Prometheus’s powerful “all that I did wrong I did on purpose; I 
shall not deny it” on the one hand, and Eve’s “[t]he serpent tricked me, and I ate” (Gen. 3:14) 
is significant.  
It might seem that in the Fall narrative, Eve is actually actively transgressing. After all, she 
decided to take the fruit from the tree, and for Nietzsche acts in awareness of it being a 
transgression.19 However, the salient aspect of the story of the Fall for Nietzsche lies in the 
fact that Eve does not desire the consequences of her action. She does not act in a desire to do 
good, instead she merely succumbs to temptation. Furthermore, Eve’s act only becomes 
meaningful in light of its dire consequences, but not in the act that Eve was taking up.  																																																								
19As I showed in the previous chapter, section 1.1.1, there are thinkers who would argue that Eve could not have 
been aware that her action was a transgression, as the concept of ‘transgression’ would not have been available 
to her. 	
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We can explain this argument by looking at Oedipus, who Nietzsche also considers to be 
passive. He is the victim of his fate: he is “fated [bestimmt] to error and misery”, and he has 
no choice but to live his life in accordance with it. Before he became aware of the truth of his 
patricide and incest, Oedipus thought that he knew himself, but this supposed self-knowledge 
and self-awareness unravels when he gains the knowledge of his transgressions. It is this, and 
his knowledge of his own fate as foretold by the oracle of Delphi that make him aware of the 
remedial effect that his suffering and death will have, both in a literal and metaphorical 
sense.20  
When Oedipus finds out the truth about his life, when he sees the reality of things, he does not 
shy away from this knowledge, but embraces it and the suffering that will follow. There is no 
active refusal to believe his fate, but a passive acceptance. Instead of striving to establish 
himself through his actions, Oedipus accepts himself as fate, his self-knowledge has become 
knowledge of fate. And it is “in this purely passive attitude the hero achieves his highest 
activity, whose influence extends far beyond his life, while his earlier conscious thought and 
striving led him only to passivity” (BT: 9). The early Oedipus in Oedipus the King constantly 
tried to resist the fate accorded to him, and this only lead to temporary power and strength. It 
is in the passivity of accepting his fate and the suffering that comes with it, that Oedipus 
becomes a more powerful figure. This is what Nietzsche refers to as Oedipus’s “glory of 
passivity”, which is contrasted with Prometheus’s “glory of activity”. For Nietzsche, 
Oedipus’s passivity is therefore very different from Eve’s: Eve’s transgression was passive 
because of its motives, and furthermore her response to this aggression is passive, all she 
admits to is succumbing to temptation. Oedipus’s transgressions are similarly passive because 																																																								
20 Burnham and Jesinghausen write that “clearly, Nietzsche sees Sophocles’ Oedipus in some relation to Christ, 
or at least to the idea of ‘sainthood’ […]” (Burnham & Jesinghausen: 83). The link to Christ is not as obvious as 
Burnham and Jesinghausen imply, although it could certainly be argued for, but the idea of Oedipus as a saint-
like figure is interesting. For Nietzsche saints are figures of self-denial and suffering, and perhaps by pointing 
towards Oedipus as a saint-like figure he wanted to emphasize the importance of suffering for Oedipus even 
more.  
		 56	
he was the victim of fate. However, for Nietzsche, Oedipus gains self-knowledge through 
accepting his fate, and as such, becomes more powerful.  
In The Birth of Tragedy, Prometheus is similarly powerful. Nietzsche argues that Prometheus 
is well aware of his action and its consequences. Prometheus acts not out of necessity, as 
Oedipus does, nor out of deception, as Eve does, but out of justice, the chief Promethean 
value. Prometheus changes the future of humankind and turns us into reflective beings. His 
transgression is not merely going against Zeus, as it furthermore allowed humans to take the 
place of Gods. This transgression thereby led to a change in the position of the Olympian 
gods: the gods are forced to ally themselves with humans, to become our gods. What 
Prometheus did was to create the possibility for new values, a new normative model, by 
turning humans into reflective beings, and thereby the importance of the Olympian gods 
changes. Prometheus acted out of hubris by facilitating humans to become gods and to take 
the place of the Olympians. The importance of Prometheus’s awareness of both the fact that 
he has transgressed and the fact that he will be punished for it is seen more clearly when 
contrasted with Oedipus and Eve. For Oedipus the suffering comes unexpectedly and Eve 
does not embrace the idea of suffering when she commits the first act of sin. Prometheus 
stands tall whereas Eve literally hides after her sin.  
However, there is an interesting parallel between Prometheus and Eve that Nietzsche leaves 
unexplored. Prometheus gives humankind what we need to be reflective beings, but Eve does 
a very similar thing. By eating from the Tree of Knowledge, she gives humankind knowledge 
of good and evil. Therefore, in both myths the transgressors offer something to humans that 
will adds to their experience in the world, and allow a certain kind of progress. Both the myth 
of Prometheus and Genesis seem to suggest the same thing: that through bringing some kind 
of knowledge to humankind, they become more like gods. The snake said to Eve that by 
eating the fruit “your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God” (Gen. 3:5). By giving 
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humans fire Prometheus also elevated their status to one closer to gods, and as Nietzsche 
writes in Human, All-Too-Human, “in the Greek grade of religion […], there may even be 
imagined a common life between two castes […], in their origin both belong to each other 
somehow, and are of one kind; they need not be ashamed of each other.” (HH I:111). 
Similarly, in the Bible we read “the man has become like one of us” (Gen. 3:22).  
There are substantial differences between Prometheus and Eve, however. One of the most 
important differences between the transgressions of Frevel and Sünde as described in BT 9 
lies in the nature of the world wherein the transgressors find themselves. Prometheus and 
Oedipus exist in a world that contains evil, and they are bound by this world. Both 
Prometheus’s and Oedipus’s transgressions go against their worlds, Prometheus transgresses 
knowingly and willingly, and Oedipus unknowingly. Prometheus moves against this world by 
trying to reject the gods and offer a new system of values, and Oedipus’ transgressions show 
us what nature is by breaking their laws. The world of Eve, the Garden of Eden, seems 
radically different from the world of Prometheus and Oedipus. A new world is created after 
the act of sin, but it is not the intentional effect of the action.  
Oedipus is undeniably part of the world he finds himself in. The transgressions he commits 
are against nature, yet at the same time they tell us something essential about this same nature. 
In the figure of Oedipus we see reflected some of what is wrong in the world. Prometheus 
tells a story of a figure who also finds himself in a world that contains badness, and his 
transgression can be explained as an attempt to make the world better. By contrast, Adam and 
Eve find themselves in a world that is wholly good, and it is only through the act of sinning 
that evil is brought into the world. It is essential to the story of the Fall that as a result of their 
transgression the world is transformed into one that contains suffering. With the act of sin, 
sinfulness and evil have come into the world, which creates a narrative of the world being bad 
because people are bad. In other words, it is because of human action, because of us that the 
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world contains evil and suffering. Here, we can already see why original sin, even when 
considered to be an act of sin, helps us to understand and accept meaningless suffering: there 
is meaningless suffering because people have acted in such a way that brought it into 
existence. Already in Nietzsche’s early work of The Birth of Tragedy we can therefore find a 
radical distinction between Greek and Judeo-Christian ways of understanding transgression. 
This distinction will continue to be illuminating in Nietzsche’s later passages on sin, as we 
will see in the next section on The Gay Science.  
  2.1.1 The origin of sin 
In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche turned to one of the paradigmatic examples of sin by 
focusing on Genesis. However, in The Gay Science Nietzsche’s concerns about the origin of 
sin turns into a historical approach. He argues that sin has its origin in monotheism, and in 
particular in Judaism. It is in Jewish thought that we first see the concept of sin, and Nietzsche 
tells us that it is a “Jewish invention”:  
Sin, as it is now experienced wherever Christianity reigns or once reigned: sin is a 
Jewish feeling and a Jewish invention; and given that this is the background of all 
Christian morality, Christianity can be said to have aimed at ‘Judaizing’ the whole 
world. The extent to which this has succeeded in Europe is best brought out by how 
alien Greek antiquity – a world without feelings of sin – strikes our sensibility of 
being, despite all the good will expended by entire generations and many excellent 
individuals to approach and incorporate this world. ‘Only when you repent does God 
have mercy on you’ – to a Greek, that is an object of ridicule and an annoyance; he 
would say, ‘Maybe slaves feel that way.’ (GS: 135)  
We seem to read here that, with regards to sin, Christianity is merely an extension of Judaism. 
Sin has its origins in Judaism, but has been propagated by Christianity, which aimed to 
“Judaize” the world. Furthermore, we read that sin is closely related to repentance; the 
feelings of sin Nietzsche talks about are captured by the sentiment that one must repent in 
order to be forgiven. But what is this feeling of sin? When we continue reading the aphorism, 
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we see that Nietzsche defines sin as a trespass against God, a transgression of God’s laws: 
“every sin is an injury of respect, a crimen laesae majestatis divinae” (GS: 135).  
This particular understanding of sin echoes the Hebrew concept of aveira, as well as 1 John 
3:4, “ [e]veryone who commits sin is guilty of lawlessness; sin is lawlessness.” The Hebrew 
Bible is the first place where the concept of sin as a transgression of God’s law (aveira) 
appears. The key passage is Deuteronomy 17:2, where we see a condemnation of 
transgressions of God’s covenant. This idea of understanding transgression as being against a 
god’s wishes is not new to Judaism. In Greek religion there are numerous examples of people 
being punished for going against what the gods desired, for example Prometheus going 
against Zeus’s commands, Orpheus and Eurydice going against Hades and Persephone, but 
also less explicit transgressions such as Cassandra rejecting Apollo and Tantalus attempting to 
feed his child to the gods. There are two reasons why the Greek understanding of 
transgression against gods is so radically different from the notion of sin: firstly the nature of 
the deities; and secondly the consequences of the transgression.  
The Greek gods are described as selfish, vengeful, loving, hateful, cruel; in other words, in 
terms of human characteristics. The Greek gods are therefore not thought of as completely 
alien to us, but instead as a greater or more powerful version of human beings. No conceptual 
problems occur when they act callously, as this is simply a human trait. Furthermore, there are 
many Greek gods, and their interests often collide: think, for example, of Athena and Apollo 
during the Trojan War. The transgression of their laws is like the transgression of human 
laws, but the punishment is potentially much greater (the eternal suffering of Sisyphus as a 
result of his transgression of xenia can only occur because his punisher has divine power). As 
Nietzsche writes, “The Greeks did not see the Homeric gods as set above them as masters, or 
themselves set beneath the gods as servants, as the Jews did. They saw as it were only the 
reflection of the most successful exemplars of their own caste, that is to say an ideal, not an 
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antithesis of their own nature” (HH I:114).  
The God of the Hebrew Bible and New Testament is very different from the Greek gods. 
Nietzsche tells us that the Jews set themselves “beneath the gods as servants”: their God is 
exalted to a much greater extent. There is possible an interpretation of the Hebrew Bible’s 
God as having human characteristics, such as vengefulness, pride and anger, but even so the 
nature of God is no longer just like human nature. A radical difference between humans and 
God is introduced. Whereas in ancient Greek religion, for example, humans and gods were 
conceived to be on the same continuum, Nietzsche argues that the Judeo-Christian God exists 
on a different continuum than human beings, and as we saw in section 1.2 this is indeed what 
the Christian account of transgressive sin presupposes. In Human, All-Too-Human Nietzsche 
interprets the radical difference between God and humans in terms of egoism. He argues that 
human beings are inherently incapable of un-egoistic acts, yet God is said to be “capable only 
of those actions which are called un-egoistic and to live in the perpetual consciousness of an 
unselfish mode of thought” (HH I:132). Here God has an attribute that is the opposite of that 
of which humans are capable.21 This is essential: God's nature is not like human nature, He is 
far beyond anything human beings can ever be.  
The difference between the natures of the Greek and Judeo-Christian gods plays a significant 
role in how we conceive of a transgression against this deity. It is the difference between 
transgressing against a very powerful human-like being, and transgressing against the most 
powerful, perfect being that exists. Intuitively, these feel like very different cases. By 
considering the respective consequences of such transgressions, we will be able to understand 
the difference between the Greek and Judeo-Christian accounts in more detail.  																																																								
21 Paul Valadier offers a different picture and argues in a Feuerbachian vein that with Paul Christianity became 
anthropocentric, and God is thought of only in relation to humans; “Dieu est conçu en fonction de l'homme et 
par rapport à lui” (2001: 51). This can be compatible with the above account, however, as even if we accept that 
Christianity is anthropocentric, that does not mean that the God to which humans relate is not posited as 
infinitely greater than us.  
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Although the Greek gods punished transgressors, these consequences were fairly straight-
forward. You committed an act against the gods, and the gods punished you in a, usually, 
visceral manner. Whether eternally pushing a rock up a hill, being turned into a stag or spider, 
being blinded or simply being killed, the gods were quick to punish humans for their 
transgressions. Furthermore, the people that were being punished after transgressing could 
still be held up as heroic, which we see above all in the example of Prometheus.  
Within the Judeo-Christian tradition we can also find punishment enacted for transgressions, 
but there is an added element that I discussed in the previous chapter: the blemish or stain that 
transgressions leave. In the Zohar we can read that “a sin leaves a mark; repeated, it deepens 
the mark; when committed a third time, the mark becomes a stain” (Zohar, Gen. 73b), and 
Nietzsche echoes this when he writes about sin “as a stain in a creature vowed to God” (HH 
I:133).22 It is important here not to understand this stain only in terms of original or hereditary 
sin, as for example Aquinas does.23 Instead, once someone has transgressed against God she 
has blemished herself, and punishment is not enough in order to remove this blemish. Only 
through an act of God can this blemish be removed. Thus, what is required is an act of 
repentance and an acknowledgement of guilt in order to receive forgiveness from the deity. In 
Greek culture, repentance was neither required nor expected. For example, if we return to 
Prometheus, he recounts the actions that lead to his punishment, but he does not apologise or 
see them as wrong. He emphasizes the “goodwill” of his gifts to humankind, and tells Hermes 
“be sure of this: when I measure my misfortune against your slavery, I would not change” 
(Aeschylus 2013: 965), and that he hates “all of the gods that unjustly returned me ill for 
good” (ibid. 975). Prometheus therefore does not feel guilty for his action, despite the 
																																																								
22 Although the Zohar is very clear about the existence of such a stain, the exact way to understand it is, and was, 
less straight-forward; “[w]hile many Jews believed that sin was in some way defiling, ancient Jews did not all 
agree on how the relationship between ritual and moral impurity was to be understood.” (Klawans 2000:159) 
23 He writes, “For this reason children are taken to be baptized soon after their birth, to show that they have to be 
washed from some uncleanness.” (Aquinas 2016: I-II 81.1) 
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exclamation “all that I did wrong I did on purpose; I shall not deny it” (ibid. 265). 
The repentance that Nietzsche emphasizes in The Gay Science 135 can be understood in terms 
of this difference between Greek and Judeo-Christian religion; ‘Only when you repent does 
God have mercy on you’ – to a Greek, that is an object of ridicule and an annoyance; he 
would say, ‘Maybe slaves feel that way.’”24 This conception of repentance and mercy, 
Nietzsche tells us, while thoroughly alien to Greek religious consciousness is absolutely 
crucial for the Judeo-Christian tradition. Certainly, it would be difficult to deny the centrality 
of repentance in Judaism and Christianity. Consider, for instance, the Jewish custom of 
cheshbon nefesh. Held in the month of Elul, before Yom Kippur, this custom is an occasion 
for Jewish people to examine their past actions and seek forgiveness from whoever has been 
wronged through those actions. It is only once this act of contrition has been fulfilled that 
forgiveness from God could be sought. Likewise, within Christianity one of the seven 
Catholic sacraments is that of penance and reconciliation, and Luther could scarcely have 
emphasized repentance more than he did. The first of his 95 Theses reads; “When our Lord 
and Master Jesus Christ said, ‘Repent'’, He called for the entire life of believers to be one of 
penitence”25 (Dillenberger 1962: 490).  
2.1.2 Judaism and Christianity 
If we follow Nietzsche’s account, we can therefore say the following. The concept of 
transgressive sin is particular to Judaism and Christianity because of the specific nature of the 
deity they uphold, in contrast to, for example, Greek deities. It is furthermore precisely 
because of the nature of the Judeo-Christian God that sin can be conceived of as a 
transgression. In a sort of caricature of the Judaic God, Nietzsche writes specifically that God, 
an “honour-craving Oriental”, does not care whether or not sins have been done against 																																																								
24 Nietzsche here echoes St. Paul: ‘but we proclaim Christ crucified, a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness 
to Gentiles” (1 Cor. 1:23).  
25 A more detailed account of repentance in Luther can be found in The Babylonian Captivity of the Church.  
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humanity or the immanent world. All that He cares about is whether He, God, feels assaulted. 
In fact, he asserts that “there can basically be no sin against humanity”: Nietzsche tells us that 
this is what the “Jewish feeling” demands. Repentance is purely about sins that have been 
done towards God, transgressions made against God.  
Here a puzzle arises, however. Nietzsche’s claim in this regard appears to run counter to some 
key elements of Judaism. In Maimonides’s Mishneh Torah we can read that there are not only 
sins between God and humans, but between humans themselves. He writes of “sins between 
man and man”, and “sins between man and God” (1998: ‘Teshuvah’ 2:5), and shows that both 
should be taken seriously and require repentance. We can find the idea that sins are 
committed against humans as well as God in many other Jewish thinkers, including Yitzchak 
Meir Alter, Moshe Chaim Luzzatto, Jonah ben Abraham Gerondi, Abraham Danzig, Max 
Arzt, and texts such as the Orchot Tzaddikim, the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch and the Midrash 
Psalms. Another interesting example is Franz Rosenzweig, who writes in The Star of 
Redemption “For the Day of Atonement, all sins, even those committed against and pardoned 
by man, are sins before God, sins of the solitary individual, sins of the soul – for it is the soul 
that sins.” (1971: 327). He argues that on Yom Kippur “the individual in all his naked 
individuality stands immediately before God” (ibid. 325), but this exception precisely 
confirms that sins against humans are possible.  
What are we to make of this problem?26 One approach is to concede the point that Nietzsche’s 
reading of the Jewish concept of sin as only against God is quite simply inaccurate or one-
sided, but claim that this does not much matter for Nietzsche’s purposes. It might therefore be 
argued that these purposes do not ultimately rely on the historical accuracy of Nietzsche’s 
descriptions of Judaism and Christianity (or Greek religion), but rather on their ability to 																																																								
26 Paul Valadier does not acknowledge this problem in his reading of the section, and instead proposes that what 
we see here is the paradigmatic Jewish attitude, in which the natural is rejected for the supernatural. (1974: 305-
306) 
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bring out salient features of religious consciousness within these traditions.27 However, there 
is a passage in The Wanderer and His Shadow that allows us to contemplate a more generous 
reading of the claims in The Gay Science 135: “[i]t was the founder of Christianity who 
wanted to abolish secular justice and remove judging and punishing from the world. For he 
understood all guilt as 'sin', that is to say as an offence against God and not as an offence 
against the world” (WS: 81). Note that here Nietzsche speaks of Christianity instead of 
Judaism. And this is where a solution to the above problem may lie.  
The opening lines of The Gay Science 135 state that “Sin, as it is now experienced wherever 
Christianity reigns or once reigned: sin is a Jewish feeling and a Jewish invention; and given 
that this is the background of all Christian morality, Christianity can be said to have aimed at 
‘Judaizing’ the whole world”. In this account, Christianity and Judaism are clearly playing 
significantly different roles. The origin of sin is in Judaism, it is a “Jewish invention”. 
However, it is not through Judaism that sin became of central importance. In fact, in aphorism 
138 Nietzsche writes that sin was “rarely a very great torment” among Jews, despite being 
responsible for the invention of sin (GS: 138). Only with Christianity does it become true that 
there is “nothing from which men suffered more than their sins” (ibid.). Thus, what we find in 
this section of The Gay Science is a schism between Judaism and Christianity. Sin was 
invented by Judaism, but it lacked two elements of sin that originated in Christianity: its 
central importance in moral psychology and its universality.28  
When Nietzsche writes that “Christianity first brought sin into the world” (WS: 78) we can 
																																																								
27 This kind of approach to Nietzsche is often taken by theologians who reject many of Nietzsche’s views but 
nonetheless find some of his insights valuable, for example see Deane, D., 2006, Nietzsche and Theology: 
Nietzschean Thought in Christological Anthropology (Aldershot: Ashgate), and Hovey, G., 2008, Nietzsche and 
Theology (London: T&T Clark). For further insight see Ledure, Y., 1981, ‘The Christian Response to 
Nietzsche’s Critique of Christianity’ in Nietzsche and Christianity, eds. Geffré, C. and Jossua, J-P. (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark). 
28 Stephen Williams supports this interpretation when he argues that the main difference between the Old and 
New Testaments, according to Nietzsche, lies in the fact that the priests re-interpret sin to become “the cause of 
misfortune” (Williams 2006: 129). 
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therefore interpret him as making a claim about the historical development of the concept of 
sin as a fundamental and universal category, a way of understanding the human condition as 
such. Sin was in the world before Christianity, but it was not yet promoted as a universal 
truth. This is the key claim Nietzsche makes in GS 135: it was through Christianity that sin 
became a universal concept that took particular hold in Europe. Sin was universalized, 
because Christianity, through Paul, became a universalizing religion, through assertions like 
this: “[t]here is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor 
female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus” (Gal. 3:28). Scripture no longer talks about the 
saving of a people, but the saving of all people.29 In other words, sin, as we understand it can 
be traced back to the Hebrew Bible. Christianity did not invent the concept but took it up and 
spread awareness of it. When Nietzsche talks about Christianity “’Judaizing’ the whole 
world”, this concerns the propagation of sin. A distinction between the origin and the 
continuation or propagation should therefore be made quite strongly, in order to present a 
coherent and plausible picture of Nietzsche’s account of sin.  
Nietzsche explores the distinction between the origin of a concept and its propagation or 
continued existence in the Genealogy. He writes that: 
[t]he origin of the emergence of a thing and its ultimate usefulness, its practical 
application and incorporation into a system of ends, are toto coelo separate; […] The 
‘development’ of a thing, a tradition, an organ is therefore certainly not its progressus 
towards a goal, still less is it a logical progressus […] instead it is a succession of 
more or less profound, more or less mutually independent processes of subjugation 
exacted on the thing, added to this the resistances encountered every time, the 
attempted transformations for the purpose of defence and reaction, and the results, too, 
of successful countermeasures. (GM II:12)  
When we trace the history of a concept, the tendency is to create a complete and systematic 
narrative, where the contemporary use of the concept can already be seen in its origin. These 
kinds of narratives are used in order to justify the use of certain words or concepts, but this is 																																																								
29 Jacob Taubes explores this in Occidental Eschatology and The Political Theology of Paul. In the latter he 
discusses Nietzsche and Freud as respectively responding to and inheritor of Paul’s universalization of sin.  
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not a project that Nietzsche is interested in. The genealogical method that he offers is meant 
to elucidate the history of a concept in order to show its contingency and complexity, and not 
so that we can provide a succinct definition of it.  In other words, if we want to understand 
sin, the origin of the concept need not tell us anything about its development or its current 
use. And so, despite designating sin as a Jewish feeling, the way in which sin is fleshed out in 
The Gay Science 135 represents the way in which has been taken up by Christianity – and 
thereby the fact that it is clearly unrepresentative of Jewish thought on sin ceases to be a 
problem.  
Indeed, Julian Young argues that even though Nietzsche appears to at times focus on the 
origin, for example by naming an aphorism “The Origin of Sin”, his true concern lies in the 
consequences of Christian belief. Young writes: “[t]hough Nietzsche places a great deal of 
methodological emphasis on the origins – historical and psychological – of Christian belief, 
his main effort, it seems to me, concerns not origins but rather the (unhealthy) consequences 
of such belief.” (2006: 65). The two are of course not unrelated, as Young continues to 
acknowledge, because Nietzsche’s project as a whole included the attempt to show that some 
aspects of Christian belief are epistemologically unsound. In order to do so, it can be helpful 
to look at the origins of this belief. However, the true focus of Nietzsche’s account of sin 
indeed lies in what sin looked like after Christianity took it up.  
Holding onto this distinction between the origin and continuation of sin, we can understand 
The Gay Science 135 as telling us two stories about sin. Firstly, Nietzsche tells us that 
Judaism invented sin, and secondly that Christianity took up the concept of sin increased its 
impact by making it a universal concept. The first claim has been explored above, and I think 
can now be granted. It is to the second story that we must now turn: what does it mean for sin 
to have been taken up by Christianity? It appears that for Nietzsche the very concept of sin 
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was transformed in Christianity. No longer can we understand sin merely as a transgression 
against God, instead, Nietzsche tells us, we should understand it as a kind of sickness. Here 
we will get the first glimpse of why Nietzsche considers sin to be a cultural problem.  
2.2 The demands of the law 
Nietzsche argues that the Christian laws were put in place to encourage people to feel more 
sinful; “Go through the moral demands exhibited in the documents of Christianity one by one 
and you will find that in every case they are exaggerated, so that he could not live up to them; 
the intention is not that he should become more moral, but that he should feel as sinful as 
possible.” (HH I:141). In Daybreak, Nietzsche writes “[t]he law itself must continually prove 
itself unfulfillable” (D: 68). 30 In other words, the laws were put in place in order to foster 
feelings of sinfulness. These laws were not simply meant to offer moral guidance or to control 
people’s desires, as the demands that they place are purposefully impossible to meet.   
Importantly, although Nietzsche treats the unfulfillability of the Christian laws as a problem, 
this need not be the case. Nietzsche’s critique here relies on a rejection of the Christian story; 
but if our sense of sinfulness corresponds to our true state of being, then becoming aware of 
this sinfulness is not a problem, even if it involves an acknowledgement that the laws are 
impossible to fulfil. Instead, the awareness of our sinful state can enable us to take up the 
proper relation to God, and become receptive to grace. We can find this kind of account in 
thinkers such as Paul Tillich, Søren Kierkegaard, and Martin Luther: “[a]lthough the law is 
the best of all things in the world, it still cannot bring peace to a terrified conscience but 
makes it even sadder and drives it to despair. For by the law sin becomes exceedingly sinful” 
																																																								
30  Nietzsche continues; “[…] the law existed so that sins might be committed, it continually brought sin forth as 
a sharp juice brings forth a disease; God could never have resolved on the death of Christ if a fulfilment of the 
law had been in any way possible without his death...” (D: 68) 
		 68	
(Luther 2012: 308). Furthermore, in Romans Paul already talks about the law’s function as 
awakening sin in us; “for through the law comes the knowledge of sin” (Rom. 3:20).  
It is important to acknowledge that Christianity differs here from Judaism. The paradigmatic 
Rabbinic principle that there should be no laws created that will make more people into 
sinners is reflected throughout the Jewish tradition. For example, Maimonides argues in 
Guide for the Perplexed that in issuing laws and commandments God always kept in mind 
what humans are capable of: “God refrained from prescribing what the people by their natural 
disposition would be incapable of obeying, and gave the above-mentioned commandments as 
a means of securing His chief object, viz., to spread a knowledge of Him [among the people], 
and to cause them to reject idolatry” (1903: 3.32). We can therefore again designate sin as the 
place where Judaism and Christianity grow apart in Nietzsche’s account.  
For Nietzsche, we can make sense of Christianity’s ‘exaggerated’ demands by looking at the 
role of God. As previously shown, in Human, All-Too-Human Nietzsche fleshes out the 
nature of God in terms of egoism. He tells us that God is conceived of as non-egoistic, and 
that human beings are incapable of any non-egoistic act. Nietzsche follows La Rochefoucauld 
and Lichtenberg in arguing that we do not love or value other people because of who they are, 
but rather for what kind of (pleasant) emotions they invoke in us. He writes that we value 
actions because of their usefulness, and not for any other reason: “The praise of the selfless, 
the self-sacrificing, the virtuous – […] this praise is certainly not born out of the spirit of 
selflessness! The ‘neighbour’ praises selflessness because it brings him advantages!” (GS: 
21). 
Nietzsche’s claim goes beyond the idea that we often do things out of egoism, or even that we 
do everything out of egoism. His claim is that we have no option but to do so. This does not 
designate a logical impossibility, rather the claim is that our human nature is such that we 
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cannot ever act out of non-egoistic motives. In other words, for Nietzsche it is not the case 
people usually act egoistically, nor even that no one has been able to act non-egoistically. 
Acting non-egoistically as such is impossible; it cannot be done. Any actions that we do 
consider to be non-egoistic, such as expressions of pity (Mitleid, to-suffer-with) are in actual 
fact self-gratifying.  
For example, one could think of a friend who buys many presents, offers to get drinks all the 
time, and thereby seems exceedingly generous. Instead of looking at this as a gesture of 
kindness or generosity, Nietzsche would interpret these acts as a way to gain power over other 
people, a way of perhaps manipulating them into spending time with you; “when I buy this 
person a present, they will surely feel like they have to tolerate my presence, they will owe 
me”. La Rochefoucauld makes this exact point: “[i]t may seem that self-love is deceived by 
kindness, and that it forgets its own interests when we are working for the sake of other 
people. Yet this is the surest way for it to reach its goals: it is lending at interest, under the 
pretext of giving; in fact, it is a subtle, refined method of winning over everyone else” (2007: 
V.236). So even when we are being kind, when we are “working for the sake of other 
people”, what we really want from this act is appreciation. In the Genealogy Nietzsche argues 
that Christian morality is based upon this kind of self-deception, and is in fact driven by 
egoistic motives. As Stephen Mulhall tells us, “Christian altruism is not just a moral code that 
comes naturally to the naturally weak and feeble, its function is to serve their own interests 
against those of others, as a weapon in the war between nobles and slaves.” (2007: 35).  
At the same time, by positing God as an ideal to live up to, the impossibility of acting non-
egoistically starts to become a cause of feelings of guilt. Without the figure of God, 
understood in a specific sense as a being that is only capable of non-egoistic actions, our 
inability to act non-egoistically would not be particularly harmful or frustrating, it would just 
add a moderate amount of dissatisfaction to our lives. With the establishment of the Christian 
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God, Nietzsche argues, the inability for non-egoism becomes almost unbearable. (HH I:37, 
101, 132).  
In order to understand the role of the Christian God for Nietzsche, we need not accept that He 
really is non-egoistic, nor that humans are intrinsically and necessarily egoistic. What we 
instead have to focus on is the mechanism described by Nietzsche. God has attribute x, 
humans are either inherently or practically unable to obtain attribute x, yet they still ought to 
strive to obtain x. In other words, God is posited as an ideal, something that we ought to live 
up to, but His nature is in some sense beyond what humans are capable of. God is perfect, and 
we cannot achieve this perfection, yet, at the same time, we ought to strive for this perfection. 
Pascal voices this feeling in Pensées; “Christianity is strange. It requires man to recognize 
that he is vile, and even abominable, and requires him to want to be like God” (2004: 103). 
This is indeed precisely the argument presented by Ricoeur and Kierkegaard in 1.2.1,  “it is 
the holiness of God that reveals the abyss of sin in man” (Ricoeur 1969: 242). 
For Nietzsche, no concept of the divine has evolved as much in the direction of the radical 
alterity of God as in Christianity. The Christian God has a nature that goes beyond any other 
deity; He is non-egoistic, He is perfect, He is the "uttermost example of godliness". If a 
person compares herself to Him, she will always fall short. We are fallible beings, and are 
constantly aware of this fact. Even if we behaved as perfectly as we could, it would be 
impossible to be ‘like God’. The kind of demands that are placed on us are not there in order 
to ensure that we live the best life possible as humans, but to ensure that we live the best life. 
According to Nietzsche, this poses a problem. If God is not only held up as a God-head, but 
also as an exemplar, and the particular quality of God is not one we can ever attain, then we 
will be striving for something that is impossible to achieve. The fact that it is still asked of us 
leads to feelings of uselessness and despair, and the sense that as humans we are essentially 
corrupt, even loathsome: that there is something wrong with us. 
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What we find here is sin that can be described as existential. Although particular events may 
trigger the feeling of sinfulness, the feeling is not locally reactive, it is an overarching feeling. 
In the previous chapter, we saw this feeling depicted powerfully in Romans 7 (see sections 
1.3.2 and 1.4). There is still something opaque about the phrase “feeling of sinfulness” 
however. Is it a feeling of debt or guilt? Is it an uneasiness, or perhaps feeling lost? I propose 
that the best way to capture it is to emphasize existential sin as signalling to us that something 
is not right about us. Not about the world or our surroundings, but about ourselves. In other 
words, to experience existential sin means to feel that there is something wrong with us by 
virtue of being human.  Nietzsche further establishes this account of existential sin in On the 
Genealogy of Morality. 
2.3 Sin in the Genealogy 
In the Genealogy, Nietzsche offers several different accounts of sin. First, he discusses sin as 
a debt towards God, which is somehow transformed into a sense of guilt. I will explore this 
account of sin as debt as grounded in Nietzsche’s account of the historical development of 
societies. I will then turn to the notion of ‘moralized guilt’, which I argue is how Nietzsche 
understands sin in the Second Essay of the Genealogy. Moralized guilt already brings us 
closer to an understanding of existential sin, as it explores sin as a sense of guilt. Thirdly, after 
a thorough analysis of the specific role of God in the origin and perpetuation of sin, I will 
offer a detailed reading of existential sin. Nietzsche argues that through positing sin as an 
explanation for meaningless suffering, the ascetic priests were able to make this type of 
suffering more bearable. I will show that the ascetic priest’s answer to meaningless suffering 
brings with it another form of suffering; suffering from existential sin.  
In the Second Essay of the Genealogy Nietzsche tells us of a pre-societal human being who 
was free to act upon her instincts, free to act upon her urges and fulfil her needs. In his 
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account, this human being did not need to have a conscience, as promises and interpersonal 
punishment only come into play once people begin living together. With the emergence of 
communal living, people have to be able to be responsible for themselves. A person becomes 
calculable and “able to vouch for himself as future” (GM II:1). According to Nietzsche, two 
things need to be in place before a person is capable of making and keeping promises: she has 
to be able to predict her future behaviour and she has to remember her promises. This 
knowledge of one’s sense of responsibility is a “dominant instinct” that can also be called 
conscience; Nietzsche goes on to say that conscience “is the product of a long history and 
series of transformations” (GM II:3). 
The development of conscience meant that a person becomes able to feel indebted. She is 
thereby able to make promises, because if she would not (or could not) fulfil her promise, she 
would be accountable to the person with whom she made the promise. For Nietzsche, this 
potential for indebtedness is essential to societal life. Furthermore, when a person becomes 
bound by society and its rules, she has to change in other ways. This means that once 
inhabiting the same space people have to channel some of their instincts that previously they 
were able to act upon freely. These instincts include “hostility, cruelty, pleasure in 
persecution, in assault, in change, in destruction” (GM II:16): all powerful, and violent, 
instincts. The instincts that used to be aimed outwards now become internalized: they turn 
inwards. Nietzsche argues that the internalization happens to “every instinct which does not 
vent itself externally” (ibid.), and by the turning inwards of instincts, the inner world of a 
person is vastly expanded. Nietzsche writes, “I take bad conscience to be the deep sickness to 
which man was obliged to succumb under the pressure of that most fundamental 
[gründlichsten] of all changes – when he found himself definitively locked in the spell of 
society and peace.” (ibid.). Bad conscience is a turning against oneself, a self-destructive 
mechanism which belongs in the field of cruelty.  
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We can now see the general structure of Nietzsche’s narrative. Prior to living in societies, 
people were free, “happily adapted to a life of wilderness”, with instincts appropriate to that 
sort of life. But then they found themselves living in a society where these instincts were no 
longer appropriate. And in order to live with others, people had to be able to feel guilty, feel 
indebted and they had to condemn their own natural instincts. In other words, humans were 
once content with themselves, in a pre-societal life, but then were forced to change in a way 
that seemed to necessitate self-condemnation.31  
2.3.1 Indebtedness and moralized guilt 
The indebtedness that is first made possible by conscience plays a further role in the 
development of guilt. A creditor-debtor relationship appears, which takes the shape of a debt 
to one’s forefathers: “here the conviction prevails that the race only exists by virtue of the 
sacrifice and achievements of the forefathers – and that one is obliged to repay them through 
sacrifice and achievements: a debt is recognized” (GM II:19). The more a culture advances, 
the more indebted it will feel towards its forefathers and the more it will sacrifice to repay its 
debt in another way. Then “the forefather is necessarily transfigured into a god” (GM II:19). 
Therefore, for gods to have come into existence, a certain kind of community needed to have 
been in place, and this is a community where indebtedness is an important part of life.  
In Nietzsche’s account in the Genealogy, sin appears when the particular god to whom we 
feel indebted is the Christian God. As opposed to The Gay Science, Nietzsche here places the 
origin of sin within Christianity rather than Judaism. Nietzsche explains the indebtedness 
towards God in terms of ‘moralized guilt’. Roughly, if we consider bad conscience to be the 
internalization of our instincts, and guilt to be bad conscience plus indebtedness towards 
																																																								
31 The structure of this narrative is similar to the Fall narrative in Genesis, and, as Mulhall has convincingly 
shown in Philosophical Myths of the Fall, this similarity is not accidental. 
		 74	
ancestors or gods, then the moralization of guilt is guilt with the added feeling that we deserve 
to feel guilty; we deserve to suffer because of our guilt.32  
The notion of ‘moralized guilt’ is a difficult one. Most accounts of moralized guilt within the 
secondary literature acknowledge that with moralized guilt we are no longer speaking just 
about feeling guilty for a specific action, but rather that this guilt permeates the way in which 
we understand ourselves. There are two different ways in which this is fleshed out, however. 
On the one hand, we find accounts where moralized guilt impact upon one’s self-
understanding as a whole being. In other words, moralized guilt impacts how I understand 
myself as a person, rather than only effecting how I understand myself in relation to one 
specific action that caused me to feel guilt. Brian Leiter and Aaron Ridley are two of the 
commentators who propose accounts of this nature. Leiter writes; “to feel guilty is to feel that 
one could have done otherwise (one could have not transgressed the norms) and to feel that the 
transgression reflects a fundamental defect of character or personhood.” (2015: 189). Ridley 
argues that moralized guilt “involves not merely "inward pain" and the thought "I ought not to 
have done that," but also the thought that one's deed, the type of one's action as such, is 
reprehensible” (2005: 37). In these accounts therefore, moralized guilt requires a notion of 
what a good person is and does, as well as perceiving oneself as not fitting those criteria. 
Instead of simply feeling guilty because of a broken promise, with moralized guilt we would 
furthermore experience an extra dimension of feeling in which we did not merely break a 
promise but are also now the kind of person who breaks promises, i.e. a bad person. 
However, Simon May, David Owen, Christopher Janaway and Matthias Risse offer different 
accounts. For them, the moralization of guilt indeed impacts the way we understand 																																																								
32 This echoes Lutheran views. Merold Westphal’s poignantly describes the feeling; "What drove Luther, 
however, first to despair and then to grace was not a fear of suffering in hell, but the overwhelming sense that 
this is what he deserved. Not the mere fact of God's wrath, but its incontestable rightness brought his existence to 
its crisis. For man can face enormous suffering with nobility and courage if with Job he is sure of his innocence 
or with Prometheus he is sure of God's guilt. What defines Luther's experience as that of guilt is precisely the 
absence of these comforts.” (1987: 76). 
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ourselves, but it concerns the way we understand ourselves qua human beings. May 
understands moralized guilt as designating a “putatively innate corruption of human nature” 
1999: 70), and Risse speaks about the “very fact of one’s being human” (2001: 65) 
determining the kinds of debts we have towards God. Here, moralized guilt does not involve 
an understanding of what a good person does, but purports to tell us about human nature an 
sich. Similarly, Owen tells us that moralized guilt contains both the idea of having been able 
to act otherwise, and the thought that “human existence is itself characterized by the feeling of 
guilt” (2007: 109). Janaway emphasizes that a further part of the process of moralization 
entails the notion that to feel guilty is itself a requirement for the good person:  
Moralization is the elevation of feeling guilty into a virtue, its incorporation into what 
the morally good individual is or does, into a conception of the kind of person one 
should want to be, be, by means of the rationalizing metaphysical picture in which the 
individual’s essential instinctual nature deserves maltreatment, because it stands in 
antithesis to an infinite creditor. (2007: 142).  
Here we see that moralized guilt is no longer primarily related to specific acts, but rather that 
it posits an understanding of human nature as deserving to be punished. These accounts, 
therefore, closely mirror the Christian accounts of both hereditary and existential sin we saw 
in the previous chapter, they understand human nature itself to be sinful.  
The distinction between these two different ways of understanding moralized guilt is 
especially important when we consider the fact that, for Nietzsche, moralized guilt should be 
understood to be the same as the feeling of sinfulness the ascetic priest promotes. In the Third 
Essay of the Genealogy, Nietzsche turns to the ascetic priest’s use of guilt. He there argues 
that guilt took on the shape of sin in the hands of the ascetic priest, and I will show later in 
this chapter that this shape should be understood as existential sin. This “dangerous and 
fateful trick of religious interpretation” (GM III:20) meant that this incarnation of guilt 
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became disconnected from specific actions, and focused entirely upon one’s human nature.33 
In other words, the feeling of sinfulness is no longer related to specific acts that one does, but 
rather to the fact of one’s human nature.  I submit that these considerations tell decisively in 
favour of the second line of interpretation outlined above. By understanding moralized guilt 
as continuing to concern specific actions and not our conception of human nature, Leiter and 
Ridley have no way of accounting for the transformation of moralized guilt into sin.  
2.3.2 Indebtedness to God 
For Nietzsche, guilt becomes problematic once the Christian God is in the picture. Feelings of 
guilt and indebtedness are simply part of living in communities, and a feeling of indebtedness 
towards ancestors is an extension of this. Even the transformation of these ancestors into 
deities is not necessarily a negative development, but it is the introduction of the Christian 
God that makes feelings of indebtedness more intense and problematic. This argument relies 
on Nietzsche’s account of the radical alterity of the Christian God, as discussed in the first 
part of this chapter. In the Genealogy Nietzsche offers the following narrative: "the sense of 
guilt towards the divinity has continued to grow for several thousands of years, and always in 
the same proportion as the concept and sense of god has grown and risen into the heights" 
(GM II:20).34 It is this conception of God’s nature that allows guilt (and sin) to grow so 
tremendously.  
																																																								
33  As seen in chapter one, understanding sin as being a deserved punishment, or understanding our sinful state as 
being deserving of punishment can both be found in many works within the Christian tradition (e.g. Augustine, 
Aquinas, Barth, Luther, Bonaventure). They also designate a distinction between two different types of sin; 
hereditary sin and actual sin. The second, which generally concerns specific acts that transgress God(’s laws), 
leads to punishment unless one repents (see for example Genesis 4:7). The first, which understands sin itself as a 
state of punishment, tends to be thought of in relation to Adam, where all of humankind is punished as a result of 
Adam’s transgression. Human nature becomes depraved and corrupt; the consequence of the punishment is a 
“hereditary corruption and depravity of our nature” (Calvin 2006: II.1.8), or “ignorance, difficulty, and death” 
(Augustine 2010: 3.20.26).  
34 Douglas Smith translates “Gottesbegriff und das Gottesgefühl” as “the concept and sense of god”, whereas 
Carol Diethe’s translation is “concept of and feeling for God”. Within the context of the passage, we can make 
sense of either translation, but I suggest that Smith’s is more accurate. Nietzsche’s argument concerns the 
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As Risse writes, “if we bring the Christian God into the story, we can easily explain why there 
is now an experience of reprehensible failure (existentially conceived): for we now have 
introduced the figure vis-à-vis whom this failure is experienced” (2005: 50). Feeling guilty or 
indebted for a particular occurrence in our life, or even feeling indebted towards our ancestors 
for allowing us to come into existence does not necessarily involve an experience of failure. 
This is because we often feel that we can make up for the wrong we have done, or we can live 
up to the expectations of our parents, live up to the image of our ancestors. When God is in 
the picture, however, we know we cannot redeem ourselves nor live up to the ideal. After all, 
God’s nature is radically different from ours, and we know we will never be able to live up to 
His image. Nietzsche tells us that some of the narratives and imagery of Christianity, as well 
as the work of the ascetic priests, increase our feelings of indebtedness, our feelings of sin.35 
Bernard Reginster argues that “[e]mphasizing indebtedness toward God, as some 
commentators propose to do, will not help” in understanding the moralization of guilt. His 
view is that “[i]f the feeling of indebtedness itself by no means decreases my worth as a 
person, it is hard to see how making it indebtedness toward God could have this effect.” 
(2011: 67), but this reasoning appears to misunderstand the particular position of God. It is 
entirely conceivable that indebtedness towards God decreases a person’s self-worth, even if 
indebtedness in any other context does not do so. To be aware of our nature, in this picture, 
means to be aware of our shortcomings and to judge ourselves negatively, because we are so 
unlike the exemplar God. This is indeed what many Christian thinkers argue, as shown in 
section 1.2.1. We can, for example, find a convincing account of this thought in 
Kierkegaard’s The Sickness Unto Death. Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the before God serves to 
																																																																																																																																																																													
conception of any deity, and by writing God with a capital ‘G’, we would be implying that this sentence 
concerns the Abrahamic God exclusively.  
35 See more in section 1.2.1. In addition, outside of Nietzsche we can find a convincing account of this thought in 
Kierkegaard’s The Sickness Unto Death. Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the before God serves to show precisely 
that standing in a relation to God changes everything about indebtedness; “[W]hat really makes human guilt into 
sin is that the guilty one has the consciousness of existing before God” (1980b: XI 192).  
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show precisely that standing in a relation to God changes everything about indebtedness; 
“[W]hat really makes human guilt into sin is that the guilty one has the consciousness of 
existing before God” (1980b: XI 192).  
The importance of the figure of the Christian God requires a closer examination of the 
emergence of God. In section 22 of the Second Essay, Nietzsche tells us about the origin of 
“the holy God”. He writes that “[the] man of bad conscience has assumed control of the 
religious presupposition in order to carry his self-punishment to the most horrific pitch of 
harsh intensity.” (GM II:22). Humans have a will to self-cruelty and a will to find oneself 
guilty, which can be seen most powerfully in the relation that is posited between the holy God 
and humans with their “absolute unworthiness” (ibid.).   
I suggest that there are three different ways we can read section 22. We can, on the one hand, 
interpret this section to be telling us about the contingent historical event of the emergence of 
the Christian God. What is found is that this is an event caused by humanity’s need to find 
itself guilty, and the positing of this Christian God in turn causes humans to feel increasingly 
guilty, and to find themselves even more wretched. This kind of reading is offered by 
Janaway (2007) and Ridley (2005).36 The second interpretation of section 22 suggests that 
God came before guilt, as proposed by Risse (2001, 2005). I will defend a third interpretation, 
which holds that God and the will to self-cruelty emerged together.  
Firstly, Ridley writes that section 22 is about “the invention of the Christian concept of God” 
(2005: 40). This invention is, for Ridley, not a condition for the “moralized concept of guilt”, 
as guilt existed before God came into the picture. Ridley paints a picture in which guilt is 
																																																								
36 A similar account is offered by Reginster, who says that “[moralized guilt] is rather a different process 
whereby the concepts of guilt and obligation, already understood in a generic moral sense, are enrolled in the 
service of the aims of morality understood in a specific sense, namely, as “slave morality” or “Christian” 
morality.” (2011: 69). He argues that Christianity perverts guilt by putting guilt in the category of the ‘before 
God’. 
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“logically prior to the concept of God” (ibid. 41). In other words, the concept of the Christian 
God is dependent for its emergence on guilt, but guilt is not dependent upon God. For Ridley, 
this temporal causal narrative is therefore one where God comes after guilt, and the 
emergence of this idea of God is caused by the kind of guilt humans already felt, concluding 
that “only the guilty need God” (ibid.). Janaway has a similar reading and describes 
Nietzsche’s account as follows; 
[W]e need to be cruel to ourselves, so we invent the notion of ourselves as wrongdoers 
in order to legitimize the self-cruelty; then in order to sustain the notion of ourselves 
as wrongdoers we resort to a metaphysical picture in which we are bound to transgress 
against something absolute that is placed there for that very purpose. (2007: 137) 
This “metaphysical picture” is one in which the Christian God takes centre stage. Janaway 
argues that God is a consequence of our desire to “legitimize our self-cruelty”, we create and 
use the idea of God in order to live with ourselves as self-cruel beings. The reason why we 
need to be cruel to ourselves, according to Janaway, is because in our society we are not able 
to act on our instincts. And indeed, this is what Nietzsche writes towards the beginning of the 
Second Essay; once people started to live together in communities many of their instincts had 
to be channelled or denied. This leads to people taking their violent drives out on themselves, 
rather than on others. Janaway argues that we legitimize this cruelty aimed at ourselves 
through the story told to us by Christianity.  
But Janaway’s and Ridley’s interpretations are unsatisfactory in a number of ways. First of 
all, they appear to conflate Nietzsche’s use of a historical narrative with teleological claims. 
Janaway’s suggestion that the metaphysical picture Christianity offers us was placed for the 
purpose of considering ourselves as sinful misses the point. Nietzsche importantly tells us that 
“there is a world of difference between the reason for something coming into existence in the 
first place and the ultimate use to which it is put” (GM II:13). Moreover, he claims that this is 
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the most important principle for “all types of history”. So when Janaway and Ridley posit 
structured teleological accounts of guilt we must seriously question them.   
However, even if we were to accept Janaway’s and Ridley’s approach to the Genealogy 
problems remain. If we need to legitimize our cruelty to such an extent, then why did it, 
historically, take so long before Christianity emerged? And, if the response to that question is 
that there are other ways in which we can cope with our self-cruelty, why did Christianity 
emerge in the first place? One could of course locate the emergence of Christianity elsewhere, 
but Ridley and Janaway locate it precisely as a consequence of self-cruelty.  
The second interpretation of section 22 comes from Risse. He argues that “[…] guilt of the 
sort that Nietzsche wants to explain arises only because there is a Christian notion of God 
already operative” (Risse 2005: 48). The kind of criticism that Ridley levels at Risse, namely 
that this means guilt is inconceivable after the death of God, is misguided as “it can both be 
true that guilt is ‘separable’ from the notion of God […] and that guilt could not have arisen 
without the notion of God being operative.” (ibid. 49). In other words, the fact that moralized 
guilt as sin only emerged when Christianity was around is simply contingent; it appeared at 
that point in history, but it could have also appeared at another point.  
After all, showing that the will to self-cruelty arose in a Christian framework does not tell us 
anything about the necessity of that framework – this is precisely the point of a genealogical 
method. Furthermore, the origin of a concept, and in this case the origin of God, does not 
necessarily tell us anything about it now. The factors that were in play that made it possible 
for God and sin to come into being do not have to be in play anymore. These concepts can 
take on a life of their own, which can mean that they are no longer dependent upon the 
conditions of their origin. Therefore, if we want to understand the relation between sin and 
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God in the Genealogy, we should not be focusing merely on the emergence of the Christian 
God.  
2.3.3 Sin and suffering 
In the Third Essay of the Genealogy Nietzsche offers a further account of the relation between 
sin and God that focuses on the growth of Christianity rather than its origins, and this is where 
we begin to see more clearly why Nietzsche's account is so important to understand 
existential sin. In order to explain the growing influence of Christianity, Nietzsche turns to the 
problem of suffering. He writes that people do not struggle with suffering as such, but they 
struggle with meaningless suffering. Suffering, for Nietzsche, is a necessary part of life. As 
Leiter writes, Nietzsche believes that “[s]uffering is a central fact of the human condition.” 
(2015: 205). We do, however, desire to understand suffering, and struggle to accept any 
suffering that we perceive as meaningless.  
In The Birth of Tragedy’s section 9, Nietzsche’s interpretations of Oedipus and Prometheus 
serve to emphasize this point. Oedipus shows the necessity of suffering in human life, and 
furthermore Prometheus shows us that suffering is not all bad: if we want to achieve progress, 
suffering is necessary. In the case of Oedipus, Sophocles describes Oedipus as being “born for 
pain” (1984: 232), a slave “to the worst relentless pains that ever plagued a man”, and that his 
acts “were acts of suffering more than actions outright” (ibid. 290, 299). Oedipus’s story 
teaches us about the necessity of suffering as well as the link between suffering and wisdom. 
He needed to find truth, searches for it obsessively in Oedipus the King. Yet knowledge 
brings him suffering and misery. As Tyler T. Roberts writes; “suffering, as an effect of 
wisdom, leads to blessedness […]. This blessedness is not so much a ‘hope’ for restored 
oneness as a recognition of the fact of oneness, of the fact of the close link between suffering 
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and joy, pain and wisdom” (1998: 109). Oedipus has seen into the heart of things, and he 
knows that suffering belongs to it.  
Similarly, the task of Prometheus is really not comprehensible without suffering. Prometheus 
considers suffering a necessity; “I must bear the fate allotted to me as best I may, because I 
know one cannot fight with the power of necessity” (Aeschylus 2013: 16). As opposed to 
Oedipus, who strives for self-knowledge but ultimately fails in this quest, Prometheus does 
have this self-knowledge, which also means that his attitude to suffering is different from 
Oedipus’. Whereas Oedipus does not feel entirely responsible for his actions, and therefore 
his sufferings do not seem to him to be entirely deserved, Prometheus does accept and even 
embraces the suffering accorded to him.    
Prometheus’ task cannot be imagined without the consequences of suffering, because the 
Promethean myth tells us something essential about the relation between suffering and 
progress. Nietzsche writes that in the Promethean myth it becomes clear that in order for 
humans to achieve “the best and highest”, they must suffer. Suffering is not something to be 
done away with, but it is an essential part of life and indeed an essential part of progress. This 
means that the Promethean myth offers a “justification of human evil – of human guilt as well 
as of the suffering incurred thereby” (BT: 9). For progress, suffering is necessary.  
Nietzsche holds onto these positions throughout his work. For him, suffering in itself does not 
constitute a problem that he believes requires redemption. However, a problem appears when 
the suffering is understood to be meaningless. There is a drive in all humans to explain 
suffering, to try and make sense of it. We desire to find a reason for our suffering. We are not 
able to suffer quietly; instead we feel the need to understand why it is happening. Our 
understanding of the reason for our suffering is essential in making the suffering bearable. 
This desire for an explanation plays into the power that sin can have over us. Imagine that you 
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have a chronic condition that has not yet been fully understood by medial science, such as 
fibromyalgia or chronic fatigue syndrome. Every day you experience a suffering that often 
interferes with your functioning in society. No explanation for your suffering is really given, 
nor do you know exactly what you can do in order to decrease your suffering. This situation 
that you find yourself in has no satisfying reason, no justification, no meaning. This lack of 
understanding, Nietzsche tells us, is unbearable. And our solution as human beings is to find 
an answer, in whatever way we can. This is, as I posited in the introduction to this thesis, an 
ontological claim. To be human means to desire an explanation for suffering. An answer to 
the question of suffering that posits that we are the reason for our own suffering therefore is in 
some ways actually satisfying to us, because it allows us to understand suffering and thereby 
to live with it. We are content to misunderstand suffering as long as this misunderstanding 
provides us with some peace of mind, that it has other suffering as its consequence is not a 
problem; this is the suffering that we desire, in Nietzsche's terms it is a suffering that we will.  
Nietzsche tells us that the ascetic priests managed to increase the prevalence of sin 
tremendously. They did so by tapping into people’s need for an explanation of suffering. The 
need for an explanation of suffering is ontological, but the particular answer that the ascetic 
priest gave is not; the ascetic priest offered a new meaning for suffering that is historically 
contingent. The meaning offered by the priests is one of guilt; it is one in which human beings 
are sinful and irredeemable, the only relief available existing in another world. There is 
suffering because we are to blame, because we are sinful. What characterizes the sinner in this 
picture is that all suffering is felt as caused by herself.  
Leiter fleshes out the ascetic priest’s explanation for suffering by arguing that we must 
understand it in relation to the ascetic ideal. The ascetic ideal, in which self-denial is 
celebrated as a virtue, is impossible for humans to live up to. Leiter argues that “[t]he ascetic 
priest seizes upon this fact in order to provide a meaning for human suffering: in a nutshell, 
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one suffers, according to the priest, as punishment for failure to live up to the ascetic ideal.” 
(2015: 209). The guilt that the ascetic priest transforms into sin is related to being unable to 
live up to the specific commandments of God that are connected to the ascetic ideal. Leiter 
therefore understands the explanation of the priest in a very specific way: we deserve to suffer 
because we cannot live up to the ascetic ideal. And indeed, the fact that the Third Essay of the 
Genealogy is centred on the ascetic ideal and its influence upon the psychology of Western 
Europe lends plausibility to Leiter’s interpretation. However, this is too narrow an 
interpretation of the specific shape of guilt that Nietzsche argues is transformed into sin. The 
experience of sin that Nietzsche describes in section 20 of the Third Essay tells us that the 
guilt the sinner feels is “everywhere”, it is all-encompassing: it does therefore not concern 
only an inability to live up to one standard.  
Indeed, the concept of sin provides an overarching narrative that gives a certain meaning to 
everything in the life of the ‘sinner’, and this narrative is closely related to suffering. We 
understand our own suffering now as deserved, as punishment for our guilt. Here we posit a 
relation between suffering, punishment and guilt. The description Nietzsche offers us does not 
refer to the sinner punishing herself because she is guilty. Instead, what we have is the sinner 
interpreting suffering that she is experiencing in a way that corresponds to her self-
understanding. This does not mean that when she stubs her toe she blames her sinful nature: 
in such a case the causal chain of events that causes the pain in her toe can remain clear, and 
trivial. But we have to remember that it is the overarching narrative of sin that we are 
concerned with. The suffering that Nietzsche talks about is not merely the suffering of a 
stubbed toe or a temporary headache, but rather the existence of suffering as such. 
In the Third Essay of the Genealogy Nietzsche gives us the following description; “Man, 
suffering from himself in some way […], uncertain as to why and wherefore, desiring reason 
– reasons are a relief – […] and behold! he receives a hint […] from the ascetic priest, the first 
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hint as to the ‘cause’ of his suffering: he is to seek it in himself, in some guilt […]” (GM 
III:20). What characterizes this sinner is that suffering is felt as caused by herself. The 
explanation of suffering that is offered by the priests is one of sin and guilt: there is suffering 
because we are to blame, because we are sinful. As Risse writes, “it is only when the ascetic 
priests introduce the Christian ‘maximal God’ that the moral psychology of guilt arises” 
(2005: 51).  
A problem appears here, however. The claim concerning suffering does not seem to 
accurately capture Christian doctrines of suffering. There are important examples in both the 
Old and New Testament that seem to hold the opposite. The Book of Job is perhaps the most 
explicit example of this. Here, we find that God scolds Job’s friends Eliphaz, Bildad and 
Zophar precisely because they tried to explain Job’s suffering. Job’s suffering had no other 
reason than that God allowed him to suffer (after being challenged by Satan), it was not 
because Job had sinned. Important to this story is that the personal guilt of Job is not at all 
relevant to his suffering.37 In fact, God declares him to be his most faithful. Similarly in John 
9 we find Jesus saying that the blind man was not suffering because of his sin; “his disciples 
asked him, saying, Master, who did sin, this man, or his parents, that he was born blind? Jesus 
answered, Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents: but that the works of God should be 
made manifest in him” (1 Jn: 9). 
These examples make clear that the relation posited between sin and suffering in Christianity 
is not accurately captured by an account that states that a person suffers because she is sinful. 
Of course this does not contradict that the idea of a causal relation between suffering and 
particular sins may find its place in the discourse of the aesthetic priest (as in the case of Job’s 
																																																								
37 For more detailed philosophical interpretations of Job, see Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil pp. 314-322, 
Girard, I see Satan Fall Like Lightning, pp.117-118., Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, 
8.265- 8.267, and Stump’s Wandering in Darkness, pp. 177-226. Although varied in interpretation, all of these 
accounts affirm the importance of the idea that Job is not suffering because of his personal guilt.  
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putatively pious friends). However, there is a way to make sense of Nietzsche’s account 
nonetheless, without attributing to him a caricature of Christian thought. This is to think about 
suffering and sin on a global scale, and not a personal one. The difference here is between the 
statements “I am suffering because I am a sinner” and “there is suffering because we, as 
human beings, are sinful”. The second would allow the idea that suffering as such exists 
because of the sinful nature of humans, rather than individual cases of suffering being directly 
linked to a sinful action. Despite this universalized sense of sinfulness and suffering, the 
individual person will still feel sinful because she is human. Again, the emphasis is on an 
overarching feeling of sinfulness rather than locally-reactive guilt – and indeed, an 
overarching feeling about what it means to be human rather than a feeling about what it 
means to be a specific individual. If we accept this reading of sin, and I suggest that we must, 
we are able to remove the contradiction between Nietzsche’s above account of sin and the 
Christian picture as portrayed in Job and John. The explanation that the ascetic priest offers 
concerns the notion that human nature as such is sinful, which leaves room for a person such 
as Job to not deserve the suffering he, as an individual, endures.  
This account, that explains suffering on a global scale, is entirely compatible with the 
accounts of sin that I discussed in the previous chapter. Although Paul struggles with himself 
as an individual, the basis for his struggle is in the fact of his human nature. It is useful here to 
think of the notion of hereditary sin: although we each of us are sinful, this is not because of 
any particularities of our existence, but rather because we are human.  
So, in the story Nietzsche wants to tell, the positing of God and sin has enabled us to find an 
answer for suffering. But this answer, he thinks, causes a different kind of suffering. 
Nietzsche writes: “[w]e have here a sort of madness of the will showing itself in mental 
cruelty which is absolutely unparalleled: man’s will to find himself guilty and condemned 
without hope of reprieve […]” (GM II:22). The will to find oneself guilty, an extension of the 
		 87	
will to self-cruelty, is expressed in the idea of God and the idea of moral perfection. There is a 
“madness of the will”; the answer to the meaninglessness of suffering is cruelty towards 
ourselves. But is this not contradictory to what we previously established, namely that the 
offering of an explanation for suffering helps the sinner live? In some sense, yes. The 
explanation of ‘sin’ does not help, in fact, the sinner experiences pain, fear, agony, cramps 
and cries out for a release from this suffering. And this, I think, is precisely Nietzsche’s point. 
He tells us in the final section of the Genealogy that the introduction of the perspective of 
guilt brought with it “new suffering”, which is a “deeper, more internal, more poisonous, 
gnawing suffering” (GM III:28). Because of this new and different kind of suffering, the 
sinner is still seeking redemption. The understanding of guilt has explained some suffering for 
her, but her suffering has not diminished, it has merely transformed. Nietzsche therefore 
posits two different types of suffering here. Firstly, there is the suffering without an 
explanation, and secondly there is the suffering that is caused by the specific explanation for 
suffering sin gives.  
The ascetic priests posit guilt as the explanation for suffering in that human beings are sinful 
and irredeemable, and furthermore they tell us that the only relief we may ever find will be in 
another world. These two sides of the ascetic priest’s explanation are important to examine. 
According to this explanation there is suffering in this world because of our human nature, 
and we must orient ourselves away from this world in order to find some kind of redemption.  
Thus, the purpose and meaning that follow from the ascetic priest’s answer are not aimed at 
our world. For Nietzsche they involve a “hatred of the human” and result in “an aversion to 
life” (GM III:28). After all, the place where we can be without suffering is beyond our 
domain. We live in a world where there is suffering, but we should orient ourselves towards 
an afterlife – the afterlife itself gives meaning to our suffering. This “aversion to life” is what 
the will to nothingness entails. The explanation the ascetic priest provides for suffering, and 
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consequently the way people then are able to give meaning to their lives, represent this same 
will to nothingness. 
The will to self-cruelty, to find yourself guilty, should be interpreted as an expression of this 
will to nothingness. To say, as Janaway does, that the will to self-cruelty is prior to the will to 
nothingness, that “cruelty is the base”, is mistaken (2007: 137). Janaway clearly 
acknowledges that for Nietzsche the Christian God plays a unique role, and in Christianity 
“[i]t belongs to the human essence to be transgressive against absolute values, and so the 
consciousness of guilt is inbuilt, perpetual, and profound” (ibid. 139), but he takes the Second 
Essay of the Genealogy as telling us about self-cruelty as a general fact or problem of human 
life, not just of life in the Christian world. What Janaway misses is that there is something 
about the particular importance of self-cruelty to the individual in the Christian framework 
that we do not find in Nietzsche’s description of Greek society. If we look at Janaway’s 
reading of the Genealogy, this self-directed cruelty should be there for any society with laws 
and regulations that force us to control some of our violent instincts, if they are not able to be 
discharged in any other way.  
In section 23 of the Genealogy, however, Nietzsche tells us something different. The Greek 
gods enabled people to live proudly and with “freedom of soul”, the gods were used to “keep 
‘bad conscience’ at bay” (GM II:23). If the Christian God is simply a logical consequence of 
the need for self-cruelty and this self-cruelty is a part of life in any society, then why did the 
Greeks have gods that were experienced so differently from the Christian God?  Perhaps one 
might argue that the Greek society was not as restrictive as the Christian one – but this would 
again point to there being something specific about Christianity that enabled self-cruelty to 
become so important. Nietzsche writes, for example, that the Greeks explained “what is bad 
and disastrous” by referring to “foolishness, not sin!” (GM II:23). They therefore resorted to 
an entirely different framework of understanding the world and of explaining the world.  
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It appears that the Greeks did not need to resort to self-cruelty in order to explain suffering in 
the world. Their explanation blamed someone else, namely the gods. The gods in the Greek 
society had a different role to the Christian God: “at that time they did not take upon 
themselves the execution of punishment, but rather, as is nobler, the guilt” (GM II:23). This 
shows that the drive to self-cruelty that Nietzsche writes about comes after the need to explain 
suffering. Nietzsche’s description of Greek society shows us that self-cruelty is but one 
possible answer to this need. 
So: is the will to self-cruelty the consequence of the specific response to the will to 
nothingness given by the ascetic priests and Christianity? Both the will to nothingness and the 
will to self-cruelty are representative of a general drive towards self-cruelty that define 
humans in the Christian world. In order to explain this, I want to return to the question of the 
relation between God and sin. What I propose is that (moralized) guilt or sin are not logically 
or ontologically prior to God, but neither is God logically or ontologically prior to them. 
2.3.4 Sin and God 
Janaway and Ridley rely on a framework in which answers only come into existence once the 
question is accurately stated. Nietzsche’s account is more complex, however. The question is 
‘why is there meaningless suffering?’ and the answer that the ascetic priest offers is ‘because 
you are to blame’. This seems fairly straight-forward. However, when we bring the will to 
self-cruelty into play, things become more complicated. The will to self-cruelty is expressed 
in sin; sin provides a way in which this will to self-cruelty is channelled. But, the will to self-
cruelty as channelled into sin only provided an answer to the question of meaningless 
suffering once sin was already in place.  
Simon May writes that “one of the central truths to which the whole Genealogy has been 
leading – that man tolerates and even wills suffering providing he is shown a meaning for it – 
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is just another expression of moral thinking and its religious roots” (2011: 80). This train of 
thought gets us closer to a convincing interpretation of Nietzsche. For May, as opposed to 
Janaway and Ridley, “moral thinking and its religious roots” is prior to the need to explain 
suffering. This reflects the difference between the Christian and Greek cultures in Nietzsche, 
and gives us insight into the relation to suffering that seems to essential to Nietzsche’s 
understanding of Christianity.  
If we return to section 23 of the Second Essay, Nietzsche describes the Greek gods as follows: 
“those reflections of noble and self-controlled [selbstherrlicher] men in whom the animal in 
man felt himself deified, and did not tear himself apart, did not rage against himself!” 
According to Nietzsche, this raging against itself, this self-cruelty, was therefore not present 
for the ancient Greeks.  However, Nietzsche is not saying that it could not have been present; 
in fact he claims that ‘bad conscience’ was kept at bay by the Gods, not that it was non-
existent in this world. It might be possible to conceive of a person in Greek society who 
struggles with their ‘bad conscience’. Her relationship to the gods may not have allowed them 
to place guilt with them, rather than with herself – and despite not having a concept of sin in 
place, this appears at the very least a possible scenario. This appears to support May’s 
suggestion that the particular shape the will to nothingness and the will for an explanation of 
suffering take is dependent upon the Christian framework.  
Risse’s reading is similar to May’s, although he goes one step further and argues that the will 
to self-cruelty and the need to explain suffering, and the Christian God, can be dependent 
upon each other. Risse agrees with May insofar as for both of them guilt or sin could not have 
arisen without a notion of the Christian God. Risse goes further, however, and also states that 
we can still conceive of moralized guilt without God, even though God was necessary for the 
emergence of guilt. As we saw him say earlier in this chapter; “it can both be true that guilt is 
‘separable’ from the notion of God […] and that guilt could not have arisen without the 
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notion of God being operative” (Risse 2005: 49).  However, I want to go one step further still. 
On the account I propose, Nietzsche’s claims are best interpreted as advancing a ‘no-priority’ 
thesis about the relationship between the ideas of God and sin: these are mutually dependent 
and take shape together. 
On this account, the emergence of the will to nothingness as the main driving force of 
humans, through sin, could not have occurred without an idea of the Christian God – but the 
Christian God would have been entirely unbelievable and unconvincing as a God without the 
will to nothingness. This we see in Nietzsche when he writes; “’Only when you repent does 
God have mercy on you’ – to a Greek, that is an object of ridicule and an annoyance; he 
would say, ‘Maybe slaves feel that way’” (GS: 135). In other words, the Christian God and 
how people relate to Him would have been an object of ridicule for the Greeks. This is 
because generally the Greeks did not suffer from the will to nothingness, they did not suffer 
from the kind of drive to self-cruelty that so defines the person living in relation to the 
Christian God.  
The suggestion Janaway, Ridley, Reginster and others make is that the will to self-cruelty can 
be conceptualised without God. The problem here is that if we consider the will to self-cruelty 
to provide us with an answer to the problem of meaningless suffering, it cannot actually be an 
answer unless the Christian God is in the picture. The idea that we, by virtue of being human 
beings, are ourselves to blame for suffering is one that Nietzsche considers to be exclusively 
Christian. The will to self-cruelty, that for Nietzsche leads to sin, requires a conception of 
God in order to be an effective way to explain suffering.  
If this interpretation is right, both the idea that sin is prior to God, and that God is prior to sin 
oversimplify Nietzsche’s account of this relationship. The will to nothingness as channelled 
into sin and the Christian God are dependent upon each other for their emergence and 
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propagation. Sin took hold of people and spread like a sickness, which could only happen 
because there was a need for an explanation for suffering. This explanation for suffering is 
universal, and not particular to any Christian or Greek context. But the shape that the 
explanation took, sin and the accompanying will to self-cruelty, was possible only in relation 
to the Christian conception of God. However, as we can see from Nietzsche’s writings on 
Greek culture, the Christian God would not have been successfully implanted or resonated 
without the concept of sin and the will to self-cruelty.  
So where does this leave us? One of the main objections Risse tries to fight off is that if we 
posit such a strong relation between sin and God, we cannot think of moralized guilt as 
existing without God. Ridley writes that if God is required for guilt, then “the notion of guilt 
should eventually […] wither away once the consequences of the death of God are fully 
acknowledged” (2005: 43). Furthermore, there is a problem in that “it is implausible to insist 
that guilt occurs only in cultures that have developed a Christian notion of God” (Risse 2005: 
52). These objections, as Risse rightly points out, do not hold up. Firstly they do not take into 
account the difference between guilt and moralized guilt or sin. This distinction, that allows 
us to understand moralized guilt in the specific form of sinfulness, is the accurate way to read 
Nietzsche’s Second and Third Essays. Secondly, contra Ridley, is in my view not at all 
implausible to suggest that Christianity has been influential to such an extent that it influenced 
and dictated particular forms of self-understanding, particular ways of viewing ourselves and 
the world.38  In fact, this is an important part of Nietzsche’s philosophical project, to 
understand and expose the psychology of existence in the Western European paradigm. 
Thirdly, the suggestion appears to be that the mutual dependence of moralized guilt and God 
in their emergence necessarily means there is a continual dependence. This latter point is 
rejected by Nietzsche throughout his work, which I will demonstrate in the third chapter of 																																																								
38  Nietzsche’s account is compatible with the thought that other religions could have done the same, though 
admittedly in different places or times. 
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this thesis. In this chapter I will suggest that sin can coherently and plausibly be thought of as 
continuing to exist after the death of God.  
In summary, Nietzsche’s account of sin in the Genealogy focuses on guilt and the idea of 
God. Sin originates when an indebtedness towards ancestors becomes transformed into an 
indebtedness towards gods. With the emergence of the Christian God, this indebtedness 
becomes a ‘moralized guilt’, where our guilt no longer reflects specific locally-reactive 
actions, but our human nature. It may seem that transgressive sin offers a very different 
account, as we saw that Nietzsche focuses on specific transgressions of God’s law. There, to 
understand sin means to understand a specific act as being a transgression against God. 
However, even in his account of transgressive sin we can find an existential dimension; by 
positing the law as unfulfillable, Nietzsche argues, Christianity aimed to make people feel as 
sinful, as guilty, as possible. The guilt that was encouraged as a response to a transgression 
went beyond feeling bad for one action, instead this one action is to be thought of as 
emblematic for one’s entire nature: as human beings we will always transgress God’s laws, 
because our nature cannot allow us to fulfil its requirements.   
In the Third Essay of the Genealogy we see in more detail how for Nietzsche Christianity 
promoted a sense of guilt and sin in humans. Through the work of the ascetic priests, people’s 
self-cruelty turned inwards and transformed into a sense that there was something 
fundamentally wrong with them as human beings. And if we want to understand this feeling 
of existential sin, there is no better place to turn to than the Third Essay of the Genealogy.  
2.4 Existential sin: the “hypnotic gaze of the sinner” 
In the Third Essay, Nietzsche offers us a description of the experience of existential sin that is 
one of the most vivid in the literature since Paul:  
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No matter where one looks, one meets the hypnotic gaze of the sinner, always moving 
in the same direction (in the direction of ‘guilt’, as the sole cause of suffering); 
everywhere the evil conscience, this ‘abominable beast’ to use Luther’s phrase; 
everywhere the regurgitation of the past, the distortion of the deed, the ‘jaundiced eye’ 
for all activity; everywhere the will to misunderstand suffering, its reinterpretation into 
feelings of guilt, the content of life reduced to fear and punishment, everywhere the 
whip, the hair-shirt, the starving body, remorse; everywhere the sinner stretching 
himself on the cruel rack of a restless, sickly, lascivious conscience; everywhere the 
dumb pain, the most extreme fear, the agony of the tortured heart, the cramps of an 
unknown happiness, the cry for ‘redemption’ (GM III:20).   
This quote will be the basis of our understanding of existential sin, and I will show that two 
aspects are particularly important: (i) sin colours our understanding of (past) experience, and, 
(ii) those who experiences themselves as ‘sinners’ are those who desire punishment and pain.  
Firstly, when we talk about sin colouring experiences, and especially past experiences, what 
we mean is that sin provides an overarching narrative that offers a new perspective upon a 
person’s life and her world as a whole. In this way it goes beyond merely feeling guilty for a 
certain act, or even a period in one’s life. Nietzsche talks about “regurgitation of the past”, 
“distortion of the deed”, “the ‘jaundiced eye’ for all activity”. This latter metaphor is 
particularly helpful. We can think of sin-consciousness as a change in vision, as putting on 
new, different, and according to Nietzsche distorted, glasses. This means that when we look at 
past events and experiences, we see them anew. We now see everything in light of our own 
sinfulness, our unworthiness.   
Let us sketch this out in some more detail. The act of looking back upon our past actions and 
experiences is a common experience for most, if not all, of us. Our present situation, state of 
mind, emotional well-being, and other factors will always play a role in how we interpret our 
past and perhaps distort this past somewhat. Furthermore, it tends to be at times in which we 
do not feel well that we tend to regurgitate our past the most. When we are already anxious 
about a certain situation, or full of regrets over messing up a presentation a couple of hours 
ago, we can easily get trapped in an avalanche of regrets, suddenly-remembered embarrassing 
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moments and overwhelming shame. Nietzsche’s description of the sinner seems to refer to a 
similar experience. We relive our past, we distort our actions, we view the world with new 
eyes. We do not merely view the world in a new way, we view it through sick eyes, jaundiced 
eyes. Nietzsche tells us that these sick eyes are not a localized illness, the sickness of sin 
pervades us.  
A useful way to understand what this means is by simply imagining our anxiety-laden 
moment of shame about our past actions as being constant, being everywhere. It is not a 
temporary emotional slump that altered our view, it is an all-encompassing existential stance 
that informs the way we look at the world. This is why Nietzsche places such emphasis on the 
everywhere, and the eye for all activity.  
When Nietzsche talks about “everywhere the whip, the hair-shirt, the starving body, remorse; 
everywhere the sinner stretching himself on the cruel rack of a restless, sickly, lascivious 
conscience”, the focus shifts from external suffering to suffering that the sinner inflicts upon 
herself. Nietzsche’s allusions to Christian penitents and ascetics (“the whip, the hair-shirt, the 
starving body”) are not accidental here. There is a long history of practices of penitence and 
asceticism in which practitioners aim to acknowledge their own sinfulness. Penitents would 
have committed particular sins for which they had to atone – and part of the atonement was 
through acts of self-flagellation, for a set period of time. This temporal limitation does not 
seem to apply in Nietzsche’s description of the sinner, and we must recognize the importance 
of Nietzsche’s repetition of the word ‘everywhere’. His point, therefore, is not simply that 
such practices exist within Christian traditions, but that they give expression to the 
fundamental form of self-understanding associated with the existential category of sin.  
The kind of sin-consciousness that Nietzsche is describing does not relate merely to specific 
acts, then, but to a person’s existence as such. The world-view of the sinner is not that she is 
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wrong because of one thing she may have done, but rather because of her nature. The 
transgression that requires punishment is therefore not related to specific acts, but to an 
existential state of being. And despite the relief of being offered an explanation for suffering, 
of being given an overarching picture that makes sense to us, it is difficult to find peace in it.  
When Nietzsche describes the sinner as living with a “deeper, more internal, more poisonous 
suffering, suffering that gnawed away more intensely at life” (GM III:28), or with “dumb 
torment, the most extreme fear, the agony of the tortured heart” (ibid. 20), he is writing with a 
sentiment that can be traced back to accounts such as those of Calvin and Paul.3 Nietzsche 
appears to consider these descriptions themselves to contain a criticism of Christianity. For 
him, Christianity has made humans feel sick and feel sinful, and this has hampered their 
flourishing. I would suggest that both Paul and Calvin would agree with the above statement. 
However, for them there is a truth revealed through the feeling of sinfulness: the suffering 
from sinfulness that people experience is merely a way of living with awareness of one’s 
existential state. We must acknowledge that Nietzsche’s account serves as a critique of 
Christianity only if the experience of sinfulness is considered to be grounded on false 
propositions regarding human nature.  
However, Nietzsche’s understanding of sin and sinfulness is still not incompatible with much 
– even most – Christian thought. Nietzsche’s accounts of transgressive and existential sin in 
particular clearly have their roots in that tradition. Sin, as Nietzsche understands it, is a 
robustly religious, and indeed distinctively Christian, concept, and the experience of 
existential sin is closely tied to the specific understanding of human nature that ‘priests’ offer. 
As Karl Jaspers writes, “[Nietzsche's] thinking has grown out of Christianity and through the 
Christian impulses themselves” (1952: 10, my translation). 
		 97	
We have arrived at a puzzle here. It is clear that Nietzsche’s account of sin is rooted in the 
Christian tradition, and that the figure of the Christian God plays an essential role in this 
account. However, Nietzsche was not a Christian thinker: after all, fact he famously 
announced the death of God. Why, then, is his account of sin so similar to Christian accounts? 
Is his account of sin, in fact, purely Christian?  
I have previously established that there is in fact a significant difference between Nietzsche’s 
account of sin and the accounts of sin offered by Christian theologians; and this difference 
lies in the evaluation of sin. For Nietzsche, sin is a false: it is a lie that has been used by the 
Church in order to promote feelings of self-cruelty and self-judgment in people. For Christian 
thinkers, however, sin is an ontological state: to be sinful is to be human. Given that 
Nietzsche believes sin is based on a falsehood, we would be justified to ask why exactly he 
spends so much time discussing it. Even if we keep in mind Nietzsche’s claim that the death 
of God will not simply mean an abolishment of Christian morality, and that remnants of 
Christianity will continue to be around for centuries to come, ’sin’ as a concept will surely not 
survive, because it relies so heavily on the idea of the human condition as being manifest 
before God. 
There are two parts to my answer to this. Firstly, it is by no means obvious that the ‘death of 
God’ will necessarily do away with existential sin, even if sin seems to require a being ‘before 
God’. We can say that a relation to God was necessary for sin to develop, and indeed that it 
was necessary for anyone wanting to offer a thorough account of sin. However, it is possible 
for concepts to become removed from their originating conditions yet to continue existing. 
These ‘floating’ concepts can remain a part of our realm of understanding and indeed a part of 
people’s self-understanding, even if they cannot be grounded. This can be explained by 
looking at the cultural dimension of sin. Sin is here understood no longer narrowly as a 
personal feeling of guilt towards the Christian God, but it has taken on an existence in the 
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cultural realm. In the next chapter I will establish in more detail what it means for sin to 
continue existing even for those people for whom God does not exist. In addition to 
Nietzsche’s Genealogy, I will turn to Ricoeur and Hans Blumenberg in offering an account of 
the cultural presence of sin that allows us to make sense of the concept of post-Christian sin.  
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Chapter 3  Post-Christian Sin: A Nietzschean 
Hypothesis 
 
Perhaps the day will come when the concepts of  ‘God’ and ‘sin,’ which are 
the most solemn concepts of all and have caused the most fighting and 
suffering, will seem no more important to us than a child’s toy and a child’s 
pain seem to an old man… (BGE: 57) 
 
Sin as explored so far in this thesis appears to be a thoroughly religious and Christian concept. 
It may therefore be puzzling that in one of the earliest parts of this thesis I discussed post-
Christianity and secularization. However, the ways in which we can understand ourselves are 
historically situated and do not take place within a present-day vacuum. Although one of the 
aims of this thesis is to understand how sin can exist within a secular(ised) framework, this 
does not mean that it can be discussed entirely secularly. In order to understand what sin may 
look like in a post-Christian account, we have to understand what sin means within Christian 
accounts. This we saw reflected in Nietzsche's work: although he does not offer the same 
interpretation of the value of sin as Christian thinkers, his descriptions and understanding of 
what sin means and how it is experienced closely echo Christian accounts.  
However, the question that we need to raise is, given that Christianity no longer holds sway in 
our culture, why should we be interested in looking at sin as anything other than a historical 
phenomenon? What is its relevance to us, now? This line of questioning suggests that we 
have, in a way, moved on from Christianity. Its idea(l)s no longer matter to us. It is this idea 
of moving on that Nietzsche questions throughout his work, and that I will attempt to bring 
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out in this chapter. In the introduction I defined ‘post-Christian’ as describing a person who 
lives in a culture that is historically Christian, yet also contains the message that we no longer 
need religion with the advent of modernity. In order to understand the experience of 
existential sin, we need to understand its shape in both of these aspects of Western European 
culture.  
Jacob Taubes points out that “[w]e still wear Christian eyeglasses, although they no longer fit 
the eyes. Our eyes see differently, and the Christian eyeglasses are artificial.” (2004: 82). In 
other words, our historically conditioned self-understanding, this inherited form of self-
understanding, no longer fits us well. In this chapter I will focus on both of these claims, 
namely that our self-understanding is inherited, and that this particular self-understanding – 
that is, the form of self-understanding in which we regard ourselves as sinful has now become 
artificial. In considering this second claim I will discuss how existential sin might be 
responsive to an ontological aspect of our existence, and thereby potentially offers us insight 
into the human condition.  
3.1 The ‘death of God’ 
In the previous chapters, I explored the distinction between acts of sin and existential sin, and 
argued that existential sin describes the experience of feeling that something is wrong with 
oneself just by virtue of being human. Both of these concepts of sin are grounded within 
Christian thought and the Christian tradition, and I further argued that Nietzsche’s 
understanding of sin is, in a fine-grained way, responsive to that tradition. However, there are 
two aspects of his account of sin in which we can see clearly how he moves away from 
Christian accounts. Firstly, he considers sin to be a false category of experience, in the sense 
that the concept of sin tells us nothing true about human nature. Secondly, Nietzsche explores 
the notion of sin as continuing to exist after the ‘death of God’. For him, even after 
		 101	
Christianity’s prevalence waned, existential sin continued to exist as a way of understanding 
oneself. The first of these aspects, namely that Nietzsche considers sin as not reflective of 
human nature, will be further discussed in section 3.4. The second requires a thorough 
understanding not only of sin, but also of the ‘death of God’. This is what I will turn to now.   
Nietzsche’s famous passage reads: 
Haven’t you heard of that madman who in the bright morning lit a lantern and ran 
around the marketplace crying incessantly, ‘I’m looking for God! I’m looking for 
God!’ Since many of those who did not believe in God were standing around together 
just then, he caused great laughter. […] The madman jumped into their midst and 
pierced them with his eyes. ‘Where is God?’ he cried; ‘I’ll tell you! We have killed 
him – you and I! We are all his murderers [Wir Alle sind seine Mörder!]. But how did 
we do this? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe 
away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its 
sun? Where is it moving to now? […] God is dead! God remains dead! [Gott ist todt! 
Gott bleibt todt!] And we have killed him! [Und wir haben ihn getödtet!] How can we 
console ourselves, the murderers of all murderers! The holiest and the mightiest thing 
the world has ever possessed has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this 
blood from us? With what water could we clean ourselves? What festivals of 
atonement, what holy games will we have to invent for ourselves? Is the magnitude of 
this deed not too great for us? Do we not ourselves have to become gods merely to 
appear worthy of it? There was never a greater deed – and whoever is born after us 
will on account of this deed belong to a higher history than all history up to now![…] 
Finally he threw his lantern on the ground so that it broke into pieces and went out. ‘I 
come too early’, he then said; ‘my time is not yet. This tremendous event is still on its 
way, wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men. […] This deed is still more 
remote to them than the remotest stars – and yet they have done it themselves!’ (GS: 
125) 
Most straight-forward accounts on the death of God hold that in this passage Nietzsche is 
announcing a diminishing of belief in the Christian God, and along with it, a rejection of 
Christian doctrines. For example, Richard Schacht tells us that the death of God is simply 
about “the abandonment of belief in God” (2003: 119, a similar but more nuanced account 
can be found in Reginster 2006). However, this interpretation is inadequate. Nietzsche clearly 
states in the passage that the madman is announcing the death of God to atheists, and that it is 
in fact these atheists who do not understand the enormity of the event: when Nietzsche writes 
“[t]his tremendous event is still on its way, wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men”, 
he is not speaking about Christians being blind to the death of God, but rather about the 
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atheists who do not realise the true nature of the event. Therefore, Nietzsche’s point is that the 
consequences of the death of God go further than we naturally expect. We cannot simply 
reject Christianity and go on with our lives as we always have done. 
And indeed, much secondary literature supports this reading. The death of God not only 
signals a diminishing of belief in the Christian God, but an entire way of understanding the 
world is undermined. Along with God, there is a rejection of metaphysics (prioritized by 
Hatab 2005, Pippin 2010, May 1999), morality (Löwith 1997) or a rejection of an entire 
sphere of meaning (May 1999, Fraser 2002). These accounts explain why Nietzsche describes 
the death of God as a devastating event. Not only was God killed, but along with God the 
ground for our understanding of the world, our explanatory narratives disappeared. As Terry 
Eagleton tells us, “Our conceptions of truth, virtue, identity and autonomy, our sense of 
history as shapely and coherent, all have deep-seated theological roots. It is idle to imagine 
that they could be torn from these origins and remain intact.” (2014: 156). We thereby see that 
the ‘death of God’ offers another way of understanding the concept of ‘post-Christian’.  
In contrast to the above accounts, however, Tillich and René Girard argue that Nietzsche does 
not actually show the death of God at all. For Tillich the figure of Zarathustra represents the 
idea that the person who has killed God still needs a god: “Nietzsche offers a solution which 
shows the utter impossibility of atheism. The Ugliest Man, the murderer of God, subjects 
himself to Zarathustra, because Zarathustra has recognized him, and looked into his depth 
with divine understanding. The murderer of God finds God in man.” (Tillich 1953: 47). 
Girard argues that the consequences of God’s murder have to be religious, and that this will in 
fact only make God more important: “the death of God is also his birth” (Girard 1984: 831). 
New sacrificial rites will have to be invented, and the process of religion will thereby only 
continue, which explains why the madman asks “[w]hat festivals of atonement, what holy 
games will we have to invent for ourselves?” (GS: 125). Tillich and Girard hereby emphasize 
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that even if the traditional concept of the Christian God may have been rejected by the 
madman and the atheists, the desire and need for God still exist. The consequence of the death 
of God is therefore not as tremendous, though still significant, as Nietzsche thought, because 
what we find is a return to religion, albeit in a different shape. 
The question Tillich raises, how we can synthesize Nietzsche’s figure of Zarathustra with his 
rejection of religion, is worth asking. And indeed, Nietzsche’s insistence upon one great 
figure, one great redeemer, who will release people from the consequences of the death of 
God gives pause. In the Genealogy he talks of “the redeemer of great love and contempt” 
(GM II:24) who will rescue us from the curse of sin and the ascetic ideal: a single individual 
who is able to transcend the seeming reality of this life, and instead redeems this reality. 
Zarathustra is portrayed as precisely this kind of individual.39 Christopher Hamilton similarly 
draws our attention to Thus Spoke Zarathustra when discussing the death of God. He argues 
that the murder of God is Nietzsche’s individual act, and that Nietzsche murders God because 
“God pities men and Nietzsche pities God” (Hamilton 2007: 174). 
The word murder is significant. Many of the secondary accounts on The Gay Science 125 
miss the fact that Nietzsche describes the death of God as a murder.40 Instead, they talk about 
the death of God as an event that simply occurred or was the result of an organic process. 
Nietzsche’s description of the murder as having left us covered in God’s blood appears to be 
irrelevant to them. For example, Robert Pippin describes the passage as telling us that “a kind 
of death has occurred” (2010: 50), and Young describes the death of God as follows: “[w]hen 
Nietzsche reported, in 1882, that ‘God is dead’, he articulated no more than the truth: the 
sociological fact […] that Western culture has ceased to be a religious culture” (2006: 3). All 
																																																								
39 See more on this in section 4.2. 
40 A key contrary account can be found in Girard, who emphasizes the collective aspect of the murder of God, 
and argues that “Nietzsche sees the disappearance of God as a horrible murder in which every man is involved” 
(Girard 1984: 830).	
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Nietzsche did, according to this interpretation, was point out a fact of life in Western Europe 
at the time. However, this seems rather incongruent with the actual text. Why, if all that this 
passage is supposed to do is describe a sociological fact, is the madman described as 
distraught, why does he exclaim, “…we have killed him! How can we console ourselves, the 
murderers of all murderers! The holiest and the mightiest thing the world has ever possessed 
has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood from us?”? Nietzsche places the 
responsibility for God’s murder in the hands of human beings. This is not something that 
happened to us, but rather something that we made happen.  
And indeed, one of the messages of the madman to the atheists is the message of 
responsibility. When he asks, “who will wipe this blood from us? With what water could we 
clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what holy games will we have to invent for 
ourselves? Is the magnitude of this deed not too great for us? Do we not ourselves have to 
become gods merely to appear worthy of it?”, the message is clear: God is dead and we bear 
responsibility for this. If we consider the death of God to be an organic process, it is difficult 
to see where our responsibility lies. Similarly, if the death of God in The Gay Science reflects 
an act of Nietzsche alone, we must ask why the madman directs himself to the atheists. I 
suggest that in the madman’s appeal to responsibility we can see reflected Nietzsche’s 
admiration for figures such as Prometheus and Oedipus. Remember that in The Birth of 
Tragedy Nietzsche argues that Prometheus knows that what he did was against the will of 
Zeus, and was fully aware of the consequences of his actions, but he affirms them 
nonetheless, and accepts any consequences (including eternal suffering). Oedipus was not as 
aware of the consequences of his actions, but once he realised what he had done, he accepted 
his responsibility. Both of these figures therefore display an acceptance of suffering and 
despair. This is now what is asked of the atheists in the marketplace. 
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The death of God parable tells us of the murder of God. God has been killed by humans, and 
this is an event that will be difficult to move on from. However, despite this, the atheists who 
hear the madman’s speech are unmoved. They are responsible for God’s death, but they do 
not seem aware of this fact. Furthermore, they do not realise the extent to which the death of 
God impacts the world. Instead, they think that they have already accepted the consequences 
of the death of God, as after all they are atheists. This portrays a misunderstanding of the 
impact of religion. And that is in fact one of the foundations on which this thesis stands. As 
opposed to thinking about religion and secularization in terms of reflectively-endorsed beliefs, 
Nietzsche tells us that there is more going on: despite reflectively endorsing atheism, the 
atheists in the marketplace still do not understand what it means for God to be dead.  
In order to understand exactly what the atheists are missing, we must turn to an earlier 
passage in The Gay Science. Nietzsche there declares not only the death of God, but 
furthermore tells us that there are shadows of God that remain. Nietzsche describes these 
shadows “God is dead: but given the way people are [so wie die Art der Menschen ist], there 
may still for millennia be caves in which they show his shadow. – And we – we must still 
defeat [besiegen] his shadow as well!” (GS: 108). If this sentence is straightforwardly 
interpreted, it appears that the only remnant of God is one shadow, which does not appear 
particularly overwhelming. However, for Nietzsche the shadow of Buddha, with which he 
opens the above passage, is considered to be “tremendous [and] gruesome [ungeheuren 
schauerlichen]”, and we must similarly interpret God’s shadow. Certainly, shadows are more 
one-dimensional than what they reflect, but as Nietzsche rightly points out, they can also 
grow larger and more terrifying in their darkness.  
The fact that Nietzsche talks about a shadow, in the singular, of God, might lead one to think 
that the remnants of Christianity will take the specific shape of God. So, depending on the 
analysis, the shadow might refer simply to Christian religion as a whole, to metaphysical 
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placeholders, to any kind of world-view that requires the giving of a God-like status to any 
aspect of the world. This analysis is certainly compatible with what Nietzsche tells us in The 
Gay Science, but a broader interpretation is also possible. By using the metaphor of shadow, 
Nietzsche is telling us that there is a presence of Christianity that remains, even if we can no 
longer locate God. Throughout his works, Nietzsche is concerned with the consequences of 
the predominance of Christianity in Western Europe. The ‘death of God’ does not lessen his 
interest or worry. If the shadow of God would be interpreted strictly as a shadow taking the 
shape of God, we can only make sense of Nietzsche’s focus if we also posit that this shadow 
of God brings with it other shadows. Otherwise, Nietzsche’s project after The Gay Science 
would have been primarily dealing with aspects of life that took over the function of God. 
This is not the case, as On the Genealogy of Morality, The Anti-Christ and Twilight of the 
Idols very evidently show.  
Furthermore, Nietzsche tells us that the shadow(s) of God, regardless of its shape, cannot 
simply be ignored, because even if our backs are turned it lingers. This is why Nietzsche talks 
about the need to defeat the shadow. The German besiegen that Nietzsche uses, implies not 
only defeating, but conquering. We must therefore be active in a pursuit of this shadow, it 
will not disappear on its own. Yves Ledure argues that in some sense nothing actually 
changes after the death of God, precisely because these shadows remain; “[c]ertainly, there is 
no more shepherd, there is no more God, but his shadow continues still. […] Fundamentally 
nothing has changed after the death of God” (1973: 126, my translation). It is therefore not 
simply the case that with God’s death these shadows will disappear on their own, nor that 
they are no longer important. 
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3.2 Nietzsche on sin without God 
Can we think about sin as one of God’s shadows? The answer to this question depends on the 
specific concept of sin we are looking at. If we conceive of sin as a transgression against God, 
then sin after the death of God is difficult to conceptualize. In the previous chapters I argued 
that for transgressive sin the position of the before God is essential – we cannot properly 
account for transgressive sin without it. With the death of God, the notion of an active God 
before whom one stands in sin is no longer possible, all we can stand before is His shadow. 
Similarly, if we conceive of sin as a debt to God, a relation to God seems necessary. 
Existential sin appears to be somewhat different, however. Whereas transgressive sin and sin 
as a debt require an active relation to God, this is much less obviously the case for existential 
sin. In this chapter I will argue that we can offer a plausible account of existential sin in a 
post-Christian context.  
I posit that we can intelligibly think of existential sin as one of God’s shadows. It has gone 
surprisingly undetected, but its dark and vast imprint upon society’s walls is there 
nonetheless. It impacts the ways in which we see ourselves, the way in which we are able to 
imagine ourselves. The eyeglasses that Taubes speaks of at the start of this chapter are 
coloured by the notion of sin. In the previous chapters I have begun to explain what this sin 
looks like, but how does it relate to a post-Christian culture? How can we make sense of ‘sin’ 
as a shadow, as a factor that still impacts contemporary life even if it is not explicitly present?  
What we must do now is explore how existential sin has continued to exist as a form of self-
understanding even after Christianity’s influence has lessened. The claim will have to be that 
some of the shadows that remained after God had died, are more than simply explicitly-
endorsed beliefs. This means that the influence of Christianity and Christian doctrines went 
beyond such beliefs, it impacted upon the experience of ourselves and the world in much less 
explicit ways. Christianity has influenced ways in which we can understand ourselves, and 
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these forms of self-understanding are still present, even when the religious beliefs on which 
they were based are no longer here. Furthermore, these forms of self-understanding have not 
immediately appeared to us as misplaced or relying on an antiquated idea of the world. 
Nietzsche’s account tells us that sin as a form of self-understanding that flies under the radar 
of explicit judgments can be conceived of as still being in place now.  
However, some of Nietzsche’s own work could be interpreted to argue the opposite. Most 
importantly, in section 133 of Human, All-Too-Human Nietzsche argues that “if the idea of 
God is removed, so is also the feeling of ‘sin’ as a trespass against divine laws, as a stain in a 
creature vowed to God”. This passage suggests that with the disappearance of God sin will 
also go away. However, this passage in fact points to an important distinction within sin that 
we must keep in mind: transgressive sin and other forms of sin. The above passage makes 
specific reference to sin as transgression, “’sin’ as a trespass against divine laws”. And 
indeed, as argued above, if we understand sin to be synonymous with transgressive sin, it is 
difficult to see how it would survive being taken out of the Christian context. We can see very 
clearly that for Nietzsche, this type of sin is done away with when God is removed from the 
picture. And so, what is left now is existential sin.  
3.2.1 Existential sin without God: the Genealogy 
In the Genealogy Nietzsche writes that there is already a “decline in the human sense of guilt 
[menschlichen Schuldbewusstseins]” (GM II:20).41 Furthermore, he says, "the prospect that 
the complete and definitive victory of atheism might redeem mankind entirely from this 																																																								
41 The German word ‘Schuld’ can be translated as both ‘debt’ and ‘guilt’. Kaufmann and Hollingdale, who 
translate it as ‘mankind’s feeling of guilt’, support Smith’s choice of ‘guilt’ in this passage. However, Carol 
Diethe translates ‘menslichen Schuldbewusstseins’ as “consciousness of human debt”. This can have significant 
consequences for the interpretation of the passage. Brian Leiter, for example, relies on Diethe’s translation in 
arguing that passage II:20 concerns debt, but passage II:21 concerns guilt (Leiter 2015: 189-190). I follow 
Smith’s translation, which I believe to be clearer and more consistent. For example, Diethe appears to get into 
trouble in section II:21, where she translates every instance of Schuld as ‘debt/guilt’, which raises many 
questions on how to read the text. However, my interpretation in this chapter is in fact also compatible with 
Diethe’s translation of II:20.   
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feeling of indebtedness towards its origins, its causa prima, cannot be dismissed [ist nicht 
abzuweisen]" (GM II:20). Nietzsche therefore signals a decline that is already taking place: as 
the Christian God becomes less important, people’s sense of guilt towards God has also 
lessened. However, we can also see a hesitation on Nietzsche’s part concerning the outright 
removal of this sense of guilt. He writes that it might be possible, which shows Nietzsche does 
not want to discount the possibility. But he certainly does not straightforwardly affirm it. We 
need to explore the significance of Nietzsche’s hesitation. 
In a similar way to Human, All-Too-Human 133, Nietzsche talks about a specific kind of sin, 
namely sin as a feeling of indebtedness towards one’s (first) origins. How are we to 
understand this? This relates back to the historical narrative Nietzsche gives us in the 
Genealogy. The move from bad conscience to guilt involves an indebtedness towards 
ancestors, towards forefathers. This indebtedness is related to one’s origins: it is a being 
indebted because you exist, because you have been able to come into existence. Now when 
we put this in the context of sin, the idea is that there is an indebtedness towards God because 
he is our causa prima. And so, with the death of God, we can no longer hold onto this idea. 
Or at least, this is an option that Nietzsche considers: an option, he says, that cannot be 
dismissed. I suggest that this means that Nietzsche himself realized that the existence of sin 
after the death of God is not straightforwardly obvious. Although he acknowledges the 
possibility of at least a certain kind of sin not existing anymore, he is clearly not convinced. 
Indeed, in the next section, 21, of the Genealogy, Nietzsche tells us the following; 
[…] at the end of the previous paragraph [I] even talked as if this moralization had not 
taken place, and consequently, as if these concepts were from now on necessarily 
approaching their end, now that their pre-condition, the belief in our ‘creditor’, in God, 
has collapsed. The real situation is fearfully different. The moralization of the 
concepts guilt and duty, their being pushed back into bad conscience, actually 
represents an attempt to reverse the direction of the development just described, or at 
least to halt its movement. The goal now is the pessimistic one of closing off once and 
for all the prospect of a definitive repayment […], the goal now is to turn those 
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concepts ‘guilt’ and ‘duty’ back – against whom then? There can be no doubt: first 
against the ‘debtor’ […] (GM II:21).  
We see here that Nietzsche’s hesitation has turned into an outright rejection of the thesis that 
sin might not continue to exist after the death of God. Nietzsche suggests in this passage that 
the moralization of guilt has resulted not in its demise, but in fact guilt is turned back against 
the debtor – now that the creditor, God, is out of the picture. In other words, guilt becomes 
internalized because it cannot be projected onto any external source, anyone to whom we are 
indebted. Furthermore, as a consequence of this internalization, redemption is cut off, because 
there is no longer a creditor who can release our debt.  
We must understand this passage not as describing the process that every single individual 
undergoes, but rather as an explanation of the existence of moralized guilt, of existential sin, 
now. One could read the above passage as symbolic for the human condition – that we all 
incur a debt that eventually becomes internalized. However, Nietzsche is telling us that 
moralized guilt may have once been primarily related to the before God, to a debt incurred to 
the figure of God, but that it has since transformed into a different kind of experience. This 
does not mean that every experience of existential sin takes places after the ‘death of God’. In 
fact, we saw in the first chapter of this thesis that Nietzsche posits existential sin as first 
depending upon the presence of God, as the ascetic priest relies on the Christian narrative in 
order to posit existential sin as an answer to suffering.  
But what we can see is how sin can continue to exist after the ‘death of God’. Once God is out 
of the picture – and this need not be an explicit acknowledgment of the death of God, the 
transformation of guilt towards God into existential sin could occur in Christians: existential 
sin becomes a way of understanding oneself in the world, without having any recourse to its 
religious origins. As Daniel Conway writes:  
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“[t]he rise of the Christian God […] completes the transformation of the concept of 
debt into the concept of guilt. To experience oneself as guilty is to experience oneself 
as permanently and irremediably indebted, independent of what God has and has not 
provided in recent memory. One stands guilty before the God of Christianity, that is, 
inasmuch as one’s indebtedness to him is indelibly imprinted on one’s very being.” 
(Conway 2008: 91-92). 
 It is this imprint that remains after the death of God. There are multiple interpretations in the 
secondary literature describing what this imprint might look like. For example, Tracy Strong 
argues that “[f]or those who live without God, yet continue to act in the forms of Judeo-
Christian morality, the forces of guilt that may drive them on now lack all goals, even the 
imagined ones” (1988: 101). Strong thereby seems to tell us that even in a post-Christian 
culture, the forces of guilt can still drive people, even when these forces are now without 
goals. For Nietzsche, the goals that were envisioned by the ascetic priest and attached to 
existential sin were imagined; there was no redemption, no afterlife, no God to save us, and 
after the death of God this seems to have come to light.  
Simon May offers a further analysis of the consequences of the death of God that focuses on 
the will to nothingness. Recall that in the Third Essay of the Genealogy, Nietzsche argues that 
sin is posited by the ascetic priests as an explanation for meaningless suffering, and as such, it 
offers a way for the will to nothingness to be channelled. If we want to uphold the above 
account of how sin can continue to exist after the death of God, then the next step is to ask 
what role the will to nothingness will play here. The origin of sin, for Nietzsche, lies in 
indebtedness to God, but it became a truly important part of Western European people’s self-
understanding by positing sin as an answer to meaningless suffering. Does post-Christian sin 
still appear to us as an explanation for this kind of suffering?    
May tells us that: 
Before the death of God, the goods posited by the will to nothingness explicitly 
involved a transcendent deity: suffering is a path to God, in whose realm death, loss 
and transience are abolished; it is redeemed by the sacrifice of his son; it is 
punishment for disobeying him. […] After the death of God, the underlying will 
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remains perfectly intact. All that changes is that the goods posited by this will are no 
longer structured by overtly supernatural or otherwise dualistic categories. (May 2011: 
83).  
We read here that the underlying mechanism of the will to nothingness continues to exist after 
the death of God, but that the particular form it takes changes. In other words, the Christian 
framework has for many lost credibility, and therefore for such post-Christians, there is no 
longer any recourse to supernatural narratives. This means that even though the will to 
nothingness, and the accompanied desire to understand meaningless suffering, remains the 
same – the particular narratives that it resorted to, change. If, as May argues, the will to 
nothingness remains the same, then for sin to continue to play a role, it would still have to 
offer a satisfying answer to meaningless suffering, otherwise the will to nothingness would 
presumably simply be channelled into something else. For example, if we can explain 
meaningless suffering by pointing to scientific research outcomes, then the explanation sin 
offers might be usurped. For May, then, the existence of sin after the death of God does not 
appear as a problem: we will find new narratives and new ways to explain suffering.  
This certainly seems to be a plausible interpretation. Let us think about a person who fits the 
description of a post-Christian, and who struggles with expansive and apparent 
meaninglessness of suffering in the world. A priest offers her the concept of sin as a possible 
answer; there is suffering in the world because humans are sinful. This explanation 
presumably would not be received positively, as there is no metaphysical foundation which 
the post-Christian would be willing to accept. The explanation that sin offers would seem to 
her archaic, a left-over from a previous era. The problem of meaningless suffering would 
remain for her, and presumably she would seek a different answer to this problem. We can 
therefore see that existential sin here functions as a socio-historically contingent explanation 
for the ontological problem of meaningless suffering, and it is an explanation that has lost its 
appeal.  
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We need to therefore suggest that existential sin will only be sustained after the death of God 
if it is already internalized. For Nietzsche’s conceptions of transgressive sin and sin as debt, 
this is most clearly the case: reflectively, the post-Christian will likely deny that she has 
committed any transgressive sin or has incurred a debt to God, because for her there is no God 
to refer to. Similarly, in the case of existential sin that offers an explanation for suffering, the 
post-Christian would struggle to explicitly and reflectively envision this as a part of her 
world-view. We here therefore return to the understanding of sin I proposed in the 
introduction: post-Christian sin is a pre-reflective form of self-understanding. 
So how does sin become a part of people’s pre-reflective self-understanding, if they have not 
themselves undergone a transition from debt to sin or sought an explanation for suffering?  To 
answer this question, Strong writes that “[…] important sustaining mechanisms, such as guilt, 
will continue to operate even among those who consider themselves somehow free of 
religion.” (1988: 101). Strong suggests that these mechanisms in fact can still function as 
sustaining mechanisms when the Christian framework is removed. If we think of guilt as a 
sustaining mechanism, the picture appears to look something like this: sustaining mechanisms 
are ways of understanding ourselves and the world that underlie our communal culture or 
individual convictions. They are mechanisms insofar as they may not be conscious decisions 
and they are sustaining insofar as there are other aspects of our understanding that rely on 
these mechanisms. In the case of existential sin, it functions as a sustaining mechanism that 
allows us to exist in the world without being overwhelmed by the problem of meaningless 
suffering. The fact that this mechanism may not be conscious would make it harder for them 
to be removed, and the fact that other important aspects of our lives might rely on it, raises the 
question as to whether we would want these sustaining mechanisms removed at all. Before we 
turn to the question of change, however, we need to understand in more detail what existential 
sin would look like after the death of God. Although Strong’s suggestion of “mechanisms”, 
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and May’s references to the will to nothingness offer convincing interpretations of how 
Nietzsche can conceptualize 'shadows' after the death of God, it remains opaque exactly how 
existential sin might be one of these shadows. In order to understand this, we have to look at 
the relation between sin and Western European culture.  
3.3 Sin as a cultural memory 
The reason why the madman’s message in the marketplace falls on the atheists’ deaf ears is 
because they do not understand the extent to which Christianity and its concept of God have 
influenced their lives. This goes beyond explanatory narratives or a desire for metaphysics, as 
it even concerns what kind of worldview or self-understanding is possible at all. In other 
words, Christianity shaped the horizon of possibilities, which explains the madman’s 
seemingly extreme claims about the earth being unchained from the sun, the sea being drunk 
up, a continuous falling, a straying through infinite nothing, empty space breathing at us, and 
a perpetual night. The death of God affects everything, seems to be the madman’s claim.  
The claim that Christianity has impacted upon Western-European culture to such an extent 
that even when its metaphysical basis ground is denied, much of the influence still remains, is 
of course difficult to definitively prove. However, we can make it both a sensible and 
plausible claim, if we put this thought in terms of cultural memory. The concept of cultural 
memory is grounded explicitly in a culture’s history. Furthermore, essential to the notion of a 
cultural memory is the idea that there is a reciprocal relationship: we influence the cultural 
memory, but we are also influenced by it. This means that the concept of cultural memory 
allows us to not only understand how pre-reflective sin-consciousness might still exist in 
contemporary culture, but it also opens up a potential to change it. If we are still wearing the 
wrong eyeglasses, as Taubes claims, then a change certainly seems desirable. 
		 115	
If we want to first understand how a Christian concept such as sin can still have a hold over 
the post-Christian, it is helpful to consider what Ricoeur calls a ‘retroactive cultural relation’ 
(1969: 21). This is one of three relations that orient our culture, the others being relations in 
depth and lateral relations. All three dictate how we view our culture, while simultaneously 
being influenced by this culture. The relations in depth relate to our immersion in our own 
culture: when we find similarities with other cultures, these merely serve to allow us to 
understand and affirm our own culture rather than to endeavour to understand another’s. 
However, in lateral relations we have to acknowledge that our culture is in fact influenced in 
important ways by other cultures, both historically and in the present. Any explanation of our 
own culture and its history will need to relate it to others. As an example Ricoeur argues that 
Middle Eastern culture has significantly impacted the “Hebrew source of our memory”, and 
that if we want to understand this source adequately, we must also look at the Middle East. 
What we see here is that even though we are very deeply grounded within our own culture, 
we must still acknowledge that it does not exist in a vacuum and that a sufficient 
understanding of our own culture and its past necessitates an understanding of other sources 
as well.  
It is the third, retroactive, relation that concerns cultural memory. In addition to an immersive 
relation with our own culture, and a relation with other cultures, we also relate to the past of 
our culture. Our cultural memory will always colour the world that is around us, but at the 
same time, this memory is itself contingent as we find ourselves in the world now and 
continue to understand and discover things about the world, which can change our memory. 
And so, this retroactive relationship to the past is constantly in flux which means that our 
memory itself is also retroactively undergoing changes. As Ricoeur tells us, “[o]ur cultural 
memory is unceasingly renewed retroactively by new discoveries, returns to the sources, 
reform and renaissances that are much more than revivals of the past and constitute behind us 
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what one might call a ‘neo-past’” (1969: 21). Ricoeur thereby points out the contingency of 
our “cultural memory”. Our understanding of ourselves and our culture undergoes changes 
and thereby its meaning changes as well. The current situation in which we find ourselves, the 
types of questioning and research that we undertake, influence the past. Therefore, concepts 
that we used in the past never truly belong to the past; they will always be interpreted with our 
current lenses. We look back at our cultural past with our current selves, and we cannot 
simply ignore the influence of our current selves and our present motivations.  
One straight-forward way in which we can understand this mechanism is when we think about 
how morality impacts on our assessment of history. In The Netherlands, for example, the 
Seventeenth Century is known as the Golden Century, as it was a time when the country 
flourished in the fields of knowledge, art, politics, power and economics. A large part of the 
successes were due to colonial endeavours undertaken by the Dutch VOC-company. 
Depictions of this century were idealised as the greatest for Dutch culture, and indeed a time 
to celebrate. And so, when prime minister Jan Peter Balkenende referred in 2006 to wanting 
to foster a “VOC-mentaliteit” [VOC-attitude], he presumably did not think of it as a 
controversial statement. Thirty years ago it indeed would not have been, but with increasing 
work done by post-colonial theorists and historians, and increased cultural awareness, the 
utterance was received with outrage by a large number of people. And so, our relation to and 
interpretations of past events and epochs change as our knowledge, attitude and priorities 
change.  
Ricoeur proposes that there are elements of our cultural memory that are not transparent to us. 
These aspects of our memory do show up in some way, in particular in myths and symbols 
that continue to resonate with us. I submit this is a helpful way to think about existential sin 
within the framework of post-Christianity. After all, we might ask ourselves why, despite the 
conscious rejection of sin as an ontological fact, we can still see elements of sin in literature, 
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art, and the kind of symbols and myths we use in order to explain our experience in the world. 
We may think of, for example, the works of literature by Camus and Dostoevsky, paintings by 
Arnulf Rainer and Jenny Saville, the often-invoked image by environmentalists of humanity 
as corrupt, and accounts of people suffering from depression as experiencing what seems to 
be existential guilt. These narratives and symbols impact upon our understanding of the 
world, even if this does not involve a conscious affirmation of the applicability of the 
category of sin.  
Aspects of cultural memory refer to objects of thought that are culturally and historically 
contingent, and thereby they take on an existence both in the world and in minds. What this 
means is that there is a reality to these collective concepts outside of an individual’s 
understanding of it. This is important, because what we want to emphasize is the cultural and 
historical dimension of the objects of our thought. Aspects of cultural memory are communal 
concepts, and they serve as restrictions to our thought. These restrictions dictate what shows 
up to us as possible.  
So how do these aspects of cultural memory show up for individuals? In other words, how do 
individuals in a culture experience aspects of cultural memory? In order to answer these 
questions, it is useful to turn to a concept adjacent to cultural memory: social imagination. 
This concept, borrowed from Miranda Fricker, posits a sphere that can help us make sense of 
why cultural norms, habits, and history can play a big role in individuals’ lives. It is what 
Fricker calls the collective, and not individual, social imagination that is particularly useful to 
us.42  
																																																								
42 Fricker further distinguishes between what she calls the diachronic and synchronic, which are two ways in 
which the social imagination interferes with progress. Diachronic means that an individual still has content in her 
social imagination that has not progressed along with her consciously-endorsed beliefs. In the synchronic case, 
the collective social imagination still holds residues that simply do not allow an individual to filter out prejudice 
(Fricker 2007: 39).   
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The collective social imagination still carries in it remnants of Christianity that influence the 
ways in which people can understand themselves. We can see the difference between 
individual and collective social imagination when we consider the following example. A. is a 
post-Christian who was brought up in a Catholic household, but grows up to reject 
Christianity. She continues, now and then, to feel what she considers to be pangs of sin-
consciousness, as well as a desire to say prayers. In other words, she continues to have 
affective states that indicate Catholic beliefs, despite reflectively having moved away from 
them. Her own, personal, background in this religion still has somewhat of a hold on her even 
after having consciously moved away from its beliefs. This kind of phenomenon can be 
explained by looking at a single individual’s psychology and history. However, think now of 
a person who was not brought up religious, nor ever affirmed any religious doctrines 
knowingly. She was educated in a secular school and never showed any particular interest in 
religion. However, she was actually raised in a country that was historically Calvinist and 
culturally still carries much of that heritage within it. Much to her surprise, she finds out that 
most of the moral norms she has internalized are in fact entirely based upon Calvinist thought. 
This is the kind of phenomenon that I am trying to capture: it is culturally dependent, and the 
possibilities of understanding oneself and the world are limited by the content of the 
collective social imagination. 
Importantly, the sphere of the social imagination often does not contain reflectively-endorsed 
judgments, but rather, in Fricker’s words, things that exist “not unconsciously in any strict, 
psychoanalytical sense, but without any focused awareness and without […] permission, as 
we might put it.” (2007: 39). The content of the social imagination can influence our thought 
directly, without having to pass through beliefs that we endorse. This is how religious content 
can “bypass” reflective rejections of religion. As such, it still influences the way in which we 
see ourselves, even if we are not consciously aware that this is what is going on. We can 
		 119	
therefore have the reflectively-endorsed belief that God does not exist, whilst still relating to 
ourselves as sinful.  
Even though our present motivations may colour how we look at certain events and ideas of 
the past, the framework in which we are able to think in the first place has been determined by 
this same cultural history. The options that are open to us may slowly shift and widen, but are 
still largely dictated by our cultural history. In this light, we can understand why Nietzsche 
talks about God’s shadows as lingering for centuries. The process is one of a lessening of the 
grip on our culture, and this is slow and painstaking and not at all inevitable. When thinking 
about sin, we should consider the presence of sin within our cultural memory as having an 
impact larger than our current-day lenses can make apparent to us. In other words, even 
though our cultural memory is contingent, it is not easily changed, and the change that we 
may perceive superficially does not tell us everything. 
But why has sin remained as an aspect of our cultural memory, while other historically 
significant concepts have not? We know of concepts that lose cultural significance through 
cultural processes such as struggle, increased knowledge, and changing power relations. We 
can here think of, for example, eugenics and the supposed intellectual inferiority of women. 
However, there are also concepts that have stuck around in cultures for centuries. The 
difficulty here is that we often cannot refer to a debate or a process analogous to efforts to 
eradicate certain concepts from our cultural vocabularies and frameworks. I suggest that the 
concepts, rituals, and stories that are able to linger for centuries, do so because they, in some 
important sense, speak to us. This is not to suggest that there are no other factors in play: 
Nietzsche importantly points out that the ascetic priests, who were responsible for the 
promotion of sin, were figures of power. Undoubtedly the predominant role Christianity has 
played in the development of Western European society will have played a part in the 
prevalence of existential sin. However, as I began to explain in the introduction to this thesis; 
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existential sin has remained a part of our cultural memory because it resonates with the 
human experience.  
3.4 Existential sin and human nature 
So far in this thesis, there has been a division in the assessment of existential sin between 
Nietzsche and post-Christianity on the one hand, and Christian thinkers on the other. I have 
shown that for Nietzsche, sin is a mistaken sense of self: it is a feeling that through the 
encouragement of the church people have taken up, but it does not represent an accurate 
picture of human nature. In contrast, for most Christian thinkers, sin designates the state of 
human nature as being fallen, and estranged from God in some way. The post-Christian, I 
have argued in this chapter, cannot simply fall back on the Christian narratives, and so the 
second option is not immediately available to her. Indeed, we might want to take a 
Nietzschean line here and say that existential sin is the creation of Christianity, and 
Christianity has lost its authority for the post-Christian. This does not mean that existential sin 
has disappeared, but it is simply a remnant of Christianity, that the post-Christian should aim 
to do away with accordingly.  
There is a third option available to us here, which is to suggest that existential sin responds to 
an ontological need, and as such gives expression to a fundamental aspect of human life. On 
this line of thought, Christianity managed to give us the tools to think about and accept an 
aspect of human nature and our existence in the world. The category of existential sin allows 
us to live with meaningless suffering by offering an explanation for it, and this responds to the 
ontological need to understand suffering. Relinquishing the concept of sin would therefore 
mean that we lose some of our grasp upon the world and ourselves, which is something we 
might want to avoid.  
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This option appears to go against much of what Nietzsche writes. In the Genealogy, Nietzsche 
describes the person who turns to sin as an “insane, sad beast”, who is preoccupied with 
“unnatural things” and “absurd paroxysms”. (GM II:22). Indeed, he tells us that humans are 
suffering from a sickness, and the world has turned into a madhouse. Nietzsche further 
describes sin as “the most dangerous and fateful trick [Kunststück] of religious 
interpretation.” (GM III:20). Nietzsche’s evaluation of sin is clear: it is a religious trick that 
has made humans (more) sick, and it does not correspond to our actual human nature. As 
Mulhall describes: “For Nietzsche, th[e] identification of humanity and sinfulness—the 
burden of the Christian conception of the Fall—is not only a contingent, but also a reactive 
and secondary episode in our development; it is not just that it could in principle be otherwise, 
but that in fact it was otherwise.” (2007: 38).43  
It is possible to reject the notion that sinfulness is a true state of human nature without 
considering it to be a problem. We could, for example, argue that sin provides an orientation 
towards the world that is desirable, perhaps we could argue that it encourages people to focus 
on humility and that this is a good orientation to have. It is therefore not the case that for 
Nietzsche sin is bad because it does not correspond to truth. In other words, there are two 
aspects of his criticism; firstly that sin is untrue, and secondly that sin is bad for human 
beings. However, despite sin depicting an inaccurate state of human nature, Nietzsche does 
																																																								
43 Christopher Hamilton gives us a very different account: “Nietzsche has 'dirty corners'. Someone who thinks he 
has dirty corners is judging himself in the light of a certain conception of goodness and purity, in which light 
everything in the inner life seems compromised and tainted, as if one were nothing but a naked, lonely, shivering 
self, remorselessly driven by greed, envy, fear, and various other forms of self-assertion and self-concern. Who 
could bear to be seen in this way? Not Nietzsche. Nietzsche's longing to be clean is, at least in part, a longing to 
be free of all that. But his bloody hands after the murder of God show him that in the very act of killing God he 
is not clean: his bid to free himself is at the same time a confirmation of his dirtiness. Nietzsche's whole 
philosophy is, seen from one perspective, an attempt to wash the blood from his hands” (Hamilton 2007: 169). I 
am very sympathetic to this reading of Nietzsche’s oeuvre. It relies on an interpretation of what is going on 
between the lines, rather than the words of the text. In this light, we can for example interpret Nietzsche’s 
repeated reference to sin as a sickness and his powerful description of existential sin, as reflecting Nietzsche’s 
own experience. This does not mean that he considered existential sin to be a true fact of human nature, but it 
would certainly add another dimension to the way in which we can understand the experience of sin. 
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acknowledge that sin is responsive to an ontological problem: the problem of meaningless 
suffering. He tells us:  
The meaninglessness of suffering, not the suffering, was the curse that has so far 
blanketed mankind, – and the ascetic ideal offered man a meaning.  Up to now it was 
the only meaning, but any meaning at all is better than no meaning at all; the ascetic 
ideal was, in every respect, the ultimate ‘faute de mieux’ par excellence. Within it, 
suffering was interpreted; the enormous emptiness seemed filled; the door was shut on 
all suicidal nihilism. The interpretation – without a doubt – brought new suffering with 
it, deeper, more internal, more poisonous suffering, suffering that gnawed away more 
intensely at life: it brought all suffering within the perspective of guilt... (GM III: 28).  
We see here that, for Nietzsche, Christianity offered the first meaning for suffering that was 
offered, and that it was accepted simply because "any meaning at all is better than no meaning 
at all". This, however, is an unconvincing claim. If, as I and Nietzsche both claim, the 
problem of meaningless suffering is an ontological one, and people have always struggled 
with it, it is difficult to imagine that the answer sin offered really was the very first.  We can 
interpret the passage differently, however. When Nietzsche writes about the “only meaning” 
for meaningless suffering, what he might mean is “the only meaning that took hold of us”. In 
other words, no explanation for meaningless suffering has become as predominant as that of 
guilt and sin. This more plausible claim offers more support for the argument that I propose in 
this thesis, namely that existential sin is a substantial aspect of the Western European culture.  
For some, to exist as a human being in Western European culture means to feel oneself as 
sinful, and I argue that we must take this experience seriously. We can take God or 
Christianity out of the picture, but that will not meaningfully impact this fundamental 
experience. Furthermore, the concept of existential sin tells the post-Christian something 
fundamental about her human experience. I will argue, following Nietzsche, that the category 
of existential sin responds to an ontological fact of human nature, namely the need to explain 
suffering. Before doing so, however, I will discuss the other part of Nietzsche's criticism of 
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sin, namely that it is damaging and destructive for human beings. In particular, I will turn to 
the question of whether post-Christian sin should be considered harmful.  
3.4.1 A phenomenology of post-Christian existential sin 
In order to look at this claim in more detail, we have to understand what post-Christian 
existential sin looks like. So far I have been defending the claim that post-Christian existential 
sin is intelligible. However, I have not yet explored how this form of sin may actually 
manifest itself. The definition of existential sin offered in this thesis has deliberately remained 
somewhat vague: a sense of global wrongness by virtue of being human. I wish now to flesh 
out this description.  
First, existential sin is experienced as an individual problem, despite being related to one’s 
being human. If I suffer from existential sin, the feeling will be one that I only relate to myself 
– there is something wrong with me specifically. However, this feeling is not because of 
specific actions, thoughts or desires of mine. I could feel that there is something wrong with 
me because I have acted callously towards a friend, and somehow cannot convince myself to 
make it up to her. I may be aware that what I did was wrong, but I do not feel the motivation 
to change anything about this. My lack of motivation can be felt as a problem if my moral 
compass is pointed in the opposite direction and urges me to fix the situation. As a result I 
feel guilty and bad, and am perhaps angry at myself. “Why can’t I fix this situation?” I might 
ask, “if I was a good person I would do something about this!”. Although perhaps pulling 
from the same emotional reservoir, this experience is not existential sin. It is localized, related 
to certain actions that we can point to. Importantly, this is not the case for existential sin, 
where no matter how many occurrences in one’s life we point to, this will never be able to 
explain the depth of feeling. 
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This does not mean that actions or thoughts are entirely separated from existential sin. They 
will affect one another, and indeed there can be actions that are determined entirely by 
existential sin. The entire way in which one acts in the world, in which one relates to the 
world, can be dictated by the underlying understanding of oneself. In other words, there are 
ways in which existential sin shows up to us in people’s behaviours or dispositions. For 
example, someone who suffers from existential sin and thereby has an underlying 
understanding of herself as somehow wrong, may be more reluctant to engage in social 
engagements. We can also imagine that she may, for example, struggle with hearing 
compliments, as her behaviour being applauded will for her feel incongruent with who she is.  
When it comes to feelings that seem closely related to sin, such as guilt and shame, in 
response to events, there are ways in which we can ascertain whether we are responding 
accurately. Bernard Williams tells us; 
What arouses guilt in an agent is an act or omission of a sort that typically elicits from 
other people anger, resentment, or indignation. What the agent may offer in order to 
turn this away is reparation; he may also fear punishment or may inflict it on himself. 
What arouses shame, on the other hand, is something that typically elicits from others 
contempt or derision or avoidance. This may equally be an act or omission, but it need 
not be: it may be some failing or defect. It will lower the agent's self-respect and 
diminish him in his own eyes. (Williams 1993: 90) 
We see here that our response of guilt and shame does not occur in a vacuum: other people 
respond to our actions in accordance with these feelings. There are social consequences as 
well as personal ones; when we have acted in a way that elicits guilt in us, they may be angry 
at us; and when we act in a way that makes us feel ashamed, they may avoid us. Other 
people’s reactions then serve as a confirmation of the accuracy of our feelings and can indeed 
deepen them. What is being presupposed here, therefore, is that other people attribute 
responsibility to the person who committed the action: I will feel guilty and they will feel 
anger if both of us recognize that this act was indeed committed by me, and that I was 
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responsible for it. This is much less clearly the case for existential sin. The fact of the 
wrongness of one’s existence is not something that the individual is responsible for, yet this 
responsibility may still be felt.  As Ricoeur tells us, “[the sinner] need not be the author of the 
evil to feel himself burdened by its weight” (1969: 101). 
Furthermore, a person may not be aware of the presence of existential sin. In the introduction 
to this thesis I described it as pre-reflective sin-consciousness: an underlying sense of self that 
flies underneath the radar of reflective judgments. If we here return to the above example of a 
person who receives compliments: she might not understand why the compliments do not feel 
justified. This again seems to separate existential sin from feelings such as guilt or shame, 
whose presence is usually not only felt acutely, but also understood consciously.  
However, even if we now understand more clearly how sin may be differentiated from guilt or 
shame, the content of the experience is still vague. Perhaps the experience of existential sin 
cannot be narrowly defined. This is why every single one of the descriptions of this feeling of 
sin has been filled with metaphors: Kierkegaard’s image of sin dragging “the individual along 
like a woman whom the executioner drags by the hair while she screams in despair” (1980a: 
IV 384), Nietzsche repeatedly referring to sin as some kind of torture, Paul’s war with 
himself, Calvin’s reference to sin as a sad condition whose burden we groan under, the 
Underground Man’s sense that he is lower than an insect. Or, consider Simone Weil: “[w]e 
are all conscious of evil within ourselves; we all have a horror of it and want to get rid of it. 
[…] This is the presence of evil in us. It is the ugliness in us. The more we feel it, the more it 
fills us with horror.” (1973: 189-190). It is significant that none of these descriptions posit 
certain conceptual requirements: there is no structured argument that something is existential 
sin iff it meets criteria x, y and z. The nature of the phenomenon does not allow such a precise 
capturing.  
		 126	
However, we can flesh existential sin out further by looking at works of Camus and 
Dostoevsky. Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Notes From Underground and Albert Camus’s The Fall 
offer useful frameworks through which to explain the phenomenology of sinfulness. 
Dostoevsky’s Underground Man might in fact be considered somewhat of a paradigm of the 
sinner. Camus’s judge-penitent Jean-Baptiste Clamence in The Fall does not suffer as clearly 
from existential sin, but his stories tell us something about his view of human nature and his 
experience of himself that should be interpreted as such.  
Dostoevsky’s Underground Man struggles with himself, and some of his depictions are 
similar to the sentiment expressed in Romans 7, and by Nietzsche and Calvin, that to be a 
sinner means to be depraved, to be broken, to be corrupt: “[...] I couldn’t even manage to 
make myself into an insect. I tell you solemnly that I often wanted to become an insect, but 
didn’t manage even that.” (Dostoevsky 2010: 9). The protagonist feels himself to be abject, to 
be worthless. It is especially in his interactions with Liza that we can see how troubled the 
Underground Man is because of his sense of worthlessness.44 
Merold Westphal provides an account of the Notes From Underground that gives further 
credence to the theory that it depicts a man suffering from existential sin. Westphal writes that 
“the one all pervasive fact is his inability even to look anyone in the face. He not only feels 
their disdain; he feels it is justified.” (1987: 84). This is a key thought: not only does the 
Underground Man feel himself to be worthless, he also believes that any disdain or judgement 
he receives from others is deserved. In other words, the confirmation of one’s own sinfulness 
through the judgement of others is experienced as something that is justified. The 
condemnation of human nature that is essential to understanding the concept of sin is not felt 																																																								44	Dostoevsky’s depiction of the Underground Man is of course ironic. One might therefore think that using 
Notes From Underground as a serious example is a flawed approach. However, I think the ironic nature of the 
Underground Man further strengthens Nietzsche’s claim that existential sin is a problem for the European soul. 
Dostoevsky states at the beginning of the book that it is a fictional account of a certain type of person and as in 
most cases of effective irony, Dostoevsky’s portrayal is immediately recognisable by the reader.  
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to be unjust. Instead, the way in which we should understand it is that this condemnation is 
our own responsibility: it is justified, even though we cannot fix it ourselves.45  
In Albert Camus’s novel The Fall we are confronted by the idiosyncratic Jean-Baptiste 
Clamence, a self-pronounced judge-penitent. Throughout the work Clamence appears 
unapologetic. He tells us that he used to think of himself as a good person, as someone who 
saved other people, but there were a number of occurrences in his life that made him realise 
that all of that was just fake. A key moment comes when Clamence walks by a woman 
standing on the side of a bridge looking over the Seine, and hears her jump moments later. 
This event leads Clamence to re-evaluate himself and his life, and he describes that he only 
ever did good things for selfish reasons: “modesty helped me shine, humility to conquer, and 
virtue to oppress” (Camus 1963: 62). This re-evaluation is portrayed not as a kind of 
traumatized, biased way of looking at his life, but instead as more enlightened. In other 
words, the event on the bridge allowed Clamence to become enlightened as to his true nature. 
He now understands precisely how, to borrow Calvin’s phrase, depraved he is. We might 
therefore say that what became clear to Clamence is his sinful state.  
Furthermore, by calling himself a judge-penitent, Clamence emphasizes two different sides of 
himself: he is continuously judging not only other people, but also himself and his own 
imperfections. The two are linked, however, which we see when Clamence says, “The more I 																																																								45	 I think there can potentially be a useful parallel with some cases of depression, where the concept of sin 
might not be appealed to, but I think is a useful tool in understanding the experience. Roughly speaking, 
depression can manifest itself in a sense of overwhelming existential guilt. With existential guilt I mean to 
separate this experience from experience of particular guilt, i.e. guilt about particular situations or actions. 
Existential guilt is an experience importantly similar to how I defined sin, as it refers to a feeling guilty for being 
alive in the first place. This is often combined with a sense of oneself as corrupt or bad, and therefore also 
undeserving. Even though one’s ‘badness’ is often felt as our own fault or responsibility, at the same time there 
is a kind of awareness that this is not something that we ourselves can fix. Practically speaking this is also true, 
as most forms of depression need outside help in order to move beyond the feeling of oneself as inherently bad 
and undeserving. This help is not God’s grace, but therapy or medication, but it seems that some experience of 
depression have a very similar structure to the experience of sinfulness. This account is also found in Freud’s 
Mourning and Melancholia, as well as contemporary research such as ‘Guilt-Selective Functional Disconnection 
of Anterior Temporal and Subgenual Cortices in Major Depressive Disorder’ by Green, S. et al, 2012, Arch Gen 
Psychiatry. 69(10): 1014-1021.  
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accuse myself, the more I have a right to judge you. Even better, I provoke you into judging 
yourself and this relieves me of that much of the burden” (ibid. 103). The capacity to judge 
others is important for Clamence, but the capacity to judge himself and to enable other people 
to judge themselves is even more so. This is because whilst everyone does deserve to be 
judged, everyone should already have judged themselves. He thereby echoes the Pauline and 
Lutheran accounts of sin that emphasize the sinful state as deserved. Clamence is an example 
of someone for whom the righteous judgement of the inner state of sinfulness is made 
explicit.   
One puzzling aspect of existential sin appears to be that it is often experienced in isolation: 
one struggles with existential sin by oneself. Although rooted in a certain understanding of 
human nature, existential sin is not posited onto others. This is portrayed powerfully in 
Véronique Olmi’s Beside the Sea, which shows that although the feeling of not being at home 
in the world may be a common experience, we begin to consider it as wrong and cruel once it 
is projected onto others. Olmi’s protagonist acknowledges that she does not belong and that 
there is something wrong with her, but furthermore posits that the same is true of her sons. 
Her subsequent murder of her children might be motivated by a feeling of existential sin, but 
does not appear to us as an understandable act. And indeed, why would it, if our fundamental 
experience is one in which only we ourselves are wrong? It appears that our own sense of 
sinfulness does not necessarily extend to other people.46  
																																																								
46 Another example is the character Dean Winchester in the TV series Supernatural. In season 4, Dean is saved 
from hell by the angel Castiel. Throughout the season Dean struggles with the question of why he was saved, 
and Castiel’s answer that God told him to do so, proves unsatisfactory. It would have been easy for the writers to 
explain Dean’s struggle by pointing out that he had committed certain acts that ought to be morally condemned 
(such as causing the apocalypse). Dean could have pointed out certain events and actions in his life that render 
him undeserving of redemption. However, Dean’s struggle is portrayed differently. The character believes that 
he did not deserve to be saved by virtue of his nature. Furthermore, despite his younger brother Sam being 
remarkably like him in behavior and temperament, Dean continuously emphasizes that Sam did deserve to be 
saved. Again, we see that the condemnation of one’s nature cannot easily be transposed onto another.  
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Furthermore, we can say that existential sin relies on a distinction between innocence and 
guilt, a state before and after the fall. The corruptness of human nature is understood in 
contrast to the goodness of God, or in contrast to the goodness of humans before their fall. 
This distinction can indeed be found in Nietzsche’s work as well, as Stephen Mulhall 
demonstrates that the Genealogy of Morality itself has the exact structure of a fall narrative 
(Mulhall 2007). We might therefore be led to think that if a notion of existential sin is 
preserved, there must be a simultaneous concept of innocent human nature. Tillich argues this 
same point when he posits that: “logically, it is not correct to speak of innocence when there 
is no possibility of becoming guilty” (1953: 43). 
In Genesis we do indeed see a powerful contrast between the state of human nature in 
innocence and after the fall. In the Garden of Eden, the Bible says, Adam and Eve were “both 
naked, and were not ashamed” (Gen. 2:25). Their first acts after eating from the tree of 
knowledge of good and evil, however, are dictated by shame. Suddenly their nakedness takes 
on a different meaning and becomes something they ought to conceal. They furthermore feel 
shame in the presence of God: as he walks into the garden they hide from him because they 
are naked. Ricoeur explains the passage as follows; 
The nakedness of the innocent pair and the shame that follows fault express the human 
mutation of all communication, marked henceforth by dissimulation. Work ceases to 
be joyous and becomes toilsome, placing man in an attitude of hostility toward nature. 
The pain of child-bearing darkens the joy of procreation. The conflict between the 
woman’s seed and the serpent’s symbolizes the militant and suffering condition of 
freedom, henceforth a prey to the guile of desires (compare with Genesis 4:7). Even 
death is altered: the curse is not that man shall die (“for dust thou art, and unto dust 
shalt thou return”), but that he shall face death with the anguished awareness of its 
imminence; the curse is the human modality of dying. (Ricoeur 1969: 247) 
Precisely by being contrasted with a pre-lapserian state are these consequences of the fall 
considered to be punishment, rather than offering a depiction of how life simply is. The 
insistence upon an innocent state displays what seems like a hopeless optimism, however. 
There is no plausible reason why the mythical state of innocence should be considered a 
		 130	
possibility. Nietzsche himself falls into this trap, when he writes in Twilight of the Idols about 
restoring the innocence of becoming and redeeming the world (TI VI: 8). Significantly, we 
are not offered an account of what the world may be like after the innocence of becoming and 
world-redemption is achieved. And indeed, what if there is no innocent state to which we can 
return? What would this change about the way in which we relate to the world? 
Importantly, if we conceive of existential sin as some kind of post-lapserian state, it might 
seem that we have to accept that there is something true about sinfulness. It implies that 
human nature is now corrupted, that humans have fallen from a better state of being. There 
might therefore be limits to its usefulness if we want to question the validity of the category 
of sin. We can interpret the contrast between pre- and post-lapserian humanity as 
metaphorical, however: we are aware of the substantial limits and flaws of human nature, and 
one way in which we can bring these into sharp relief is by contrasting them with a, albeit 
hypothetical, more perfect state.  
Nietzsche allows us to understand existential sin as a significant aspect of Western European 
culture, and make explicit its role in explaining meaningless suffering. As a socio-historical 
explanation offered to the problem of meaningless suffering, it has been profoundly effective. 
Even in Nietzsche’s account existential sin is reflective of some kind of truth: it reveals to us 
the problem of meaningless suffering. I have argued in this chapter that one of the reasons 
why existential sin has taken hold of us is because it speaks to our human experience. 
Although sin may have been posited by Christianity, and as such is a socio-historical and 
contingent element of human nature, it in fact responds to an ontological problem.  
Of course, there are people who would argue against the above position. It might be entirely 
incongruent with their experience of the world. There are philosophical accounts that support 
such an interpretation, and suggest that we are still so deeply embedded in a Christian culture 
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that we may interpret existential sin to reveal a true state of human nature, but this is in fact 
nothing more than a left-over from Christianity. They argue that the problem of meaningless 
suffering is not ontological, but rather something that shows up to us because of our Christian 
eyeglasses.  
Hans Blumenberg, for example, can be used to argue against the above position. He writes 
about aspects of our cultural memory in terms of ‘question’ and ‘answer’ positions. For him, 
we must be aware of the contingency of the questions that are being asked, and acknowledge 
their historicity. It is in this context that he writes the following: 
 It is in fact possible for totally heterogeneous contents to take on identical functions in 
specific positions in the system of man’s interpretation of the world and of himself. In 
our history this system has been decisively determined by Christian theology, and 
specifically, above all, in the direction of its expansion. Theology created new 
‘positions’ in the framework of the statements about the world and man that are 
possible and are expected, ‘positions’ that cannot simply be ‘set aside’ again or left 
unoccupied in the interest of theoretical economy. (Blumenberg 1983: 64) 
Note here the use of heterogeneous contents, identical functions and specific positions. The 
individual’s system of interpretation, in which we find instances of cultural memory, is not 
pre-given. In fact, it is dependent upon the specific cultural surroundings that she finds herself 
in. And most importantly, it is the positions themselves, the specific questions that are being 
asked, that are culturally contingent. So the needs that we feel and the questions that we ask 
are themselves already a part of a pre-supposed framework. At the same time these needs will 
be felt intensely, and those answers that can satisfy these needs have the chance of being 
successful within the aforementioned framework. We can therefore say that the fact that 
existential sin maps onto one’s experience of the world so well is precisely because 
expectations, problems, questions and needs were formed within the context of existential sin. 
It maps on so neatly, precisely because it helped to create the framework within which we 
attempt to understand the world.  
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It might therefore be the case that there is no ontological problem of meaningless suffering, 
but rather that the context of existential sin, i.e. Christianity, created a narrative and world-
view in which such a problem appeared. I argued in section 2.3.3 of the previous chapter that 
the problem of meaningless suffering also shows up in the ancient Greeks. However, we 
could argue that this interpretation of these Greek texts is itself entirely dictated by the 
Western European Christian paradigm in which my culture and thought was formed. If we 
accept this argument as valid, then perhaps we need to make any claims about meaningless 
suffering less strong: the problem of meaningless suffering is not an ontological one, but 
rather socio-historical. It appears to us as ontological because our thought on such issues is 
dictated by the realm of Christianity.  
Even if we were to accept this claim, not much would change about our account of existential 
sin. After all, even if what we perceive as ontological problems are only socio-historical, this 
perception is essential to our experience. My goal in this thesis is not to offer a response to 
meaningless suffering, but rather to argue that existential sin has served, and continues to 
serve, as one such answer. This is the case even if the problem of meaningless suffering is a 
historically contingent problem.  
3.5 The (im)possibility of redemption 
Indeed, all we definitively know is that existential sin is historically Christian, and can 
plausibly be thought of as a part of our cultural memory. In Christian thought sin is very 
closely tied to redemption. Generally, we can be redeemed despite our sinfulness, and thereby 
released from its burden. This does not seem an avenue immediately available for the post-
Christian. For Nietzsche, in fact, we are even facing an “impossibility of redemption” of sin 
after the death of God. This impossibility of redemption appears because we are no longer 
able to rely on the redemptive or explanatory narratives that Christianity offered us. We are 
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stuck with a feeling of existential sin (a remnant of the Christian narrative), and as a 
consequence of our murdering God we can no longer have any hope of redemption.  
However, Giles Fraser offers a different interpretation. He writes that “the death of God is, for 
Nietzsche, precisely that from which salvation is made possible.” (Fraser 2002: 30). And 
indeed, in Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche writes that “[t]he concept ‘God’ has hitherto been 
the greatest objection to existence.… We deny God; in denying God, we deny accountability: 
only by doing that do we redeem the world.” (TI VI:8). In response, we have to emphasize 
that there are two different ways in which redemption shows up here: redemption from sin, 
and redemption from suffering. This project is concerned with the first of these forms of 
redemption. We saw in the first chapter that there is a complicated relation between sin and 
suffering in Nietzsche, as he argues that redemption from suffering has in fact taken the form 
of sin, which brings with it its own kind of suffering. If we therefore look at the above 
quotation again, we can say that the kind of suffering that has been caused by sin now 
requires the world to be redeemed. In this Fraser is right, by removing God from the picture, 
Nietzsche believes that we can redeem the suffering caused by sin. By no longer holding 
people accountable for existence and suffering, we can achieve some kind of redemption. 
This, however, is not the whole story.  
I posited that Nietzsche’s descriptions of the origin and emergence of sin can help us 
understand how sin came into the world and took on the important role it did. However, it 
cannot help us understand the situation of the post-Christian who struggles with sin-
consciousness. After all, the way in which she acquired her sin-consciousness was not 
through her search for a meaning of suffering: the story of the ascetic priest would not be 
convincing to her, as a post-Christian. The way in which existential sin exist, and the fact that 
the post-Christian is able to take it up as a pre-reflective self-relation means that the concept 
of sin has transformed from an explanation into a cemented part of our cultural understanding. 
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This also means that even though the absence of God may imply that there will be less “new” 
sinners, the above passage from Twilight of the Idols is misleading. Indeed, this whole chapter 
has aimed to show that by denying God, we do not automatically redeem the world.  
This does not mean that redemption is impossible, however. In the next chapter I will look at 
different possible forms of redemption for existential sin. For now, we can orient ourselves 
towards possible avenues of redemption by returning to Blumenberg. In the first part of The 
Legitimacy of the Modern Age Blumenberg gives a detailed elaboration of the very idea of the 
secularization itself and argues that “there is no need for a continuum of verifiable instances 
of the metaphorical content of ‘secularization’ (1983: 19). In order to show this, he writes the 
following;  
The alienation of a historical substance from its origin, which it carries with it only as 
a hidden dimension of meaning, unavoidably raises the question whether this is a 
process of self-alienation or externally induced deformation. The difference here is the 
difference between the proposition that the attribute of infinity crossed over from God 
to the world because in its highest intensification the idea of creation simply cannot 
avoid this consequence and the alternative proposition that infinity was usurped for the 
world in order by this means to let the world take over God’s position and function. 
(ibid. 18)  
Blumenberg rejects the notion of one universal historical substance, but does talk about 
particular examples of historical substance, and the notion of infinity is one of these. We must 
here understand historical substance to refer to a substance that has existed in history, and not 
a substance that is a necessary part of history as such.  
The starting point for Blumenberg is that historical substances, or as I have named them so 
far, instances of cultural memory, can be alienated from their origin. The question 
Blumenberg raises is whether this alienation is caused by an internal shift in this cultural 
memory, or whether it is forced to change through external influence. The internal shift 
appears to look something like a necessary transposition – if there is to be any idea of 
creation, there must be an idea of infinity. Therefore, if the consensus about the creation of 
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the world has shifted from God to the world, the idea of infinity will shift accordingly. And 
so, we have the same kind of ideas in Christianity as in secular thought, they are simply 
transposed.  
So what does it mean for external forces to change the use of an attribute such as infinity? The 
example Blumenberg gives is strikingly similar to the role Nietzsche ascribes to the ascetic 
priest, albeit more abstractly, as Blumenberg talks about the world usurping infinity, but of 
course “the world” is not an entity that can act in such a way. The goal is for the world to 
“take over God’s position and function” – but this is a goal that we cannot attribute to the 
world itself, only to agents in the world. Blumenberg offers another glimpse of what kind of 
change he is talking about in this discussion on the status of original sin: 
The generatio aequivoca consists simply in the fact that the combination of the 
concept of freedom and the doctrine of original sin could be codified at this specific 
location into the ‘answer’ to a ‘great question’ that was yet to be accurately stated. 
When the credibility and general acceptance of such answers dwindle away, perhaps 
because inconsistencies appear in the system, they leave behind them the 
corresponding questions, to which then new answers become due. Unless, perhaps, it 
turns out to be possible to destroy the question itself critically and to undertake 
amputations on the system of world explanation. (ibid. 66) 
The reference to ‘amputation’ is especially interesting here. This implies that we can remove 
certain questions and answers from our arsenal of explanations, but that this will not be 
without any pain. An amputation is the removal of a limb, often in order to save a person’s 
life (although in the past also often the cause of people’s deaths, especially on battle fields). 
These limbs are often diseased, or malfunctioning in some other way, and the body to which it 
belongs can be considered healthy outside of this limb. And so, although amputation can 
restore health to the entire individual, this will be at the cost of a loss, a lack, that will forever 
appear as something missing. When limbs are amputated, they do not grow back.  
Blumenberg suggests that an organic process takes places with the questions and answers; as 
answers become unbelievable, they will fade away, leaving behind questions. The question 
		 136	
concerning the meaning of suffering, to which Nietzsche argues sin gave an answer, should 
therefore remain after the death of God. Its answer of existential sin, however, should be 
fading away. This does not appear to be the case. So how can we respond to this problem? 
Although existential sin may have first become important as an answer to a question, it now 
no longer functions as an answer. As I have argued in this chapter, sin’s presence in our 
cultural memory means that it has become cemented in such a way that it functions 
differently. I suggest that the process that Blumenberg describes, radically undervalues how 
cemented instances of cultural memory can become. Reflectively these changes may indeed 
be taking place the way Blumenberg describes, but this does not mean that all our realms of 
experience are similarly affected. Indeed, this is precisely what the concepts of cultural 
memory and social imagination show: any explicit changes in our culture are not necessarily 
accompanied by changes in our entire consciousness. We must therefore turn to different 
ways of understanding the change within our cultural memory to be able to think about what 
kind of redemption is possible for the post-Christian sinner.   
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Chapter 4  The Possibility of Redemption after 
the ‘Death of God’ 
 
I, however, rejoice in great sin as my great consolation. 
(TZ, ‘Of Higher Men’) 
 
 
In the previous three chapters I have established an account of post-Christian sin by tracing 
the history of the concept of sin, and arguing that it has become a part of the cultural memory 
of Western Europe. I have furthermore argued that we need to understand sin as a socio-
historical response to the ontological question of meaningless suffering, and as such 
responsive to an aspect of human nature. We have also seen, however, that even though 
existential sin may provide a response to meaningless suffering, it comes with its own kind of 
socio-historical suffering. This we find not only in Nietzsche, who offers a critique of sin, but 
also in Christian texts such as those by Simone Weil, Calvin and Paul (see chapter 3).  
There are two ways in which we can consider existential sin to be a problem for the post-
Christian. Firstly, existential sin as a pre-reflective form of self-understanding might be 
incongruent with the conscious beliefs of the post-Christian. She may consciously reject the 
Christian God and its concept of sin, but still relate to herself as sinful. It is important to 
enable the post-Christian to become aware of her sin-consciousness, as self-awareness is 
generally beneficial. Secondly, existential sin is itself the cause of suffering that we may wish 
to avoid. When the post-Christian feels herself to be a sinner, she suffers. It is, after all, not a 
pleasant thought: that there is something wrong with herself, as an individual, simply because 
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she is human. The self-understanding it fosters can manifest itself in anything from intense 
self-hatred to self-alienation, as we have seen in descriptions of existential sin throughout this 
thesis. Indeed, for Nietzsche, one of the main problems with existential sin is that it prevents 
human flourishing. By internalizing drives, moralizing guilt, and standing before God, the 
human soul is alienated and corrupted (AC: 58). We can safely assume that it is desirable for 
human beings to not hate themselves, and as such to encourage forms of self-understanding 
that allow for this. In the Christian tradition, the possibility of redemption helps to alleviate 
the distress of sin-consciousness. Can we similarly conceive of redemption for the post-
Christian?  
In the first part of this chapter I will turn to Christian forms of redemption from sin. 
Considering the fact that post-Christian sin is so closely related to Christian forms of sin, the 
question arises whether we can use Christian redemptive narratives in order to attain 
redemption. By looking at Nietzsche’s critique of Christian forms of redemption from sin, and 
in particular the event of the crucifixion, I will argue that this is not the case for two reasons. 
Firstly, it is unclear how Christian redemptive accounts could survive the ‘death of God’, as 
they rely on the figure of God too heavily. Secondly, following Nietzsche, I will argue that 
Christian redemptive accounts may redeem us from suffering but not from sin, and this 
distinction should be taken seriously.  
In the second and third sections of this chapter I will turn to Nietzsche’s accounts of 
redemption, in particular genealogy and life-affirmation. Therefore, we must turn to the 
genealogical method. Nietzsche proposes genealogy as a method through which we can 
increase our understanding and knowledge of ourselves and the world. As such, it responds 
well to the problem of pre-reflective sin-consciousness. However, the genealogical method 
itself does not constitute or motivate change, and is therefore not sufficient in itself. This is 
where life-affirmation provides a further avenue to explore. Life-affirmation, I will suggest, 
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appears to map onto post-Christian sin well. In Chapter 2 we saw that one of Nietzsche’s 
objections to the ascetic priest is that this figure denies this life, this world, and instead posits 
meaning in another world. The ‘other world’ plays a large role in the emergence of sin, and 
therefore re-orienting herself towards this world might be helpful for the post-Christian. I 
argue that instead of redemption, pursuing the avenue of life affirmation allows us to answer 
the problem of meaningless suffering, whilst enabling a reduction of the suffering caused by 
sin.   
4.1 Nietzsche’s critique of Christian redemption 
In the Christian tradition, redemption can take several different shapes. There are, for 
example, the concepts of grace and sacrifice, and the rites of baptism and confession. One 
important aspect of grace is the notion that our redemption from sin cannot be achieved by 
our own actions alone, God must be willing to help us, and bestow His grace upon us (Eph. 
2:8-9).47 The Lutheran tradition emphasizes the redemptive powers of baptism, which we can 
see in Augsburg Confession Article IX, Augustine emphasizes that we have to search for and 
accept God in order to receive grace in On Free Choice of the Will, and Bonaventure similarly 
argues in The Journey of the Mind into God that we must commit to acting a certain way 
order to receive grace; we must pray, live in accordance with the Laws, and cultivate our 
understanding of the world and God. In the New Testament we find a significant shift, as with 
Paul grace became redemptive. Although there are mentions of grace in the Hebrew Bible and 
Old Testament, these refer to God’s favour, often to a specific person being favoured by God; 
Noah in Genesis 6, Moses in Exodus 33, the king in Psalm 45. In the New Testament grace 
becomes a gift from God that redeems us (Romans 5, Ephesians 2-3). This gift is closely 
																																																								
47 “For by grace you have been saved through faith, and this is not your own doing; it is the gift of God — not 
the result of works, so that no one may boast.” 
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linked to the event of the crucifixion: God sent down his only son Christ in order to be 
sacrificed for the salvation of humankind.  
4.1.1 The crucifixion 
Nietzsche’s critique of Christian redemption is focused on the notion of the crucifixion as 
redemptive. Nietzsche emphasizes the cruelty of the crucifixion, and although this itself does 
not go against most Christian interpretations, there is something about the cruelty itself that 
Nietzsche finds objectionable. For example, Nietzsche refers to the crucifixion as the “horrific 
and paradoxical expedient” (GM II:21), an “unexpected ignominious death” (AC: 40) and as 
the “mystery of an inconceivably ultimate, most extreme cruelty” (GM I:8). The argument 
seems to be that i) the crucifixion was a cruel act of torture, ii) Christianity emphasizes the 
cruelty by taking up the crucifix as its symbol, iii) seeing the crucifix reminds us of the torture 
of Christ, and iv) being reminded of this torture is objectionable. Many Christian thinkers 
could conceivably agree with points 1-3, it is point 4 that separates Nietzsche here. The 
statement does not mean that what the crucifix inspires us to think about, namely Christ’s 
sacrifice, is a bad thing an sich. But it is the thinking-about, the being-reminded-of, that 
Nietzsche criticizes. He argues that the sacrifice of Christ, although couched in terms of love, 
grace, and mercy, has been interpreted by the Church (following Paul) as actually being an 
event that increases people’s debt to God. This, Nietzsche tells us, goes against Christ’s own 
message (AC: 40,41).  
For Nietzsche the crucifixion narrative and symbolism encourage people to feel even more 
indebted to God. Although we are told that God has sacrificed himself on the cross for us, at 
the same time the emphasis lies on the suffering of the innocent Christ. He is suffering 
because of us, and we are constantly reminded of his suffering because the symbol of His 
church is Christ’s torture device. As we can see his Fraser’s analysis; “Nietzsche’s attack 
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upon Christianity is based upon the observation that Christian salvation, far from being a 
legitimate means of saving human beings, actually constitutes much of – and certainly 
reinforces – their bondage. Christian soteriology is salvation which damns.” (2002: 82-83).  
This thought can also be found in earlier Nietzsche works. In Daybreak, for example, he 
writes: “[…] what a dreadful place Christianity had already made of the earth when it 
everywhere erected the crucifix and thereby designated the earth as the place ‘where the just 
man is tortured to death’!” (D I:77). Christ is designated as a “just man” (this thought is 
reaffirmed by Nietzsche in The Anti-Christ), and the church is spoken of in relation to its use 
of the symbol of the crucifix. This second point is especially important. Nietzsche’s criticism 
of Christian redemption is not a purely theoretical argument. He not only rejects the specific 
theological account of redemption, but he also points at the practices of the Church. The 
Church, through the workings of the ascetic priests, has been able to affect human’s sense of 
self-understanding by constantly focusing on the torturous death of God by humans. In 
Nietzsche’s view, the predominance of the crucifix in churches emphasizes not redemption 
from sin, but sinfulness itself. This picture does have some intuitive appeal. After all, it seems 
paradoxical that the Church of a loving God would have a torture device as its symbol. 
Particular depictions of the crucifixion, and not just a crucifix, can certainly inspire fear and 
guilt. We can think here of Arnulf Rainer’s various crucifix paintings, or churches which have 
a life-size depiction of the crucifixion hanging over their entrance.  
Nietzsche also offers the crucifixion the highest praise: it is a stroke of genius. And it does 
offer us some relief, albeit a temporary one. As I have just argued, the main focus of 
Nietzsche’s criticism of image and use of the crucifixion in Christianity is based on the idea 
that on the cross Christ died for our sins. Our sins are here conceived of as an indebtedness to 
God, an indebtedness that we ourselves can never redeem – and then the one to whom we are 
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indebted absolves us of our debt. This act involves not any simple kind of forgiveness, but a 
sacrifice. It is this sacrifice that Nietzsche remains sceptical of: 
To devise something which could even approach the seductive, intoxicating, 
anaesthetizing, and corrupting power of that symbol of the ‘holy cross’, that horrific 
paradox of the ‘crucified God’, that mystery of an inconceivably ultimate, most 
extreme cruelty and self-crucifixion undertaken for the salvation of mankind?... (GM 
I:8) 
This interpretation goes against much of the Christian discourse surrounding the crucifixion. 
For example, we can see an emphasis on the crucifixion as God’s free gift of grace (Rom 5), 
grace being given to us through Christ (1 Jn. 1:17),48 Christ taking away “the sin of the 
world” (1 Jn. 1:29),49 similarly in Luke “repentance and forgiveness of sins” is proclaimed 
after Christ’s death (Lk. 24: 46-47), and in Titus Paul writes that Christ offers himself up to 
redeem all of humankind (Tit. 2:11-14).50 In Aquinas, Christ “endured the Passion from love 
and obedience” (1920: 3.49.1), Luther describes Christ as a gift offered to us by God (2012: 
261-265), Kristeva defines as decisively Christian the “generous change of the ‘victim’ into a 
saving, mediating ‘offering’ under the sway of a loving God” (1982: 131), Swinburne 
describes the crucifixion as “a costly penance and reparation sufficient for a merciful God to 
let men off the rest” (1989: 154).  
These accounts have one idea in common: that the crucifixion as a redemptive act was a gift 
from God. In other words, the sacrifice of Christ on the Cross redeems humankind from their 
sins, but does not require any kind of repayment. It is a gift freely given (in most accounts out 
of love), and perhaps an act of mercy. This act is not dependent upon some kind of 
compensation. The difference here is between someone giving a gift to a friend for their 																																																								
48 “The law indeed was given through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus Christ.” 
49 “The next day he saw Jesus coming toward him and declared, “Here is the Lamb of God who takes away the 
sin of the world!” 
50 “For the grace of God has appeared, bringing salvation to all, training us to renounce impiety and worldly 
passions, and in the present age to live lives that are self-controlled, upright, and godly, while we wait for the 
blessed hope and the manifestation of the glory of our great God and Savior, Jesus Christ. He it is who gave 
himself for us that he might redeem us from all iniquity and purify for himself a people of his own who are 
zealous for good deeds.”  
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birthday, and then expecting the same to happen in return on their own birthday, and someone 
giving a gift with no interest in receiving anything back; selfless gift-giving.  
It is precisely this notion that Nietzsche rejects. He offers scathing comments about the 
implausibility of a creditor sacrificing himself for the debtor “out of love (are we supposed to 
believe this? -), out of love for his debtor” (GM II:21). In the next section he tells us that 
anyone who listens to the sinner and hears “the shout of love [that] has rung out during this 
night of torture and absurdity, the shout of the most yearning rapture, of salvation through 
love”, would turn away in horror (GM II:22). In The Antichrist we further read Nietzsche 
raise the question of “‘how could God have let this happen!’” (AC: 41). He tells us that the 
response of Christians was to formulate “a horribly absurd answer: God gave his son to 
forgive sins, as a sacrifice. This brought the evangel to an end with one fell swoop. The guilt 
sacrifice, and in fact in its most revolting, barbaric form, the sacrifice of the innocent for the 
sins of the guilty!” (ibid.). 
Another aspect of Nietzsche’s critique of the crucifixion seems to be a perceived juxtaposition 
between humans being told that they are utterly sinful, and then being redeemed through a 
gift. It appears that for Nietzsche these messages are so different that the very fact they are 
both proclaimed by Christianity is a problem in itself. This objection seems to be present in 
most of Nietzsche’s descriptions of the crucifixion, such as the ones quoted above, but most 
explicitly in the following passage from Human, All-Too-Human: “Christianity […] crushed 
and shattered man completely and buried him as though in mud: into a feeling of total 
depravity it then suddenly shone a beam of divine mercy, so that, surprised and stupefied by 
this act of grace, man gave vent to a cry of rapture and for a moment believed he bore all 
heaven within him.” (HH I:114). In addition to the general rhetoric that we find here and in 
the passages quoted above, it is the phrasing of the sudden divine mercy, the description of 
“mit Einem Male den Glanz eines göttlichen Erbarmens hineinleuchten”, that tells us what 
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Nietzsche considers significant.51 Nietzsche is attempting to show us the absurdity; first we 
are to believe that we are completely depraved, and then all of a sudden we are blinded by this 
saving light. However, this argument is not particularly compelling. The divine light would 
necessarily need to be of such force, of such blinding energy, precisely because of the extent 
of humanity’s sinfulness. Again, what we find here is that Nietzsche offers us a description 
that may appear to offer a critique of Christian doctrines, but is in fact entirely compatible 
with them.   
Therefore, Nietzsche objects to the idea that the innocent party, the creditor, would sacrifice 
themselves for the guilt of the debtor. And this becomes clear when we look at our own 
customs surrounding debt. Imagine that I borrowed 100 pounds from a friend. I am unable to 
pay her back, and in fact, this is not the first time it has happened. Perhaps the most straight-
forward course of action for my friend would be to ask for the money back, and certainly to 
refuse lending me money in the future. If she is particularly kind, she might not hold the debt 
against me, and might continue to give me the benefit of the doubt. It is much more difficult 
to conceive of someone who will not only consider my debt to be redeemed, but will do so at 
great cost to herself. This is, after all, what the Gospel tells us. God sacrifices his only son, to 
die in an incredibly painful way, and therefore this sacrifice came at genuine cost to Himself. 
We might ask, and Nietzsche indeed does so, why, if God can redeem us, He decided to do so 
by way of the torturous death of Christ. If we conceive of God as our creditor, and He is able 
to redeem our debt, then why did He not simply do so, without any suffering on His part?52   
																																																								
51 Interestingly, Nietzsche uses a very similar phrase in The Gay Science; “plötzliche Hindurchleuchten eines 
einzelnen Sonnenstrahls” (GS: 139).  
52 Further to the accounts mentioned above, another important thinker who responds to this question is John 
Hick. In ‘Is the Doctrine of Atonement a Mistake?’ he argues against Richard Swinburne’s account of 
redemption: “[I]t was, according to [Swinburne], entirely within God’s free choice to establish the conditions for 
human salvation. But in that case God’s insistence on the blood, sweat, pain and anguish involves in the 
crucifixion of his innocent Son now seems to cast doubt – to say the last – on the moral character of the Deity.” 
(Hick 1994: 253). Furthermore, he argues that “the Cross has continued throughout as the central Christian 
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The main source of scepticism for Nietzsche appears to be the idea of a loving God; God as 
having redeemed humans out of love, Christ suffering on the cross because of love for 
humans. In this picture God is comparable to a human creditor – and is thought to exist in the 
same moral sphere. But when we consider God to be just like us, then how are we able to 
think of him an infinitely good, as a loving God? Indeed, this is what Nietzsche appears to 
object to; for him God is presented a creditor, and there is a debt that needs to be paid. Now 
this debt is not repaid by those that are indebted, but by the creditor itself, and it is repaid 
through extreme violence on Christ, who is both God and the son of God. Nietzsche’s 
question of how God could allow it is important; we need to ask what is needed in order to 
adequately explain the violence of the sacrifice.  
It is not surprising that Nietzsche’s account of the crucifixion allows this question to be 
raised. In fact, many theologians and philosophers have asked whether, and why, Christ’s 
suffering was necessary. Bonaventure, for example, holds that the suffering of Christ was 
necessary because it is the most effective way to shock people into pursuing a virtuous path 
(1963: IV.9.2). In the Question 46 of the Third Volume of the Summa Theologica, Aquinas 
offers a number of reasons why Christ’s suffering was necessary, including that it 
demonstrates God’s love to us, as He was willing to sacrifice his son. Luther tells us that “the 
main benefit of Christ’s passion is that man sees into his own true self and that he be terrified 
and crushed by this” (2012: 426), indeed, Christ’s suffering serves to make us aware of our 
own sinfulness and to become terrified (2012: 427). For Girard, the suffering of Christ is 
essential because it has a revelatory function; it allows us to finally see the violent 
underpinnings of our society: “the crucifixion reduces mythology to powerlessness by 
exposing violent contagion”  (2001: 138). Nietzsche’s outrage at the cruelty of the crucifixion 
could therefore be simply an appropriate response to the event.   																																																																																																																																																																													
symbol because it stirs deeper, more complex emotions than are captured by any of these official doctrines” 
(ibid. 261). 
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Nietzsche tells us the crucifixion reaffirms the notion of humankind as ultimately wrong. We 
are told that we cannot achieve redemption ourselves, and that the only way in which we can 
escape our own badness is by having our God sacrifice himself on the Cross. As Roberts 
writes, “[Nietzsche] argues that the crucifixion marks the culmination of religious self-hatred 
insofar as it reflects the recognition that the debt to God could never be repaid by human 
beings, that only God could pay the wages of sin. In this respect, the crucifixion points to the 
ultimate powerlessness of human beings” (1998: 59). This account itself does not constitute a 
critique of the Christian redemptive narrative. It is in fact entirely compatible with Luther’s 
account of the crucifixion as mentioned above. However, Nietzsche does move away from a 
Lutheran interpretation, as there is a difference in evaluation. Whereas for Luther the 
continual reminder of our sinfulness allows us to see our true nature, for Nietzsche it does not 
correspond to any real state of being. He rejects the notion that we are all ontologically sinful 
beings, and this is in fact one of his main critiques of Christianity; that it offers us a kind of 
self-understanding that is really a type of self-judgment or self-cruelty.53  
And so, when Nietzsche rejects the idea of the crucifixion as a redemptive sacrifice, this is 
because he thinks it in fact perpetuates feelings of sinfulness. This does not mean that for 
Nietzsche Christian redemptive accounts were not redemptive at all. In fact, he tells us in the 
Second Essay that through the crucifixion humans found “temporary relief” (GM II:21). The 
relief that it offers, however, is not relief from sin. Instead, it is relief from suffering, by 
making our suffering more bearable through providing an explanation for it. However, this 
explanation for meaningless suffering increases feelings of sin, as the ascetic priest tells us 																																																								
53 There is a different interpretation possible here. We might want to say that Nietzsche’s discussion is not a 
theological one, but rather he focuses on what he sees as the consequences of this redemptive narrative. His 
argument is that, sure, Christianity tells us that we are all redeemed, yet that is not how it feels. We cannot 
escape our guilt and indebtedness because we are told again that we are worthless, and that God had to kill 
himself/his own son in a torturous way in order to redeem us. He is, therefore, interested in what he considers to 
be the psychological effects of the redemptive narratives. And so, we could interpret his claims as psychological 
ones, he is not concerned with whether or not we actually literally are redeemed, but rather the fact that we do 
not feel as such.  
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that we are to blame for our suffering. What we see here, is that, as Roberts puts it eloquently, 
“suffering itself is not healed, but, at the price of one kind of suffering from suffering— 
guilt—another—the feelings of helplessness and uncertainty—is ameliorated. Suffering is 
“healed” only in its transformation into hatred for this world and desire for the next.” (1998: 
52).  
Roberts interprets Nietzsche as claiming that this is in fact the “Pauline strategy”; “to bring 
[guilt] to a nearly unbearable pitch in the recognition of one’s worthlessness— and in 
preparation for surrendering to the power of grace” (ibid.). There is something to be said for 
this, as Paul emphasizes that all of us are sinners, and that we cannot meet the requirements of 
the law. However, for Paul the emphasis is not on “one’s worthlessness” in order to become 
receptive to grace, rather what is essential for him is an awareness of our nature as such. This 
is fleshed out in terms of our sinful state, but also in terms of atonement through Christ. It is 
important that even though there is nothing contingent about our sinful state for Paul, his 
strategy could still work if we were not sinful, if this was merely a side note. I would argue 
that this more generous reading of Paul is in fact entirely compatible with Nietzsche’s 
condemnation of Pauline soteriology. In other words, for Paul it is true that we are sinful, this 
is simply what our nature is. For Nietzsche, sin is not a ‘true’ state of our nature, but 
something posited by Christianity. This means that when he talks about Paul or Pauline 
Christianity, he is already assuming that the sin that is posited is false. We might therefore 
object to Nietzsche and say that his critical reading of Paul has a starting point that already 
means he is unable to represent whatever Paul’s intentions might have been. However, I 
would argue that even if we accept sin as a true state of our nature, Nietzsche’s criticism of 
the crucifixion can still hold sway. It seems possible that even if we accept sinfulness to be 
the true state of human nature and the crucifixion has redeemed our sins, Paul’s texts 
emphasize the wrongness of our nature, rather than the fact of our salvation. 
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The result of the Christian narratives is, for Nietzsche, what Taubes calls a “continually self-
perpetuating cycle of guilt, sacrifice and atonement” (2004: 87-88). We suffer and desire a 
meaning for it; the answer we are offered is that there is suffering because we are to blame, 
because we are sinful; this sinfulness brings with it further suffering. This suffering can be 
redeemed through the sacrifice of Christ; but this sacrifice increases our feelings of sinfulness 
and indebtedness. For Nietzsche, therefore, the Christian forms of sacrifice, as exemplified by 
the crucifixion, will not be redemptive.   
There is a further difficulty Nietzsche raises with Christian redemptive accounts. In The 
Wanderer and His Shadow Nietzsche writes “[i]t was Christianity which first painted the 
Devil on the world's wall; it was Christianity which first brought sin into the world. Belief in 
the cure which it offered [dagegen anbot] has now been shaken to its deepest roots: but belief 
in the sickness which it taught and propagated continues to exist.” (WS: 78). This passage, 
titled ‘Belief in the sickness as sickness’, suggests that even though sin and the devil continue 
to exist, redemption as their antidote no longer does. Unfortunately Nietzsche does not offer 
any further explanation, but what I will argue is that Christian redemption cannot work for the 
post-Christian who still struggles with sin, as these redemptive accounts are too closely tied 
up with the concept of God. 
At the beginning of this chapter I pointed out that different accounts of grace have in common 
the idea that we can strive to become receptive to grace, but it is up to God to decide whether 
to offer it to us. The discussion on the crucifixion further supports this statement. God 
sacrifices his son for our sins; this is an act that came from on high. What would this account 
look like after the ‘death of God’? There appear to be two options; a) grace would have to 
become something we can give to ourselves, b) someone or something other than God would 
have to be able to bestow grace. With both of these options, the effectiveness of grace would 
diminish, however. In Christian accounts grace allows for a complete salvation from 
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sinfulness, as it is bestowed upon us by God, who is all-powerful and benevolent. The kind of 
grace that another human being could provide us with would be much more akin to 
forgiveness.  This immanent grace, offered horizontally rather than vertically, could perhaps 
be fruitful. In Ricoeur’s account of forgiveness he emphasizes its restorative capacity: “under 
the sign of forgiveness, the guilty person is to be considered capable of something other than 
his offenses and his faults. He is held to be restored to his capacity for acting, and action 
restored to its capacity for continuing” (2004: 493).54  For Ricoeur, however, forgiveness will 
be related to certain transgressive acts that have been committed. It responds, in other words, 
to something like transgressive sin. However, in the previous chapter I have argued that post-
Christian sin must be understood as existential, and not transgressive sin. If forgiveness is 
therefore not about a trespass against another person (or deity), the question becomes one of 
authority. What gives the other person the authority to offer the post-Christian redemption? 
Unless we want to posit a different religious or political framework that awards someone this 
authority, the answer would have to be that the other person does not have this authority, or 
certainly not the same kind of authority that a creditor would have. The redemptive 
framework where redemption is offered by someone outside of oneself therefore does not 
work for the post-Christian.   
Where does this leave the post-Christian sinner? Nietzsche tells us that the crucifixion, as the 
pivotal redemptive moment of Christianity, did not redeem people from feelings of sinfulness. 
The overall Christian redemptive narratives allowed a lessening of suffering by offering an 
explanation, yet it thereby increased feelings of sinfulness. Furthermore, the particular 
structure Christian redemptive narratives take, with their emphasis on the role of God, cannot 
be applied to the post-Christian. We must therefore direct our attention elsewhere. Nietzsche’s 																																																								
54 This description echoes Nietzsche’s Twilight of the Idols; “That no one is made responsible any more, that a 
kind of Being cannot be traced back to a causa prima, that the world is no unity, either as sensorium or as 
‘mind’, this alone is the great liberation – this alone re-establishes the innocence of becoming...” (TI IV:8) 
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own philosophy contains redemptive elements, and in fact Fraser even posits that Nietzsche’s 
entire work should be understood as “a series of experiments in redemption” (Fraser: 2). 
Although I hesitate to support this claim, turning to Nietzsche’s writings on redemption will 
allow us to further conceptualize redemption from post-Christian sin.  
4.2 Nietzsche on redemption: genealogy 
The first problem we must tackle is how pre-reflective sin-consciousness can become 
reflectively available to the post-Christian. After all, one of the key features of post-Christian 
sin is the fact that a person might not be aware of it. The genealogical method is a method of 
analysing the history of concepts and values. I will argue that it can be fruitful for our current 
project, as it allows the post-Christian to gain awareness of sin. Furthermore, not only can the 
genealogical method lead to an increased understanding, this understanding also already 
contains critical elements. Through the genealogical method we become aware of the 
contingency of values and concepts, and this contingency in itself is the first step towards 
possible change. 
A good way to begin understanding the genealogical method is by looking at Nietzsche’s use 
of it in the Genealogy. Even though the genealogy is presented to us as a historical account, 
Nietzsche is not interested in making purely factual claims about history. He is not offering a 
historical narrative because it would make it easier to define concepts; it is rather the 
historical aspect of these concepts that makes them what they are. As Paul Katsafanas writes: 
“the story that Nietzsche tells in the Genealogy constitutes a historically grounded critique of 
modern morality” (2011: 191, emphasis mine).  
Nietzsche tells us that “there is a world of difference between the reason for something 
coming into existence in the first place and the ultimate use to which it is put” (GM II:13). 
This is in fact the most important principle for “all types of history”. We cannot understand a 
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concept by looking at its use now, and that the use of concepts and values undergoes a long 
process; “[…] anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continually interpreted 
anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new purpose by a power superior to 
it” (GM II:12). We see here that not only is it important to separate the current use of 
something with its origin and historical trajectory, but we must also acknowledge that the 
development of this thing is entirely dependent on the interpretations of agents. Therefore, 
genealogy consists of an analysis of different forces, and the psychology of agents, at play in 
the historical development of concepts. Peter Kail defines it as follows; “[genealogy is] 
primarily an explanatory account of the emergence of some distinctive set of beliefs, 
practices, and associated phenomena, involving situating agents with a particular psychology 
in a social-cum-environmental situation to which that psychology is responsive.” (2011: 214). 
Raymond Geuss offers a slightly different reading. He tells us that we should interpret the 
genealogical method as the most accurate account of history available, and therefore that if 
we want to understand a concept, the way to analyse it is through this method: “the 
appropriate historical account is a genealogy” (Geuss 1994: 282). Geuss argues that, for 
Nietzsche, his own depiction of Christianity in the Genealogy is a more plausible account 
than any traditional ones: it is “historically superior” (ibid. 288). We can make sense of this 
claim by noting that for Nietzsche history has to be in the service of life, as he argues in ‘On 
The Uses And Disadvantages Of History For Life’. History is not stagnant or factual, it is a 
process that humans must engage with; “if he is to live, man must possess and from time to 
time employ the strength to break up and dissolve a part of the past: he does this by bringing 
it before the tribunal, scrupulously examining it and finally condemning it” (UM II:3). A 
‘superior’ historical account, as Geuss argues the genealogical method offers, therefore does 
not mean that it is more true, but rather that it is “in the service of the future and the present” 
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(UM II:4).55 So here we are again faced with Nietzsche’s condemnation of Christianity, and 
Christian narratives, as being inimical to life.    
Furthermore, the genealogical method emphasises understanding the emergence of something 
through understanding the agential roles involved. In the case of God, it would look as 
follows:  
[T]he genealogical Nietzsche sees the concept of god being used in a particular way in 
a particular historical trajectory by which human beings alienate themselves in the 
worship of God. Although Nietzsche does think that it has brought some benefits to 
human culture, this historical trajectory does not represent the necessary movement of 
spirit or human self-consciousness. (Roberts 1998: 59).  
In other words, to understand the concept of ‘god’ genealogically, one's analysis would focus 
on people’s use of the concept through time. Roberts points out that one of the outcomes of 
this approach is that the history will not be understood as necessary, but as contingent. The 
genealogical method uncovers this contingency by emphasizing the use of concepts and the 
role specific people or forces play in their emergence or development. Kail describes this as 
the genealogy removing a “givenness” from moral intuitions, and for Geuss genealogy points 
out that things are given meaning, rather than intrinsically having it. Lawrence Hatab 
similarly argues that through genealogy Nietzsche is able to criticize the idea of moral purity, 
as he offers “a different look at the historical context out of which certain moral values arose” 
(2005: 39). Nietzsche confirms the importance of contingency in the following passage:  
The inquiry into the origin of our evaluations and tables of the good is in absolutely no 
way identical with a critique of them, as is so often believed: even though the insight 																																																								
55 Ted Sadler, in Nietzsche: Truth and Redemption, argues that redemption through truth in Nietzsche should be 
understood as a “comprehensive existential orientation”. Sadler talks about concepts such as ‘highest reality’ and 
‘absolute truth’, and argues that for Nietzsche redemption is found in Dionysian affirmation, and that 
“Nietzschean redemption is rather the liberation from everything ‘worldly’ at the same time as it is liberation 
into the authority of the ‘essential’ (other-worldly self)” (Sadler: 162).  Sadler’s reading of Nietzsche relies 
almost entirely upon The Birth of Tragedy and The Will to Power, which can be seen in his insistence that for 
Nietzsche redemption involves a rejection of the principium individuationes, which only appears in The Birth of 
Tragedy (ibid. 168). As such, the philosophical interpretation Sadler offers fails to convince, and he is mistaken 
in suggesting that it is key to Nietzsche’s philosophical project of redemption that we turn away from “the 
empirical self” (ibid.).   
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into some prudenda origo certainly brings with it a feeling of a diminution in value of 
the thing that originated thus and prepares the way to a critical mood and attitude 
toward it. (WP: 254) 
Nietzsche here acknowledges that gaining knowledge, or even accepting something as true 
may not lead to any genuine transformation. He tells us that all the genealogical method can 
do is to make us aware of the contingency of, for example, concepts. By being aware of this 
contingency, we are free to take up a critical attitude towards it, but the genealogical method 
itself is not this critical attitude. However, as Reginster tells us, “even though a genealogical 
inquiry is not yet a critique of moral values, it may nevertheless be necessary for it” (2006: 
198). We cannot rely on the genealogical method to directly generate change, but what 
genealogy can do is offer new insight into the origin and emergence of values, concepts, and 
other aspects of our life.  
This should not be undervalued. A person could be struggling with post-Christian sin without 
being aware of exactly what it is that she is dealing with, her sense of sinfulness could be 
interpreted by the post-Christian as being caused by something else. Perhaps she thinks that it 
is particular to herself, or that one event in her life caused this. Through the genealogical 
method, it would become possible for the post-Christian to become aware of the historical and 
cultural elements that were in play in the origin, emergence, and promotion of feelings of 
sinfulness, and that the configuration of sin she experiences may be an off-shoot of this 
tradition.  
However, this increased awareness does not in itself cause any change. It appears that we 
have taken one step in the right direction, but still fall short of offering an account of 
redemption that would allow the post-Christian to move on from her sin-consciousness. The 
question we must ask here is how this increased knowledge can become motivational. How 
can an awareness of the contingency of one’s self-understanding lead to a motivation for 
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change? This is a question Nietzsche does not provide an answer for, but it must be taken very 
seriously. It is not obvious that knowledge of post-Christian sin-consciousness will 
automatically lead to a desire to change it, let alone the possibility of changing it.  
Once a person is aware of her existential sin as a form of self-understanding, there are a 
number of options open to her. Existential sin can either be understood as a problem that 
needs to be solved, or as an aspect of life that, now she understands it, can be affirmed. For 
much of this thesis, I have suggested that we ought to take the first approach. Existential sin is 
a remnant of Christian thought that still linger for the post-Christian, but it no longer suits her. 
To solve existential sin, perhaps all we need is awareness. Once the post-Christian 
understands that the way in which she relates to herself, and indeed, to much of the world, is 
tainted by remains of a religion she rejects, she will want to reject those remains. And, as 
these fragments, in the form of existential sin, become reflectively available to her – they turn 
into propositions that she can deny, as she denied God. This, indeed, is what the genealogical 
method can help her do. By becoming aware of the contingencies and historicity of her self-
understanding, by bringing to the surface these cultural remainders of Christianity, she can 
move away from them. And this is how she can transform from one of the atheists in the 
marketplace, into someone who acknowledges the impact of the death of God. She now 
understands the extent of Christianity’s influence.  
This seems reasonable enough, and I do not wish to argue that it is necessarily a mistake to 
pursue this avenue. However, it strikes me as overly optimistic. Firstly, it assumes that 
awareness leads to a desire and possibility to change things. This, as I argued earlier in this 
chapter, might not be the case. Secondly, and more importantly, existential sin is responsive 
to the ontological problem of meaningless suffering, and offers us a way to deal with this 
problem. We might therefore suggest that rejecting existential sin is undesirable, particularly 
if there are no alternatives available. However, I will show that Nietzsche’s account of life 
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affirmation can be understood to offer such an alternative.  
4.3 Nietzsche on Redemption: life-affirmation  
At the end of the Second Essay of the Genealogy Nietzsche offers us a glimpse of what 
redemption might look like for him: 
 But at some time, in a period stronger than this brittle, self-doubting present, he must 
yet come to us, the redeemer of great love and contempt, the creative spirit whose 
compelling strength allows him no rest in any remote retreat and beyond, a spirit 
whose seclusion is misunderstood by the common people, as if it were a flight from 
reality – while it is only a further steeping, burrowing, plunging into reality, from 
which he may at some time return to the light, bearing the redemption of this reality: 
its redemption from the curse which the previous ideal has laid upon it. (GM II:24)  
Nietzsche is talking about a single immanent individual, a ‘redeemer’, “der erlösende 
Mensch”.56 The parallel with Christ is striking here. In contrast, in The Antichrist Nietzsche 
describes a “Typus eines Erlösers der Menschheit”, a type of saviour of humankind. This 
saviour needs to be understood to stand in direct opposition to the redeemer of GM II:24. The 
difference is to be found in the world that is embraced: the redeemer in the Genealogy 
plunges “into reality”, and is oriented towards “redemption of this reality”. The type of 
redeemer in The Anti-Christ exhibits a “hatred for every reality”, and aims their redemption at 
“a world that has become completely ‘internal’, a ‘true’ world, an ‘eternal’ world.” (AC: 
29).57    
																																																								
56 As argued by Fraser (2002) and Conway (1989), we can understand the redeemer in this passage as the 
übermensch, the type of higher human that Nietzsche describes in other works such as Twilight and Zarathustra. 
Nietzsche’s use of this redeeming figure leaves open many questions. Firstly we have to ask, what makes this 
individual able to be a ‘redeemer’? Do they have access to truth that others do not? Or are we meant to 
understand them more as an exemplar? In order to answer these questions for Nietzsche, an analysis of the figure 
of Zarathustra in Thus Spoke Zarathustra is necessary. There, Zarathustra is portrayed as a prophet, as a teacher, 
and as an exemplar. For a detailed analysis, see for example Lampart 1986, Conway 1989, Ansell-Pearson 1992, 
and Loeb 2010. 
57 There is evidence within The Antichrist that Nietzsche considered Christ to be closer to the first kind of 
redeemer than the second. In section 31 he writes that the way in which we understand Christ now is greatly 
distorted, and in section 32 that we should understand Christ as a “free spirit”, who does not wage war on this 
world.  
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For Nietzsche, Christianity entails a turning away from this life, an orientation towards the 
next life. One of the recurring themes in Nietzsche’s writings on Christianity is that this 
religion promotes an orientation towards a different world, instead of embracing our world. 
We can find this thought in sections such as Genealogy II:21-22 and III:11; Twilight of the 
Idols IV:2, V:1, V:5, IX:34, and IV 2;  The Gay Science 130, 344, and 346; Ecce Homo III 
‘BT’:2, and III ‘WC’:2. Furthermore, in Daybreak 94 Nietzsche writes that Christianity has 
sacrificed this world for the punishment of sins. In Beyond Good and Evil we read that 
Christianity “invert[s] all love of the earthly and of supremacy over the earth into hated of the 
earth and earthly things – that is the task the Church imposed on itself.” (BGE: 62). In the 
Genealogy’s final section Nietzsche tells us that the ascetic ideal expresses a “hatred of the 
human […], [a] yearning to pass beyond all appearance, change, becoming, death, desire 
[…]|” (GM III:28). In Twilight one of the phases of the ‘Real World’ becoming a fable 
Nietzsche attributes specifically to Christianity: “The real world unattainable for now, but 
promised to the wise man, the pious man, the virtuous man (‘to the sinner who repents’)” (TI 
IV:2). In a passage in The Will to Power Nietzsche writes that the Christian meaning for 
suffering “is supposed to be a path to holy existence”, and as such “[t]he Christian denies 
even the happiest lot on earth: he is sufficiently weak, poor, disinherited to suffer from life in 
whatever form he meets it. The god on the cross is a curse on life, a signpost to seek 
redemption from life […]”. (WP: 1052, italics mine).  
Nietzsche tells us in these passages that Christian doctrines constitute a denial of this world. 
He fleshes this out in several different ways: he focuses on the crucifixion, on the figure of 
God, but also on the message of asceticism and the rejection of sensuality. They have in 
common a particular grounding in the distinction between our world and another world. The 
explanation that the priest offers for suffering, as described in Chapter 2, relies on positing 
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another world: we are sinners now, but God has redeemed us, and in the next life there will be 
no suffering. As Clark puts it:  
Nietzsche believes that the ascetic ideal originally closed the door to "suicidal 
nihilism." It did so by explaining human suffering as punishment for sin and by 
providing a goal: the overcoming of one's attachment to life, which the great ascetics 
carried to extremes of self-torture. This explanation and the related goal saved the will, 
making it possible for human beings to affirm life, to find living and the pursuit of 
other goals worthwhile. However, the cost was a devaluation of human life. The 
ascetic ideal's answer to nihilism made later outbreaks of nihilism inevitable because it 
deprived human life of intrinsic value, treating it as valuable only as a means to its 
own negation: nirvana, heaven, for example. (Clark 1990: 252) 
The crucifixion emphasizes the otherworldly nature of God, by emphasizing the 
miraculousness of God becoming human. Sensuality is rejected, because if we embrace our 
sinful natures we will not be redeemed in the next life. Indeed, Nietzsche suggests throughout 
his works that Christianity condemns sensual desires and bodily drives as a whole. For 
example, in Human, All-Too-Human 141 Nietzsche writes that the saint uses his sensual 
desires in order to see his life as a battlefield between good and evil. Nietzsche argues that the 
saints and ascetics deny themselves anything of a sensual nature whilst knowing that this will 
only increase their appetite for it, which in turn increases a feeling of sinfulness because their 
desires and thoughts are also considered transgressions. By denying ourselves in this life, by 
living ascetically, we will be able to enjoy eternal life. For Nietzsche these kinds of 
descriptions display precisely what makes the ascetic priest’s Christianity a life-denying 
religion, a religion that denies this world and instead focuses on another.  
We could perhaps say that this is a misrepresentation of Christianity. Despite Christ telling us 
that his “kingdom is not from this world” (1 Jn. 18:36), Christianity does not ask us to deny 
that we exist in this world. It gives us guidelines on how to live now,58 and in Christ it gave us 
																																																								
58 Nietzsche himself writes in The Gay Science 353: “The true invention of the religion-founders is first to 
establish a certain way of life and everyday customs that work as a disciplina voluntatis while at the same time 
removing boredom; and then to give just this life an interpretation that makes it appear illuminated by the 
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an exemplar of how we ought to act in this world. However, when it comes to redemption, we 
can certainly make the case that the emphasis is strongly on the afterlife. Nietzsche is arguing 
against a specific form of Christianity that upholds a worldview reminiscent of Platonism.59 
The ascetic priest promotes precisely this kind of picture. We can leave open the question of 
whether the priest offers a distortion of Christianity, by acknowledging that at the very least 
the strong emphasis on an afterlife has been an influential view within Christianity. This view 
can be summarized as follows: we will not experience redemption in this life, as salvation will 
be found in the next life. In the early Christian Church, we can already find The Apostles’ 
Creed, containing the statement that Christians shall believe “the resurrection of the body, and 
the life everlasting”. The Catechism of the Catholic Church fleshes this out: “each will be 
rewarded immediately after death in accordance with his works and faith” (Catechism 1021, 
italics mine). The fourth of Luther’s Ninety-Five Theses states that “the penalty of sin remains 
as long as the hatred of self, that is, true inner repentance, until our entrance into the kingdom 
of heaven” (Luther 2012: 67). Although acts in this world will decide whether salvation is 
received, this salvation itself exists for the Christian only after this life. For this reason, we are 
oriented not merely towards our life in this world, but also towards another world, another 
life.60  
																																																																																																																																																																													
highest worth, so that henceforth it becomes a good for which one fights and under certain circumstances even 
gives one’s life.” 
59 A different view can be found in, for example, Karl Barth’s Church Dogmatics, particularly Volume III. He 
focuses on the “actuality of human existence” and argues for an “autonomous human self-understanding”, which 
does not rely on positing the realm of God as separate from humanity.  
60 The positing of another world is of course not particular to Christianity. Nietzsche argues that it is a part of 
most religions, as well as part of the message the ‘ethical teacher’ offers; “The ethical teacher makes his 
appearance as the teacher of the purpose of existence in order that what happens necessarily and always, by itself 
and without a purpose, shall henceforth seem to be done for a purpose and strike man as reason and an ultimate 
commandment; to this end he invents a second, different existence and takes by means of his new mechanics the 
old, ordinary existence off its old, ordinary hinges” (GS:1, italics mine). Nietzsche here echoes Schopenhauer’s 
article On Man’s Need for Metaphysics, where Schopenhauer argues that in order to live with the suffering in 
this world, we need to receive an explanation for it and we need to be able to believe in another realm. However, 
Nietzsche moves away from Schopenhauer by arguing that the ‘metaphysical need’ is in fact a consequence of 
religion; “The metaphysical need is not the origin of religion, as Schopenhauer has it, but only a late offshoot of 
it. Under the rule of religious ideas, one has got used to the idea of ‘another world (behind, below, above)’ and 
feels an unpleasant emptiness and deprivation at the annihilation of religious delusions – and from this feeling 
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These orientations are not necessarily conflicting. Salvation may be in another world, but we 
can only achieve it through our lives now, and therefore an orientation towards the other 
realm exists in the correct orientation towards this world and existence. And so, Nietzsche’s 
description of a denial of life is appropriate for the ascetic, but appears not quite accurate for 
the Christian. However, Nietzsche does not say that Christianity is removed entirely from this 
life. What he talks about instead is that Christianity is oriented towards another world. 
Meaning, peace and salvation are all to be achieved in the next life, and we understand this 
life in relation to the afterlife. Suffering in this world is explained partly by referring to 
another world. Therefore, even when we offer a reading of Christianity as speaking to us 
about this life and offering us guidance in living it, there is still an orientation towards another 
realm. We can turn to section 1052 from The Will to Power: “[o]ne will see that the problem 
is that of the meaning of suffering: whether a Christian meaning or a tragic meaning. In the 
former case, it is supposed to be the path to a holy existence; in the latter case, being is 
counted as holy enough to justify even a monstrous amount of suffering” (italics mine). The 
difference here is a difference between affirming this life for the sake of a possible salvation 
after this life, and affirming this life for the sake of this life itself. The first is the Christian 
redemptive narrative of the ascetic priest, and the second we can find in what Nietzsche calls 
the “affirmation of life”. 
Nietzsche criticizes the ascetic priest’s Christianity for not embracing this world or this life, 
but instead finding meaning in a different world. It appears then, that the ‘affirmation of life’ 
must constitute an attitude wherein we find meaning solely in this world. The orientation of 
life-affirmation must furthermore contain some kind of embracing of life, as Nietzsche 
criticizes Christianity for denying life and turning away from it.  
																																																																																																																																																																													
grows now ‘another world’, but this time only metaphysical and not a religious one.” (GS: 151) 
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A small note on the complexity of the current topic is needed. Affirmation of life is bound up 
with nihilism, amor fati, the eternal recurrence, and a Dionysian approach to life. In this thesis 
I have not delved into these concepts, and explaining each in detail would overwhelm us in 
material. Therefore, I suggest a specific orientation towards life-affirmation that narrows our 
focus. The current chapter concerns possibly redemptive avenues for the post-Christian 
sinner, and we are thereby interested in looking at life-affirmation as redemptive. The 
question we want to focus on is whether life-affirmation can be a redemptive attitude for the 
post-Christian sinner to take up. Will it redeem her from her sense of sinfulness? In order to 
answer this question, it is not necessary to offer a comprehensive overview of life-affirmation 
in Nietzsche. Nor will we need to understand the specific nature of nihilism or the Dionysian 
drives. Amor fati will be explored as an interpretation of life-affirmation, but the overarching 
objective of this section will be to assess whether life-affirmation can map onto post-Christian 
sin as a possible redemptive avenue.61  
4.4 Life-affirmation and suffering 
So what is life-affirmation? There are several passages in Nietzsche’s texts that offer an 
answer to this question. In Ecce Homo Nietzsche talks about the “highest affirmation”, which 
we can find in the Dionysian. This highest affirmation consists of “a yes-saying without 
reservation, even to suffering, even to guilt, even to everything questionable and alien about 
existence” (EH III ‘BT’:2). He continues to describe an “affirmation of transience and 
destruction” (ibid. 3). In Twilight of the Idols we read;  
																																																								
61 For Nietzsche on nihilism, see Van Tongeren 2010, Pippin 1999, Franks 2013, and Reginster 2006 – the latter 
of which contains a detailed analysis of the relation between nihilism and life-affirmation. Béatrice Han-Pile’s 
2009 paper ‘Nietzsche and Amor Fati’ gives what is perhaps the most convincing account of amor fati, by 
understanding it as a medio-passive form of agapic love. Other relevant texts include Stern 2013, and Owen’s 
‘Modernity, Ethics and Counter-Ideals: Amor Fati, Eternal Recurrence and the Overman’ in Owen 1998. For 
eternal recurrence, Löwith 1997 and Hatab 2005 are the most comprehensive, further interesting accounts 
include chapters in Reginster 2006, May 1999, Strong 1988, and Clark 1990.  
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Saying yes to life,62 even in its strangest and harshest problems; the will to life 
rejoicing in its own inexhaustibility through the sacrifice of its highest types – that is 
what I called Dionysian, that is the bridge I found to the psychology of the tragic poet. 
Not to escape horror and pity, not to cleanse yourself of a dangerous affect by violent 
discharge […] but rather, over and above all horror and pity, so that you yourself may 
be the eternal joy in becoming. (TI X:5).  
It appears therefore, that we should understand the affirmation of life as being a Yes to life: 
affirming life in all its facets, and doing so wholeheartedly. Nietzsche focuses in particular on 
suffering, on “horror and pity”, “destruction” and the “hardest problems”. Instead of 
attempting to find explanations for suffering that lessen their impact, and turning away from 
the destructive aspects of life, we should embrace them. Suffering should not be condemned 
as a part of life that does not belong, as something that is wrong and needs fixing. We saw 
earlier in chapter 2, that Nietzsche argues that human beings struggle most of all with 
meaningless suffering. For Nietzsche, the intense drive to explain and ground suffering would 
be satisfied by understanding it to be a fundamental and necessary part of life.  
If we affirm life and suffering in the way Nietzsche intends it, then the question of why 
suffering exists at all would be answered by pointing out that suffering is a part of life, in the 
same way that love or joy are parts of life; “suffering results inevitably from the engagement 
with life” (Roberts 1998: 165). Life-affirmation can take over the role of existential sin in 
responding to the ontological problem of meaningless suffering. In response to the question of 
why there is suffering, we would say that there is suffering because this is necessary for life. 
Suffering is a fact of our existence: “all becoming and growth, everything that guarantees the 
future involves pain” (TI X:4).63 It is important to affirm suffering precisely because it is an 
essential part of our lives: the thought goes that suffering is there whether we like it or not, we 
																																																								
62 German: “Jasagen zum Leben”, translated as “affirmation of life” by Hollingdale, and as “saying Yes to life” 
by Large and Norman. 
63 German: “alles Werden und Wachsen, alles Zukunft-Verbürgende bedingt den Schmerz” – bedingt is 
translated by Large as “presupposes”, and by Hollingdale as “postulates”.  
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might as well take up as healthy an attitude towards it as we can. Life-affirmation therefore 
has a redemptive element to it; it redeems us from the problem of meaningless suffering. 
However, for Nietzsche we must not only accept suffering, but also “show that suffering is 
good for its own sake” (Reginster 2006: 15). It is still possible to accept suffering as 
necessary to life, but to retain an orientation towards another world. Schopenhauer, for 
example, acknowledged the necessity of suffering, and argued that as a consequence the only 
appropriate attitude towards life is one of denial. Indeed, when we become overwhelmed by 
the fact that suffering is inevitable this can lead to despair and an unwillingness to embrace 
life. In order to clarify exactly how life-affirmation differs from these kind of orientations, 
Reginster helpfully employs the categories of resignation and concealment: 
[Ecce Homo, II 10] contrasts a genuine affirmation of life (the “love” of it) with two 
other attitudes one might adopt toward suffering, which we might call respectively 
resignation and concealment. Resignation is the acceptance of aspects of life we 
deplore but recognize to be inevitable (for example, suffering). Concealment, by 
contrast, designates the effort to mask the necessity of those deplorable aspects. (ibid. 
229) 
The attitude of resignation entails an acknowledgment of suffering as necessary, but still 
designating this suffering as undesirable. In the case of concealment, we might acknowledge 
suffering as necessary, but will believe that it is not much of a problem. Reginster offers two 
different ways in which Nietzsche fleshes out concealment: idealism and counter-adaptation. 
Idealism will sound familiar to us: it is to argue that suffering in this world is merely an 
illusion, as there is a true, real world after this life. Counter-adaptation refers to an attitude of 
extreme adaptability: “dissatisfied or frustrated, because they always manage to convince 
themselves that what they get is what they want, and that what they fail to get they did not 
want anyway” (ibid. 230). Although the idealist and adaptive individual can both 
acknowledge suffering as necessary to this life, they are still unable to affirm suffering as 
desirable for its own sake, i.e. not as means to an end. Life-affirmation requires us to look at 
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our life, and to affirm it wholeheartedly. When I affirm suffering as necessary, I am affirming 
it as necessary for my life: “Nietzsche’s conception of life-affirmation goes far beyond life-
enhancement; it aims for a global affirmation of all life conditions, even those that run counter 
to one’s interests […].” (Hatab 2005: 47).  
In the Genealogy the ascetic priests treat life as something that should be rectified, as “a 
mistake which one rectifies through action” (GM III:12). They negate life by asserting that 
value is to be found in another world, the ascetic priests thus “juxtapose this life to a 
completely different form of existence, which it opposes and excludes, unless it somehow 
turns itself against itself, denies itself” (ibid.). The ascetic priests’ valuation of life is therefore 
counter to life, and as such it is a value that for Nietzsche should not be asserted when we 
affirm life. This particular value of the priests is directly opposed to life-affirmation as such, 
and easily identifiable as such. Immanent life-affirmation would not be possible if meaning is 
to be found outside of this world. In the case of post-Christian sin, it is less obvious whether 
this is inimical to ‘life’, as there is no conscious affirmation of another world. More 
importantly, post-Christian sin-consciousness is pre-reflective. Before she can begin to figure 
out if her sense of sinfulness is contrary to life, the post-Christian sinner must first become 
aware of its existence. Life affirmation is not an approach meant to give us knowledge of how 
we are constituted. It already starts from a position of knowledge; knowledge of what life is, 
knowledge what is and is not good for life. The post-Christian sinner does not find herself in 
this position.  
It is therefore worth raising the question whether life affirmation, and specifically the 
affirmation of suffering, might also help deal with post-Christian sin-consciousness. The link 
between suffering and sin that Nietzsche establishes relies on the need for an explanation of 
suffering. If, with life affirmation, this need is channelled into an acceptance of suffering as 
simply a part of life, then no longer will sin be required as a solution – the problem is no 
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longer there. We can think of this as a paradigm shift – the first paradigm that explained 
meaningless suffering was existential sin, but now there is the possibility of a new paradigm 
wherein this suffering is explained by life affirmation.  
By stating it thus, it appears that life affirmation undertakes a critical re-evaluation of the 
meaning of suffering. However, if we read it in terms of Blumenberg’s account of answer and 
question positions, we can see that the change from existential sin to life-affirmation can also 
be thought of as maintaining the same paradigm. Both sin and life-affirmation answer the 
question of meaningless suffering, and as such find themselves within the same system of 
world explanation. Life-affirmation does not “destroy the question itself critically” 
(Blumenberg 1983: 66), but rather offers a different answer to the ‘great question’ of 
meaningless suffering.  
This is precisely how we should understand Nietzsche’s project of life affirmation. When 
there is no answer available to the problem of meaningless suffering, we can fall into 
nihilism. This is why Nietzsche tells us that the ascetic priests saved the will: by positing sin 
as the explanation for suffering, “man was saved, he had a meaning, from now on he was no 
longer like a leaf in the breeze, the plaything of the absurd, of ‘non-sense’; from now on he 
could will something” (GM III: 28). We must understand the answer the ascetic priest gives 
as an attempt to engage with the problem of meaningless suffering and make life more 
bearable. For Nietzsche, “[…] ascetic ideals are honored […] precisely because of the honest 
confrontation with the meaning problem, even if the response is to find no meaning in finite 
life.” (Hatab 2005: 44).  
It is this “meaning problem” that life affirmation attempts to find a solution to. As such, it 
offers an alternative to sin: instead of human beings being responsible for suffering, suffering 
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ought to be looked at as an indispensable part of life.64 However, Roberts argues that there is 
an important difference between Nietzsche’s account of life-affirmation and the Christian 
conception of sin. He argues that the Christian account is deeply reactive: life itself is 
understood in relation to suffering, in the sense that “suffering, life itself, then becomes a 
problem that one must solve in order to live.” (Roberts: 165). In contrast, Roberts argues, we 
should understand Nietzsche’s account as showing us that “an answer to the question of 
suffering” (ibid. 165) is not necessary in order to find meaning in life. According to this 
account, the problem of meaningless suffering will no longer occupy a central position in the 
human experience once suffering is acknowledged as a necessary part of life.   
There is a significant difference in the evaluation of suffering between Nietzsche and 
Christian accounts. Nietzsche does not condemn suffering, nor consider it something we 
ought to strive to get rid of. For Nietzsche, whatever picture the ‘ideal world’ may refer to, it 
is not one without suffering. The Christian picture shows us the opposite: suffering is a 
difficult and undesirable part of life, and one of the reasons why this life is not as good as the 
next: the better, even perfect, world after this one does not contain any suffering. Although 
Nietzsche’s account does provide an answer to the problem of meaningless suffering, it 
furthermore contains an evaluation of suffering that is radically different from that proposed 
by Christianity.  
We need to consider what it means to affirm meaningless suffering. The way in which I have 
described the post-Christian’s response suggests that it is fully up to her: once she becomes 
aware of her existential sin, she can choose to reject it and answer the problem of meaningless 
suffering differently. This choice is presented as a free, emotionally detached choice, where 
																																																								
64We can look at Löwith to strengthen this reading: “The death of God means the resurrection of the man who is 
abandoned to his own responsibility and command, the man who finally has his most extreme freedom in 
‘freedom toward death.’ At the peak of this freedom, however, the will to the nothing inverts itself into the 
willing of the eternal recurrence of the same.” (Löwith 1997: 37) 
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existential sin either does or does not correspond with other beliefs the post-Christian 
reflectively holds. These beliefs need not necessarily be religious. For example, if she 
understands herself as a free agent in the world, able to make her future and put an imprint 
upon the world, she will most likely want to reject existential sin. If, on the other hand, she 
understands the world as filled with suffering, is immensely troubled by how humankind is 
destroying earth, and believes her conscience to be the key to navigating the world, she may 
wish to affirm existential sin.  
Presenting this decision as such is somewhat misleading. As Hamilton points out, there is 
always an element of luck involved here: “if one is able to look the tragedy of life squarely in 
the face and find things in life that make it nonetheless worthwhile, then this is largely a 
matter of luck.” (2016: 146). The ways in which the post-Christian understands the world, and 
the beliefs she holds, are not merely a matter of reflection: they are impacted by our culture, 
by our education, by our temperament: in other words, by contingent circumstances. 
The demands of life affirmation are significant, and perhaps even excessive. Why is it not 
enough to accept suffering as a part of life and not as desirable? And why is it furthermore not 
even sufficient to accept and love suffering as a means to an end, rather than in itself? The 
excessiveness of Nietzsche’s demand is brought out particularly strongly if we consider the 
doctrine of eternal recurrence. Nietzsche writes: 
What if some day or night a demon were to steal into your loneliest loneliness and say 
to you: ‘This life as you now live it and have lived it you will have to live once again 
and innumerable times again; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and 
every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unspeakably small or great in 
your life must return to you, all in the same succession and sequence - even this spider 
and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal 
hourglass of existence is turned over again and again, and you with it, speck of dust! 
Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who 
spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would 
have answered him: ‘You are a god, and never have I heard anything more divine.’ If 
this thought gained power over you, as you are it would transform and possibly crush 
you; the question in each and every thing, ‘Do you want this again and innumerable 
times again?’ would lie on your actions as the heaviest weight! Or how well disposed 
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would you have to become to yourself and to life to long for nothing more fervently 
than for thus ultimate eternal confirmation and seal? (GS: 341) 
The final sentence is key here, what the eternal return demands is for a person to be well-
disposed towards herself and her life to such an extent that she would happily live it over and 
over again. This is the exact opposite of what the ascetic priest’s message demands of us. 
There, we are told that this life is one of sin and misery, but that once it is finished for us, 
there will be relief in a different world. This orientation is therefore one where there will be 
radically different possibilities open to us after our lives, and that these possibilities are 
precisely what we should look forward to as they will be without suffering. For Nietzsche, 
there is no such future available to us. Instead, we have to think of our life as being repeatedly 
infinitely, and we should strive for desiring this to come to fruition. This means that, for 
example, I ought to desire to relive the death of my mother. On a larger scale, it means that I 
ought to desire to live in a world where Rohingya are systematically murdered, women in 
India raped, and gay men in Chechnya detained for no reason. It means that I ought to desire a 
world with, for example, a history of slavery, segregation, and the Holocaust.     
These things I cannot and will not desire. And so, when we look at what life-affirmation 
demands of us, we have to seriously consider that it might be demanding the impossible. 
Maudemarie Clark insists that within Nietzsche’s account we must be able to affirm life 
through eternal return whilst “preferring a world that is just like ours except for the absence of 
Hitler […]”  (Clark 1990: 281). Indeed, many commentators struggle with what seems to a 
thoroughly unethical view in Nietzsche’s account of life-affirmation: if saying ‘yes to life’ 
means designating all past suffering as desirable, we would be considering acts of cruelty, 
violence and pain as desirable. When I struggle to accept the suffering that cancer forced my 
mother to go through, any suggestion that I should not only accept this suffering as necessary, 
but also designate it as desirable would be felt as unreasonable and unethical.  
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In order to offer an alternative explanation for meaningless suffering that can usurp the 
position of existential sin in Western European culture, we may not have to go as far as 
Nietzsche’s concept of life-affirmation goes. He offers us a starting point by arguing that 
suffering is, necessarily, a part of life. He further argues that in order to flourish we need to 
embrace this suffering as desirable. This further step he takes is not necessarily in order for 
life-affirmation to be an effective answer to the problem of meaningless suffering. A 
resignation that comes from understanding all suffering to be inherently a part of life, and as 
such necessary and unavoidable can take the sting out of the problem of meaningless 
suffering. Nietzsche does not advocate resignation, but a powerful affirmation, a ‘yes’ to the 
suffering that I have seen and endured.    
The problem of meaningless suffering concerns suffering that we consider to be without 
rhyme or reason and possibly unjust. The paradigm of existential sin responds to these 
instances of suffering not only by explaining that humankind is essentially guilty and 
therefore deserving of punishment, but also by positing another world in which there will be 
no more suffering. Some theologians might be comfortable arguing that a child’s death from 
leukaemia is related to guilt, but it will be difficult for most people to accept this explanation. 
However, emphasizing that the child is now somewhere where she can no longer suffer can be 
an immense source of comfort. Life-affirmation cannot provide this second kind of comfort, 
as there is no other pain-less realm that we can look forward to. It can explain the suffering of 
this child by pointing to the facts of our existence: there is no rhyme and reason to suffering, 
many suffer unjustly, and this is part of what it means to be human. For Nietzsche, we should 
add “and this is good!” For the person struggling with meaningless suffering, it would 
actually suffice to say “and this is difficult and frustrating.” In order to respond to 
meaningless suffering, we need not create a framework in which it is to be affirmed as 
desirable, but rather we need a framework that allows us to understand the role of suffering in 
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relation to us as human beings, and the world. Acknowledging the fact that suffering is a 
necessary part of life does precisely this. Acknowledging the fact that suffering is not related 
to our guilt, but that it is largely a game of chance further aids our understanding. We need to 
go to the lengths Nietzsche went through in order to make life with meaningless suffering 
bearable: suffering is a fact of life, but need not be desired.    
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Conclusion 
 
I stand before my highest mountains and before my longest hike: therefore I 
must descend deeper than I ever climbed before: – descend deeper into 
suffering than I ever climbed before, down into its blackest flood! (TZ, ‘The 
Wanderer’) 
 
 
One way in which this current philosophical project can be understood is as making a 
distinction between parts of our relation to ourselves and the world that are fixed, and parts 
that may appear fixed but are in reality no more than very hard to get rid of. The question of 
meaningless suffering is fixed, as it is a part of what it means to be a human being as such. 
Existential sin is not fixed, but has proven itself to be extremely persistent. In many ways, 
understanding the tenacity of existential sin was the main motivation for this thesis: why is 
existential sin still a pernicious part of the human experience in Western Europe when there is 
a clear decline in the number of people that consciously affirm Christian beliefs?   
The answer to this question, I have argued, lies in the fact that existential sin responds to an 
ontological problem. As such, it captures something fundamental about the human 
experience. Nietzsche convincingly shows us that existential sin is a product of Christianity, 
and tied to a particular cultural trajectory. It is therefore itself not ontologically necessary, but 
existential sin continues to resonate with us because it is responsive to the problem of 
meaningless suffering.  
In this thesis I focused not on the problem of meaningless suffering, but rather on establishing 
a robust account of existential sin that can help us understand its relevance for contemporary 
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society. In order to do so I first offered a detailed account of sin in Christian thought. 
Although not comprehensive, it included discussions of many pivotal texts in the history of 
sin. Through exploring these texts, I established existential sin as a category of sin that 
concerns human nature, rather than specific acts. Texts such as Paul’s Romans and Calvin’s 
Institutes of the Christian Religion offer accounts of existential sin that describe it as a terrible 
burden and illness, a state of human nature that comes with significant suffering.  
It is precisely this type of description of sin that we can also find in Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
work. In the second chapter of this thesis I argued that we should understand Nietzsche’s 
account of sin, particularly as expounded in his Genealogy, as thoroughly rooted in the 
Christian tradition. This chapter thereby argued against certain commentators of Nietzsche, 
who represent his project in the genealogy as wholly secular. It is in fact when we place 
Nietzsche in direct conversation with the Christian tradition that his powerful descriptions of 
existential sin can be adequately understood.  
However, it is pivotal to this thesis that existential sin does not remain an excuslively 
religious category. Although rooted in Christianity, I show in the third chapter that existential 
sin as a form of self-understanding has taken on a life of its own after the ‘death of God’. By 
looking at Nietzsche’s account of the ‘death of God’ and the shadows that remain, I argue that 
it is indeed possible for such thoroughly religious concepts to remain a part of a culture even 
if a process of secularization has taken place. Existential sin has become a cultural memory 
that is cemented within Western European culture, and therefore available as a form of self-
understanding even for post-Christians. In responding to an ontological problem, existential 
sin has become a category that itself appears to be fundamental to the human experience. 
The final chapter serves to argue that existential sin is not fixed, and that there are methods of 
redemption from sin available to us. Given that existential sin is so deeply rooted in Christian 
		 172	
thought, I first look at Christian accounts of redemption. Following Nietzsche, I argue that 
these forms of redemption are not available for the post-Christian sinner. I therefore turn to 
two forms of redemption found in Nietzsche’s work: the genealogical method and life-
affirmation. Although genealogy can allow the post-Christian sinner to become aware of her 
sense of sinfulness, it does not offer us a robust theoretical account of how this would allow 
her to change it. Life-affirmation appears more promising: it allows the post-Christian to take 
up a different orientation towards her own life. In particular, by designating all suffering as a 
necessary part of life, we can offer a different way of responding to the problem of 
meaningless suffering. However, I argue that Nietzsche’s account of life affirmation requires 
too much in its emphasis on depicting suffering not only as necessary but desirable. The 
affirmation of suffering can be a viable alternative to existential sin in its response to the 
ontological problem of suffering, and designating suffering as desirable is therefore not 
necessary. 
A final thought on the topic of the affirmation of suffering. To affirm suffering means to look 
it squarely in the eye and acknowledge that it is a fundamental part of human existence. In 
other words, to affirm suffering means to know and understand the extent and inescapability 
of suffering. In the fourth chapter of this thesis I argued that this knowledge, and acceptance 
thereof, can redeem us from the problem of meaningless suffering. This argument assumes 
that an awareness of the inescapability of suffering can be a relief to us, because at least we 
understand why there is such seemingly gratuitous suffering. It is entirely possible, however, 
that this knowledge leads to despair rather than relief. One might say that the happiness of 
Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden before they ate of the fruit can never be matched by any 
happiness achieved on earth. Lev Shestov tells us that “the fallen man […] puts all his trust in 
knowledge, while it is precisely knowledge that paralyzes his will and leads him inexorably to 
his downfall.” (1968: 222). This thought should be taken seriously, and any further 
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exploration of existential sin might want to consider the possibility that it has proven more 
persistent than the affirmation of suffering precisely because it does not require us to 
acknowledge the truth of suffering: that it is pervasive, indifferent, and overwhelming.  
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